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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees the free exercise of religion and prohibits the estab-
lishment of religion by government.' In dozens of cases decided
in the past three decades, the Supreme Court, as the institution
designated under the federal system to ultimately resolve these
issues, has struggled to identify coherent principles of interpre-
tation. The difficulties inherent in attempting to reconcile the
prerogatives of individual belief with the majoritarian acts of
governmental bodies have created a jurisprudence of complex,
conflicting, and often undulating principles.
The emergence of a new kind of religious challenge has re-
cently compounded the problems faced by the Court. In the past,
free exercise and establishment challenges generally were posed
by religious adherents seeking exemptions from oppressive
majoritarian action or by nonreligious (or nonconforming reli-
gious) individuals seeking to strike down legislation that was
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ").
838 [Vol. 36:837
1995] SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 839
seen as advancing the cause of traditional religious groups. In
both cases, the complaining parties accepted-indeed, advocat-
ed-the private nature of religious experience and sought its
separation or protection from the public sphere. During the past
few years, a new kind of claimant has emerged. Whether reli-
gious employers resisting the enforcement of state and munici-
pal civil rights laws2 or parents objecting to the establishment
of "secular humanism" in the public schools,3 these claimants
share a fundamental characteristic: they reject the assumption
of the separation of the religious and the secular in society and
in government. They contend instead that religious beliefs and
values are an integral and inseparable part of all aspects of
their lives. Although claimants with such views have certainly
not been unknown in the Supreme Court,4 the recent public
assertion of such claims by more traditional religious groups
presents a new and difficult challenge for existing First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. The implication of nonseparationist
claims-that all state activity potentially involves Free Exercise
2. See, e.g., Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985) (objection
by the Roman Catholic Church, Agudath Israel, and the Salvation Army to the en-
forcement of state and municipal civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of religion, sex, marital status, or affectional preference, as an
infringement of the employers' rights to free religious exercise); Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 474 U.S. 978 (1986); State v. Sports & Health Club,
Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986)
(similar claims by fundamentalist Christian groups).
3. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)
(contention that a prescribed set of reading textbooks in the public schools contained
acceptance of evolution, secular humanism, futuristic supernaturalism, and pacifism,
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Smith
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.) (claim that "a man-centered
belief-system, . . . [known] by the appellation 'secular humanism,' [was] promoted in
the public schools to the detriment of [the complainant's] children's First Amendment
right of free exercise, all in violation of the Establishment Clause"), rev'd, 827 F.2d
684 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (challenge to two exhibitions at the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History,
on the ground that they established secular humanism in violation of Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause guarantees).
4. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (Native Americans); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish); Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890) (Mormons); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (Mormons).
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or Establishment Clause guarantees--challenges the limits of
First Amendment doctrine.
Nonseparationist claims present the most difficult challenge
because they attack what I shall argue to be the deepest motiva-
tion and operating principle of existing First Amendment juris-
prudence: the separation of the religious and the secular within
the individual, in society, and in government. While acknowl-
edging the pervasiveness of religious belief in many aspects of
individual and collective life, the Court's majorities have as-
sumed that such separation can be made-indeed, must be
made-in determining the scope of First Amendment religious
protections and prohibitions. This belief has been presented as
something required by the history, purposes, and spirit of the
Amendment; and it has, accordingly, been enshrined as the core,
first principle of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's attempt to separate the religious and
the secular is not an aberrational response to twentieth-century
society and political culture. It is part of a deeper strain in
American politics and government that has gained momentum
since the time of the Founding Era.' What was originally at-
tempted "disestablishment," or the removal of governmental
support of religious institutions, became a model for deeper
schism between the religious and the secular spheres of life. As
secularism and religious individualism became important cultur-
al forces, attitudes hardened toward the involvement of the
religious in public life.' Walter Berns expressed a not uncom-
mon view when he listed the Ku Klux Klan, the Know-Nothing
5. The "Founding Era" for the purposes of this study will be understood to en-
compass, roughly, the period of 1770-1800. To the extent that individuals who were
prominent during that period made later statements which bear directly upon these
issues, those statements are included as well.
6. See generally PETER L. BERGER, TIiE SACRED CANOPY 1 (1967) ("Religion was
no longer the 'sacred canopy,' investing the existing social order with sacred mean-
ing."); STEPHEN L. CARTER, TIE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) (describing general attitudes of hos-
tility to religion in public life); CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW ANI)
THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION 1-10 (1986) (same); Sanford Levinson, The Con-
frontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1059 (1990) (attributing the "privatization of religious identi-
ty" to the ascendance of Protestant theology).
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Party, and the Jehovah's Witnesses as examples of groups who
have combined religion and politics and who "have both mani-
fested bigotry and been its victims." "[B]igotry sometimes mani-
fests itself politically when given the opportunity and the occa-
sion .... "'
Some have lived happily under this scheme. Secularists who
view religion with suspicion and distrust consider its
expungement from public life as a practical and highly desirable
necessity. Some Protestant groups also have welcomed this de-
velopment. For them, religion is a private matter, and members'
primary concerns with personal salvation have little to do with
the affairs of government. For other groups, the attempted
compartmentalization of life into separate religious and secular
spheres has created extraordinary difficulty and alienation.
Those who believe in the "public church"-in the need for reli-
giously-based responses to questions of social responsibility or
the public good--view the attempted delegitimization of reli-
gious beliefs and values in the public sphere with much bitter-
ness, anger, and alienation from public institutions. John
Courtney Murray, who has been called "the most important
American Catholic thinker of the twentieth century,"9 reflects
this sentiment when he attacks the Supreme Court's efforts
toward privatization of religion as "an irredeemable piece of
sectarian dogmatism. . . , a deistic version of fundamentalist
Protestantism.""
7. WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY 35 (1976). Berns expresses relief that 'the history of the United States,
especially on the national level, is marked by the absence of religious politics ...
Id.
8. See generally MARTIN E. MARTY, THE PUBLIC CHURCH (1981). These groups in-
clude Roman Catholics, evangelical and sectarian churches, some mainline Protestant
groups, and many of those in the Jewish community. See EDWARD F. HUMPHREY,
NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 1774-1789, at 3 (1924); Levinson, supra note
6, at 1059-60 (discussing the comprehensive reach of many strands of Roman Catho-
lic thought, and the reach of Traditional Judaism "from the bedroom to the public
square").
9. WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 218 (1986).
10. John C. Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 30
(1949); see also JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION at ix (1964) ([A] Catholic ... knows that the prin-
84119951
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There is no doubt but that religion has "sanctified many cruel-
ties."1 There is also no doubt but that religious impulses have
galvanized individual action and compelled social change
throughout our history, from the anti-slavery campaigns of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the Civil Rights move-
ment of the 1960s.12 For better or worse, religion has always
been a powerful force in American history. As historian Henry
May has observed, true religious skepticism has largely been
confined to small groups of intellectuals; emotionally fervent and
often theologically conservative religion has always been very
prevalent and very powerful, particularly among the poor and
the oppressed.13 The extraordinary degree of religiosity in
American life, when compared to other Western cultures, has
been documented many times. 4 For many citizens, religion pro-
ciples of Catholic faith and morality stand superior to, and in control of, the whole
order of civil life. The question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism is compati-
ble with American democracy. The question is invalid as well as impertinent; for the
manner of its position inverts the order of values.").
11. MILLER, supra note 9, at 347.
12. See MOONEY, supra note 6, at 6 ("This was precisely the source of the Civil
Rights movement of the 1960s: the ability of Martin Luther King, Jr., to draw upon
and then to transform the personal spiritual experiences of so many Americans by
his call to build a just society."); see also HUMPHREY, supra note 8, at 15 ("The Anti-
slavery clauses of the Constitution may be attributed to the 'religious fanaticism' of
Quakers, Methodists, Baptists, and various other church organizations.").
13. HENRY F. MAY, IDEAS, FAITHS AND FEELINGS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN INTELLEC-
TUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 1952-1982, at 136 (1983).
14. A recent study observed that:
Religion is one of the most important ways in which Americans "get
involved" in the life of their community and society. Americans give more
money and donate more time to religious bodies and religiously associat-
ed organizations than to all other voluntary associations put together.
Some 40 percent of Americans attend religious services at least once a
week . . . and religious membership is around 60 percent of the total
population.
ROBERT N. BELLAB, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 219 (1985). In a survey of resi-
dents of North Carolina taken in the 1970s, 74% agreed with the statement that
"human rights come from God and not merely from laws." Phillip E. Hammond, The
Conditions for Civil Religion: A Comparison of the United States and Mexico, in
ROBERT N. BELLAH & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION 41 (1980).
Although such ideas have certainly undergone periods of erosion, see, e.g., SYDNEY E.
AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1972), that religion has
been and remains a powerful force in American culture is undeniable. As Henry
May wrote, "[tlo say that something which attracts some concrete allegiance from 60
percent of the population is insignificant, one must be extraordinarily certain about
842
SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
vides a deeper meaning for life and the opportunity to belong to
a defined community. For such individuals, the division of life
into religious and secular spheres, with little commerce between
them, is a virtual impossibility. Although the vast majority sup-
ports the concept of church-state separation, this ideal does not
mean the exclusion of the religious from public life.
In this Article, I will examine this model of religious/secular
separation. I will first examine the Supreme Court's efforts to
separate the religious and the secular as a matter of First
Amendment, doctrinal interpretation. The Supreme Court's
efforts have proceeded along two lines: analytical separation, or
the separation of religious motives, uses, meanings, and so on,
from secular ones; and a deeper (and related) spheric separation,
or the separation of religion, as a totality, from public life and
government. I will argue that these separationist models, al-
though often unspoken, have in fact been used by the Court to
provide fundamental shape and content to First Amendment
guarantees.
Distinctions between the religious and the secular can surely
be made; indeed, such distinctions are assumed if the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses are to have meaning at all. Ques-
fions of distinction are different, however, from those of separa-
tion. Can the religious and the secular uses of an object be sepa-
rated, such that the object can be put to a secular use but not to
a religious one? Can the religious and the secular motivations of
an individual be separated, such that we can be sure that an
action has secular reasons, but not religious ones? Sometimes,
the answer is yes. We can identify religious and secular institu-
tions; we can identify clearly religious exercises and those which
have no apparent religious content.
I shall argue, however, that such analytical separation, and
the deeper spheric separation it serves, are more often analytical
and practical impossibilities. Religious beliefs, expressions, or
values are intrinsically interwoven in the lives of human beings
and in the cultures and governments that human beings create.
The Court's attempted separation of the religious and the secu-
lar, in the terms it has evolved, is in fact an impossible task;
what is important and what is not." MAY, supra note 13, at 158-59.
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and in the wake of its failure lies a body of jurisprudence of
inevitable-and unparalleled-contradiction and confusion.
If we reject this separationist model as the structure for First
Amendment jurisprudence, what could take its place? In an
effort to answer this question, I will examine the alleged histori-
cal roots for the separationist approach. The Supreme Court has,
through the invocation of writings by men such as Thomas Jef-
ferson and James Madison, attempted to identify an alleged
historical separation between the religious and the secular,
which it then employs to guide its understanding of the constitu-
tional guarantees of individual free exercise and freedom from
government establishment of religion.15 The Court argues that
through this separation, Madison, Jefferson, and other reformers
believed that the secular state would be protected and govern-
mental encroachment on fundamental religious liberties would
be contained.
Through an examination of the historical evidence presented,
I will argue that a separation of the religious and the secular, in
the terms envisioned by the Supreme Court, was not a part of
the reformist strains of political or constitutional discourse dur-
ing the Founding Era. The religious freedom that was the core of
concern at the time was freedom of conscience; its preservation
represented the highest common factor of agreement among
anti-clericalists (such as Jefferson and Madison) and those com-
posing other parts of the religious and political spectra. Free
inquiry, or freedom of conscience, was believed to be necessary
in order that religious or "transcendent" moral truths could be
apprehended by individuals and could, in turn, be implemented
by government. Such truths, and the values that they suggested,
were believed to be vital for the creation of basic social bonds
and for maintenance of the foundations of republican govern-
ment. Individual free religious exercise and freedom from gov-
ernment establishment of religion were seen as necessary ways
to preserve individual free, "religious" inquiry as a vital and
necessary part of individual and collective life.
The approach to religious freedom that emerged during this
15. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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period never required separation of the religious and the secular
in the terms that the Supreme Court assumes. To the contrary,
this ideal assumed the essentiality of freedom of conscience (or
religious free exercise) in individual affairs and in collective life.
The individual and social utility of this freedom required that it
be afforded the greatest latitude that maintenance of public
order could allow. There was only one exception to this: the
prevention of alliance or merger of religious and governmental
institutions. Because institutional alliance was believed to carry
the potential for destruction of freedom of conscience (the core,
underlying value), such alliance was prohibited.
This approach-which I shall call the "historical" approach-is
strikingly different from that which we generally assume to be
necessary for the preservation of religious freedom. Its broad
understanding of the religious, and of the primacy of religious
freedom (as essential to private and public life), represents a
radical departure from most existing twentieth-century assump-
tions. If we acknowledge the inseparability of religious and secu-
lar beliefs, values, and expressions-if all are acknowledged to
be integral and important parts of our culture, society, and gov-
ernment-is there any shape or content to First Amendment
guarantees? Or do they-as some fundamentalist claims im-
ply-simply dissolve into protections and prohibitions of unlimit-
ed scope?
In the third Section, I will consider what the implications of
this historical or "nonseparationist" approach might be. I will
argue that the historical approach in fact yields a more work-
able, albeit quite different, shape and content for First Amend-
ment guarantees. Free exercise protections will, for instance,
include the recognition of societal as well as individual interests
in the protection of claims, fundamentally altering the outcome
in many cases. In the Establishment Clause area, general con-
cern with the expungement of religious values, motivations,
uses, purposes, and so on in the public sphere will be replaced
by the enforcement of religious and governmental institutional
separati6n. I will demonstrate that, in both cases, our judicial
system can preserve fundamental religious freedoms, while ac-
knowledging the integrated nature of the religious and the secu-
lar in human life and experience. I will also argue that under
19951 845
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this approach, the seeming conflict between Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause principles is, in large part, reconciled.
In conclusion, I will consider a deeper issue posed by those
who advocate the separation of the religious and the secular in
public life. A debate has raged recently over whether the "tradi-
tional" exclusion of the religious from liberal democratic politics
is either necessary or desirable in view of its inherent discrimi-
nation against religious persons and views.16 I will consider the
question in the reverse light: whether we, as custodians of a
liberal, democratic government, should wish to separate the
religious from the secular in public affairs. The articulate
spokesmen of the Founding Era did not see religion, society, or
government in such narrow terms. The question that we must
address is whether we, indeed, wish to do so.
Before discussing these ideas, I will address two questions.
The first is what the "religious," as used in this Article, is in-
tended to convey. During the Revolutionary period, more than
three thousand religious organizations existed in the American
colonies.17 Differences among these groups were profound; the
roles assigned to reason and revelation, the interpretation or
authenticity of religious writings, the existence or nature of a
Supreme Being, and so on, created charges and countercharges
of heresy or worse.'" Despite these differences, the fact that the
16. Some argue in favor of the exclusion of religion from democratic discourse.
See, e.g., DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 190-91 (1984); MOONEY, su-
pra note 6, at 14-15; RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 8 (1984); Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of
Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad
eds., 1988); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE
L.J. 1611, 1620-21 (1993); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1555 (1988); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public
Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993). Others resist the exclusion of the religious
voice, in whole or in part. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 6; KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POW-
ER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); Stephen L.
Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 977; Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV.
671 (1992).
17. 1 ANTON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 273 (1950).
18. One common target for such charges were Deists, who, although they clearly
believed in the existence of a Supreme Being and shared other tenets of major reli-
gious groups, were often excoriated for their explicit rejection of other Christian
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"religious" had meaning to the Founding generation is beyond
dispute. When the Virginia Declaration of Rights or the Massa-
chusetts Constitution referred to religious rights and liberties,
those references clearly had meaning for the people of that age.
Although particular beliefs differed from individual to individu-
al, religious beliefs shared a family resemblance that generated
widespread recognition and desires for protection. Throughout
our history, Americans have had a shared, cultural understand-
ing of what religious liberty is-the ability of individuals to
freely decide about ultimate matters of belief, meaning, and
value. 9 In this study, "religion" is used in this sense. It does
not have a sectarian, or even deistic, meaning. Rather, this
study proceeds from the premise that religion, in the sense of
the search for fundamental or transcendent truths, is an inte-
gral part of human freedom and human experience; and that it
is for this reason that we so persistently seek its protection.
Finally, because of the heightened sensitivity that surrounds
these issues, the motivations and purposes that underlie this
Article should be made clear. I do not consider myself a "reli-
gious" person in the traditional sense. My intention is not to
argue for religious evangelism in politics, or to advocate the
"return of religion" to public schools. The exclusion of explicitly
religious argument from public dialogue, as a way to avoid im-
pediments to conversation, deliberation, and the achievement of
consensus, is, in my view, a worthwhile and necessary public
goal. The principles of church-state institutional separation that
I describe here are, in many respects, more severe than those
established by prevailing Supreme Court doctrine.
Rather, my concern is with the role of individual conscience in
public life. Throughout our history, individual conscience has
provided one of the few indictments against the use of the exis-
tence of law or the existence of collective judgment as a justifica-
tion for the failure of individuals to make moral inquiry. By
"separating" the religious from the secular, and excluding the
beliefs. See RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 196-98 (1985). Some Federalists expressed the fear that if Deism or
noninstitutionalist evangelism grew, the moral fabric of the nation would be at risk.
See LINDA K. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT 212 (1970).
19. See MILLER, supra note 9, at 340-43.
1995] 847
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
former from public life, we implicitly exclude (as irrelevant or
illegitimate) ultimate issues of belief, meaning, and value. We
justify and reify a model of superficiality and self-centeredness
in politics. We risk the loss of individual conscience in public
life.
II. THE ATTEMPTED SEPARATION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE
SECULAR: THE STATE OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Of all constitutional provisions, the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment present the most overt challenge to the at-
tempted separation of the 'religious and the secular in govern-
mental affairs. The very existence of the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses is a testament to the existence of religious
belief and its potential involvement with government. The Free
Exercise Clause establishes the protection (and limits) of indi-
vidual action (or inaction) on the basis of religious belief; the
Establishment Clause establishes the protection (and limits) of
government in its interaction with religion. Both challenge the
shape, form, and content of the religious/secular divide.
The approach of the Supreme Court has been to unremittingly
attempt to separate the religious from the secular in two ways:
analytical separation, or the separation of religious motives,
meanings, and so on, from secular ones; and a deeper (and relat-
ed) spheric separation, or the separation of religion, as a totality,
from public life and government. As the first effort has proven to
be increasingly problematic, the second has become more insis-
tent. The result has been the development of a body of jurispru-
dence of perhaps unparalleled contradiction and confusion.
The problems begin with the analytical first step in the appli-
cation of the Religion Clauses: the definition of religion itself.
The Court's definition of religion has undergone a process of
evolution. In early cases, the Court defined religion in tradition-
al, theistic terms: it was "one's views of his relations to his Cre-
ator"2 or a "belief in a relation to God involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation."2' Not until Torcaso
20. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
21. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dis-
senting).
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v. Watkins,22 decided in 1961, did the Court extend recognition
to nontheistic religions as well. In its now-famous footnote, the
Court stated that "[a]mong religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the exis-
tence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism, and others."23 Later, in the context of statutory
interpretation, the Court attempted to refine the definition of a
nontheistic religious belief to be one that is "sincere and mean-
ingful" and "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by ... God." It is a belief that is "based upon a
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is ... ultimate-
ly dependent."24
The difficulty in determining the boundaries of religious belief
under these definitions25 was compounded by the Court's at
least ostensible adherence to the principle that both the nature
of asserted religious belief and the question of an individual's
adherence to that belief must be left to individual determination,
without interference or second-guessing by the courts.2" In
22. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
23. Id. at 495 n.11.
24. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
25. For scholarly attempts to derive a workable definition of religion from these
tests, see, for example, John H. Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, in
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 10 (David A. Gianella ed., 1965) (proposing that
religious belief is "the affirmation of some truth, reality, or value" that "addresses
itself to basic questions to which man has always sought an answer, questions about
the meaning of human existence, the origin of being, the meaning of suffering and
death, and the existence of a spiritual reality"); Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A
First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 164-65 (1982)
(suggesting that religion consists of beliefs or practices based on a perception of
reality composed of both "sacred" (that which transcends experience in the natural
environment) and "profane" (natural) elements); Note, Toward a Constitutional Defi-
nition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1071 (1978) (arguing that religion is an
individual's 'ultimate concern," which may be political, economic, or cultural): For
critiques of these efforts, see Anand Agneshwar, Rediscovering God in the Constitu-
tion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295 (1992); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980); George C.
Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71
GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983).
26. Indeed, it has been suggested that judicial formulation of a definition of reli-
gion may itself violate Establishment Clause guarantees. See Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Certainly this Court
cannot be called upon to determine what claims of conscience should be recognized
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
United States v. Ballard,27 the Court reiterated that the
boundaries of religious belief are subjective, understood and
defined by the individual alone:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious be-
lief, is basic in a society of free men.... It embraces the
right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox
faiths.... Men may believe what they cannot prove....
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may
be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be
made suspect before the law.28
Respect for the liberal principle of individual free inquiry and
autonomy in religious matters reached its zenith in West Virgin-
ia State Board of Education v. Barnette,29 when the Court stat-
ed that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion . . . ."" As the Court has very recently reiterat-
ed, "'religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection."'31
and what should be rejected as satisfying the 'religion' which the Constitution pro-
tects. That would indeed resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion
which the Constitution sought forever to forbid.").
27. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Ballard was the first case that squarely presented the
issue of potential conflict between theistic definitions of religion and the principle of
individual free inquiry and definition. Its advent was undoubtedly the result of the
rise of nontheistic and other "unorthodox" religious beliefs in the United States. Cf
James Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American Plural-
ism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 3 (discussing the rise of a hetero-
doxy of moral values based upon religious beliefs).
28. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87 (citation omitted).
29. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Id. at 642; see also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("lIlt is no
business of [the] courts to say ...what is a religious practice or activity . . ").
31. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2225 (1993) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). In Hialeah,
the Court noted that the appellants' claims "cannot be deemed bizarre or incredi-
ble."' Id. at 2226 (quoting Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829,
834 n.2 (1989)). If a belief need not be "comprehensible to others," one wonders why
the Court implies the relevance of a "bizarre or incredible" test.
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The extension of "religion" to include nontheistic or unortho-
dox beliefs, and the leaving of the content and sincerity 2 of be-
liefs to the individual declarant, did not represent a retreat from
the attempt to separate the religious and the secular: if any-
thing, it made the need to establish boundaries even more press-
ing. If the definition of religion is nebulous at best, and what
definition exists is left to the individual adherent, the potential
reach of claims under the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment
Clause becomes unlimited.
Traditionally, the Court has attempted to contain free exercise
claims in two ways: by distinguishing (pure) religious belief from
("less religious" or "quasi-secular") religiously-motivated action,
and by weighing such action against any compelling state inter-
est involved. Freedom to believe receives absolute protection,
whereas freedom to act (in accordance with religious belief) does
not." Freedom to act is protected only if it is required by a cen-
tral religious belief, is substantially burdened by the governmen-
tal action, and is not outweighed by a compelling governmental
interest.
34
The problems with these tests are apparent. The distinction
between belief and action assumes an analytical and actual
separation may characterize some mainstream religious faiths,
but is clearly rejected by others.35 Since, under the Court's
view, the nature of religious belief must be left to the religious
32. Inquiry into the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs might well "run
afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees." Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961); see Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protec-
tion: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604, 622 (1964) (arguing that assess-
ment of the validity of religious beliefs intrudes into individual religious freedom and
risks "establishing a notion respecting religion" in violation of the Establishment
Clause).
33. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603-05; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-
05 (1940).
34. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
35. See, e.g., State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 859-62
(Minn. 1985) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (discussing current Christian views of religious
beliefs and secular life), dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Note, Re-
ligious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Au-
thorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 364 n.81 (1980) (observing that Jehovah's Witnesses and
Jews, among others, see a broad role for religious beliefs in areas of life often con-
sidered to be secular).
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declarant, the simple exemption of belief from governmental
control represents a potentially large incursion by religious
claims into the realm of secular state authority. Faced with this
problem, the Court simply has found virtually all claims to in-
volve "action": -even when founded on the status of an indi-
vidual as a leader of a religious group. Indeed, in the history
of the Court's adjudication of free exercise claims, only once has
the Court recognized clear governmental coercion of religious
belief: the required declaration of belief in God for the holding of
public office. :"
The collapse of the belief/action distinction has pushed the
analysis of free exercise claims into the second part of the
Court's test: whether there is a central religious belief or prac-
tice that is burdened by state action and, if so, whether it is
outweighed by a compelling governmental interest. Although
there has been some discussion of the "centrality" and "burden"
requirements, and a rare case where the absence of a "burden"
on a "central" religious belief seemed to play a part in the
Court's analysis, 9 the need to defer to-an individual claimant's
36. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1943) (holding that
distribution of religious literature was "action," even though "ItIhis form of religious
activity occupies the same high estate . . . as . . . preaching from the pulpits");
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-07 (1940) (holding that delivery of the
religious message by Jehovah's Witnesses in house-to-house canvassing was religious
"action" subject to compelling state interest test).
37. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that
Tennessee law operated against claimant "because of his status as a 'minister' or
'priest.'" The law was "directed primarily at status, acts, and conduct," and not
"'freedom to believe'). But see id. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
("The characterization of the exclusion as one burdening appellant's 'career or calling'
cannot withstand analysis. . . . One's religious belief surely does not cease to enjoy
the protection of the First Amendment when held with such depth of sincerity as to
impel one to join the ministry.").
38. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In two other cases, the Court held
that state action unconstitutionally required the "declaration of belief," but the deci-
sions rested more clearly on speech than on religious grounds. See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
39. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
304-05 (1985) (denying free-exercise claim, on the ground that government action did
not actually burden religious beliefs); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) (Although "[lilt is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' inter-
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declarations of the existence, importance, and impairment of
religious beliefs has made this determination an unworkable
basis for distinguishing protected from unprotected claims.4"
Attention has therefore devolved onto the final part of the inqui-
ry: whether there is a compelling governmental interest in-
volved.
An examination of the Court's implementation of this weigh-
ing of competing values compels the conclusion that the Court
has, in fact, used this test as a surrogate for its deeper notion of
the religious/secular divide. If the religious group in question
respected the separation and autonomy of the religious and sec-
ular spheres along lines generally in accord with liberal no-
tions-if its claim was insular, discrete, and posed no fundamen-
tal challenge to the Court's conception of the separation of the
religious from the secular sphere of public life-its claim was
upheld, even when powerful, countervailing interests were at
stake.41 If, however, the free exercise claim involved a direct
pretations of those creeds, . . . Iwle do, however, have doubts [as to] whether the
alleged burden . . . is a substantial one.").
40. In a recent free exercise decision, all members of the Court appeared to aban-
don the "centrality" test. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990)
("It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of religious be-
liefs before applying a "compelling interest" test in the free exercise field, than it
would be for them to determine the "importance" of ideas before applying the
'compelling interest" test in the free speech field. . . . [Clourts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a reli-
gious claim."); id. at 906-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree with
the Court . . . that because "[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the cen-
trality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith,'" . . . our determination of ...
constitutionality . . . cannot, and should not, turn on the centrality of the particular
religious practice at issue."); id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I agree . . . that
courts should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of religious
doctrine, a particular practice is 'central' to the religion . . . ."). But cf Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 474 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I believe it appropriate . . . to require some showing of 'centrality'
before the Government can be required either to come forward with a compelling
justification for its proposed use of federal land or to forego that use altogether.").
41. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for instance, the Court upheld the
right of the Amish to refuse to send their children to public schools, despite the
state's extremely strong interest in public education. Although the Amish rejected
the idea of the separation of the religious and the secular within the individual,
they accepted it in their dealings with the state; their desire was to be apart from
the rest of the world, not in it. See id. at 246 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ('[Tihe emphasis of the Court on the 'law and order' record of
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challenge to religious/secular separation--either by directly
challenging a prevailing secular norm42 or by a direct challenge
to public, "secular" action 43-it was denied, even when the gov-
ernmental interest involved did not appear to be of a vastly
more compelling nature.44
The collapse of the compelling interest test into a generalized
concern for the protection of the secular state reached its culmi-
nation in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion4" and Employment Division v. Smith.46 In Lyng, Native
Americans challenged the construction of a road and the con-
ducting of logging activities in an area of a national forest used
for their religious worship.47 The Court acknowledged at the
outset that "[i]t is undisputed that the Indian respondents' be-
this Amish group of people is quite irrelevant"); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (invalidating state unemployment compensa-
tion rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness
to work under conditions forbidden by his or her religion); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (same); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 k1963) (same);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down licensing and taxing
systems that restricted religious speech and solicitations); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (same).
42. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (denying Mormons' asserted right to practice polyg-
amy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (same). The powerful, symbolic
nature of the secular norm, and the "flagrant" manner of the Mormons' challenge,
ensured their persecution and defeat---even though they wished to live apart from
others. Polygamy was, the Court wrote, "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of
the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world." Latter-Day
Saints, 136 U.S. at 49. The Court questioned "whether the promotion of such a
nefarious system and practice, so repugnant to our laws and to the principles of our
civilization, is to be allowed to continue by the sanction of the government itself."
Id.
43. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native Americans' claim
for exemption from assignment of a Social Security number); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting Amish claim for exemption from participation in the
Social Security system); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (rejecting
claim for exemption by selective service inductee who opposed a particular war on
religious grounds).
44. See, e.g., Bowen, 476 U.S. at 693 (interest of the government in the "integrity"
of the Social Security system); Lee, 455 U.S. at 252 (same); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 437
(interest of the military selective service in a system free from claims for exemp-
tions).
45. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
46. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441-42.
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liefs are sincere and that the Government's proposed actions will
have severe adverse effects on the practice of their reli-
gion"--assertions that were, indeed, unassailable under the
Court's prior decisions.
Under the Court's traditional test, this finding next required
the demonstration of a compelling governmental interest. The
problem, however, was that the government could demonstrate
no such compelling interest in the activities at issue.49 Faced
with this situation, the Court simply held the compelling inter-
est test to be inapplicable to all claims of this type. Only Vhen
the individual is coerced by government to act in violation of his
religious beliefs must a compelling governmental interest be
shown. If the government's actions simply create conditions that
make religious exercise impossible, that (in the absence of gov-
ernment intent to discriminate against the religious) creates no
cognizable claim under the Free Exercise Clause."
The reason for the Court's decision is clear. If individuals
could declare road building and logging to be burdensome to reli-
gious exercise, they could declare other governmental activities
to be as well.51 To "require government to bring forward a com-
pelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions" whenever
claimants assert a clash between government and religious be-
liefs would result in an intolerable intrusion of religious beliefs
into public affairs.52
In Smith, the respondents were dismissed from their employ-
ment "because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at
a ceremony of the Native American Church." 3 They were sub-
sequently denied unemployment compensation benefits because
they were discharged for work-related "misconduct."54 They
sued on the basis that the state could not condition the avail-
ability of unemployment compensation on an individual's will-
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id. at 445.
50. Id. at 449, 451-52.
51. Id. at 452.
52. Id. at 450-51.
53. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
54. Id.
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ingness to forgo conduct that was religiously required.55
The Court rejected this claim. 6 If prohibiting or burdening
the exercise of religion is not the object of the law, but merely
"the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."57
The Court noted that ."[i]t is not within the judicial ken to ques-
tion the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or
the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those
creeds," '' and that:
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all ... it
must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be
religiously commanded. Moreover, if "compelling interest"
really means what it says . .. , many laws will not meet the
test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy... . [WIe cannot afford the luxury of deeming pre-
sumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order. 9
Accommodation of religious belief must be left to the "political
process."60 This "must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the so-
cial importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs."6
55. Id. at 876.
56. Id. at 890.
57. Id. at 878; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) ("[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.").
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
699 (1989)) (emphasis removed).
59. Id. at 888.
60. Id. at 890.
61. Id.
With the removal of all "neutral" legislation from the traditional, compelling
interest test, the Court can afford to stress the rigor of the test in those few cases
in which it still applies. In Hialeah, the Court stressed that:
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice
must advance "interests of the highest order" and must be narrowly
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Thus, faced with the prospect of unlimited claims-a product
of the Court's prior decisions that leave the definition and scope
of the "religious" to the individual adherent-and the intrusion
that such claims might make into the public or "secular" sphere,
the Court reacted with renewed vehemence of separation. If the
First Amendment previously was read to mean that the religious
could compel government to an accounting, that reading was
now incorrect. For the vast number of governmental acts, the
First Amendment simply does not apply.
Holding the First Amendment to be inapplicable is a solution
of sorts; it is, at least, a rule that is simple in its application.
The state of First Amendment doctrine after Lyng and Smith
has not, however, advanced much in overall coherence. The
protection of freedom to believe will receive absolute protection,
while the manifestation of that belief will not-a separation
which, at least on an analytical level, is an almost hopeless
impossibility. If prohibiting or burdening religion is the object of
the law, it must be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est; if it is not so justified, it is unconstitutional.62 How the "ob-
ject" of any law and its "anti-religious" nature are to be deter-
mined is left unresolved.a The constitutionality of a "neutral"
law, in turn, will depend on whether it requires an individual to
tailored in pursuit of those interest.... The compelling interest stan-
dard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is
not "water[ed] . . . down" but "really means what it says."
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888) (citations omitted).
62. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
63. Recently, the Court gave its first extended statement on the question of how a
law's anti-religious bias, in the Free Exercise context, might be shown. Anti-religious
bias, or the failure of neutrality, is closely related to the law's general applicability;
a law which fails one test is likely to fail the other. Id. at 2226. The issue is
whether "the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious
conduct." Id. at 2227. Relevant evidence includes the text of the law (such as refer-
ence to a religious practice without a discernable secular meaning) and its real effect
and operation (in a way which targets religious practices). Id. at 2227-30.
Several Justices, including Justice Kennedy (who otherwise authored the ma-
jority opinion), wished to explicitly adopt the approach used in Establishment Clause
cases, where relevant evidence includes "the historical background of the decision
under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official
policy in question, as well as the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body." Id. at
2230-31. The majority did not agree.
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act in violation of his religious beliefs, prohibits action in viola-
tion of religious beliefs, or simply creates conditions that make
religious exercise impossible.64 This is true even though action
and inaction are the mirror images of each other, and suppres-
sion of all religious exercise surely works to kill belief itself.65
The Court's reliance upon separationist principles in the con-
struction of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence has fared no
better. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman," a three-pronged test is ap-
plied to determine whether a governmental practice violates the
Establishment Clause: whether it has a secular purpose; wheth-
er its primary effect is one thai neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and whether it fosters excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.67 The "secular purpose" and "primary effect"
prongs of this test have been recently reformulated by the Court
to ask whether the challenged government practice "endorses"
religion-whether it 'convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a mes-
sage that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred.'65
The reasons that the Court has expressed for these tests re-
flect the fears that underlie the enforcement of religious/secular
spheric separation. The "union of government and religion tends
to destroy government and to degrade religion."69 Laws that
permit government involvement in religious practices are inher-
ently "coercive." "When the power, prestige and financial support
64. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-53
(1988).
65. See id., at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Rleligious freedom is threatened no
less by governmental action that makes the practice of one's chosen faith impossible
than by governmental programs that pressure one to engage in conduct inconsistent
with religious beliefs.").
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. Id. at 612-13. The Lemon test has been routinely applied in Establishment
Clause cases since its promulgation. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655
(1992) (refusing to reconsider Lemon); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
592 n.44 (1989) (citing cases that have applied the Lemon test). But cf Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (declining to apply the Lemon test).
68. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-50 (1990) (plurality opinion); id. at 264 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
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of government is [sic] placed behind a particular religious belief,
[there is] ... indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to conform . ,, 70 Government religious establishment and
religious persecution "go hand in hand."7' The involvement of
religion leads to "divisiveness"72-- presumably the conflict be-
tween competing, religiously-based values.73
The application of these Establishment Clause tests has re-
sulted in attempts to separate analytically the religious and the
secular in a myriad of ways. Cases have turned on (1) the sepa-
ration of religious and secular motivations of legislators and
public officials (secular "purpose"),74 (2) the separation of reli-
70. Id.; see also Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("[Tihe Constitution guarantees that gov-
ernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer-
cise . . ").
71. Engel, 370 U.S. at 432.
72. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) ("[Plolitical division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect."); see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584; Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 702-03 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 799-800 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 258
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98
(1973).
73. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 651 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Religious] displays of this kind inevita-
bly have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences among
individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The Establishment Clause does not
allow public bodies to foment such disagreement."); cf Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-56
(noting that '[dlivisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting reli-
gions, and neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the State's
attempts to accommodate religion in all cases." Divisive potential is particularly
acute, however, where 'coercive pressures exist," such as an overt religious exercise
in a secondary public school environment.).
74. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (finding no secular motiva-
tion for state statute prescribing a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer" in public schools); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591-93 (holding that motivation for
statute requiring the teaching of 'creation-science" with "evolution-science" was
'clearly to advance the religious viewpoint"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
107-09 (1968) (finding that "religious advertisements and campaign" for passage of
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools established legislators'
religious motivations); cf Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (plu-
rality opinion) (Even if some legislators were motivated by a desire to protect reli-
gious speech, that alone would not invalidate the Act; "what is relevant is the legis-
lative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators . . ..
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gious and secular uses of books, instructional aids, or equipment
(secular "effect"),7 (3) the separation of religious and secular
functions of particular tasks of government or religious institu-
tions ("entanglement"),76 (4) the separation of religious and sec-
ular elements of symbols (secular "purpose," "effect" or religious
"endorsement")," and so on.
The problems generated by this approach have been both
analytical and empirical.75 In determining whether a statute
Because the Act on its face grants equal access to both secular and religious
speech, . . . the Act's purpose was not to "'endorse or disapprove of religion.'") (quot-
ing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56) (emphasis in original).
75. See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250 (finding unconstitutional the provision of
projectors, tape recorders, and record players to nonpublic schools, because secular
and religious educational uses were impossible to separate); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that loan of secular textbooks to parochial school stu-
dents had a secular, not religious, effect); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
225 (1963) (prohibiting Bible reading as a religious activity in public schools; "objec-
tive" study of the Bible as part of a secular program of education would be permis-
sible).
76. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (hold-
ing state provision of sign-language interpreter to accompany Catholic high school
student permissible as a non-entangling, "neutral" service); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 371-72 (1975) (holding provision of auxiliary services by public school
teachers in nonpublic schools too entangling in view of required surveillance to en-
sure that teachers did not advance religious goals); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (holding that state reimbursement of costs of testing
and record keeping in private schools was unconstitutional, in the absence of effort
to determine if the testing was free of religious content or function); Lemon, 403
U.S. at 619 (holding that state plans to pay nonpublic school teachers for teaching
secular subjects was too entangling, in view of the surveillance of teachers' neutrali-
ty required).
77. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1984) (holding that inclu-
sion of a creche in a town Christmas display was not, under the circumstances, the
use of a religious symbol that endorsed religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983) (holding that "nonsectarian" legislative prayer had historical and civic, not
religious, meaning); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that display of
Ten Commandments on the walls of a public classroom was the use of a "religious"
symbol, in violation of the Establishment Clause).
78. The apparently inconsistent results from the application of these tests are well
known. Nondenominational prayer in public schools was unconstitutional, Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-36 (1962), while prayer in legislatures was not. Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-95 (1983). State tax revenues to pay the basic bus
fares of parochial school pupils as part of a general transportation program was
permissible, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947), but transportation
for parochial school field trips was not. Wolnan, 433 U.S. at 252-55. Textbook loans
to parochial school children were permissible, Allen, 392 U.S. at 241-48, but loans of
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had a religious purpose, thus rendering it unconstitutional, the
Court has cited the testimony of state senators at trial,79 the
addition of three words to statutory text,"0 the existence of an-
tecedent, "religious" laws,8" and the existence of religious adver-
tisements and campaigns by religious groups in support of the
government act.82 Although members of the Court have argued
that a statute may be motivated by both secular and religious
considerations,83 or that what motivated one legislator may not
have motivated another,' such considerations have rarely been
acknowledged in its analysis.
The problems involved in divining unconstitutional religious
motivation became particularly acute in Edwards v.
Aguillard,85 where the Louisiana legislature expressly articulat-
ed a secular purpose for the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction"
Act.86 This statute prohibited the teaching of the theory of evo-
lution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in
instructional equipment or materials to parochial schools were not. Meek, 421 U.S.
at 362-66. Diagnostic services were properly provided by public employees to stu-
dents in parochial schools, Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-44, but guidance counseling and
testing, remedial instruction, and speech and hearing therapy were not. Meek, 421
U.S. at 367-73.
79. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985).
80. Id. at 59 ("meditation or voluntary prayer") (emphasis added).
81. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968).
82. Id. at 108 n.16.
83. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 ("[Elven though a statute that is motivated
in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first [Lemon] criterion .... the First
Amendment requires that a statue must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by
a purpose to advance religion.") (citation omitted).
84. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor noted that:
[I]t is particularly troublesome to denigrate an expressed secular purpose
due to postenactment testimony by particular legislators or by interested
persons who witnessed the drafting of the statute. . . . [Clourts should
find an improper purpose behind such a statute only if the statute on its
face, in its official legislative history, or in its interpretation by a respon-
sible administrative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of en-
dorsing [religion] . . ..
Id.
85. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).
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"creation science."" Although the Act's stated purpose was to
protect academic freedom,8 a legitimate secular interest, the
Court rejected this statement of purpose as a "sham."9 To sup-
port this finding, the Court cited its conclusions that the Act did
not, in fact, further academic freedom," that the motivation of
the legislator who sponsored the bill "was to narrow the science
curriculum,"91 and that there were "historic and contemporane-
ous antagonisms between the teachings of certain religious de-
nominations and the teaching of evolution .. ..""2 "The preemi-
nent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to ad-
87. Id. §§ 17:286.4-.5. "Creation-science" is defined as "the scientific evidences for
creation and inferences from those scientific evidences." Id. § 17:286.3(2).
88. Id. § 17:286.2.
89. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87.
90. The Court stated:
If the Louisiana Legislature's purpose was solely to maximize the
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would have
encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of hu-
mankind. But under the Act's requirements, teachers who were once free
to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so ...
Thus we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does
not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different
purpose of discrediting "evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at
every turn . ..."
Id. at 588-89 (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (1985)) (footnote
omitted). The Court also rejected the argument that "academic freedom" might mean
"teaching all of the evidence," and that the Act furthered this purpose: "[t]he goal of
providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by out-
lawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science." Id.
at 586.
91. Id. at 587. The Court stated:
The sponsor of the Creationism Act, Senator Keith, explained during the
legislative hearings that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted
from the support that evolution supplied to views contrary to his own
religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of evolution was
consonant with the "cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular
humanism, theological liberalism, atheistism [sic]." . . . The state senator
repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views
should be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact
that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he charac-
terized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. The legislation there-
fore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a
religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.
Id. at 592-93 (citations and footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 591.
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vance the religious viewpoint ....
In its analysis, the Court vacillated between an objective and
subjective test. At one point, it stated that "[t]he Establishment
Clause... 'forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or
the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a par-
ticular dogma."'94 Under its characterization of creation science,
the Court's statement would seem to prohibit the teaching of
this theory under any circumstances.95 Later, however, the
Court stated that "teaching a variety of scientific theories about
the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly
done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness
of science instruction."96 It was because the primary purpose of
the Creationism Act was "to endorse a particular religious doc-
trine" that it violated the Establishment Clause. 7 This seems
to indicate that a "secular" motivation for the study of creation-
ism-like the "secular" study of the Bible 9 -might meet the
requirements of the Establishment Clause.
Different evidence establishing religious motivation was cited
by Justice Powell in a concurring opinion. Because the "theory of
creation" involved the concept of God (and was identical to a
literal interpretation of Genesis),99 and because the recognized
creation scientists in the United States were affiliated with
religious institutions,"' one could conclude that the "intent of
the Louisiana Legislature was to promote a particular religious
93. Id.
94. Id. at 593 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968)).
95. This could also be argued to invalidate any attempt to prohibit the teaching of
creation science (or to prefer the teaching of evolution), if the prohibition is moti-
vated by the belief that creation science is antagonistic to another dogma (i.e., the
theory of evolution).
96. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594.
97. Id. In dissent, Justice Scalia attempted to clarify this muddle by stating that
"regardless of what 'legislative purpose' may mean in other contexts, for the purpose
of the Lemon test it means the 'actual' motives of those responsible for the chal-
lenged action. The Court recognizes this [in this case] . . .as it has in the past .
Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("Nothing we have said
here' indicates that . . .study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively
as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment.").
99. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 603 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 602.
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belief.... The test that he advanced is subjective, not objective:
"[a] decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply be-
cause the material to be taught 'happens to coincide or harmo-
nize with the tenets of some or all religions."""2 Rather, the
Establishment Clause is violated "only when the purpose for
[the] decision[] is clearly religious."'":
The implications of the Court's analysis in this case are diffi-
cult indeed. The constitutionality of a legislative act hinges,
finally, on the subjective purpose that motivated its enactment.
If the motivation was religious in nature-as determined by the
religious motivations of individual legislators, the law's coinci-
dence with religious tenets, a history of religious fervor over the
issues involved, and so on-the law is invalid, even if it has no
explicit religious purpose and no substantial religious effect."
4
Indeed, because the Establishment Clause equally prohibits the
promotion or inhibition of religion,"'5 completely secular legis-
lation that was subjectively motivated by anti-religious senti-
ment presumably would be invalid as well." One wonders
where this analysis would leave much of the legislation of the
twentieth century."'7 The Court's (at least past) adherence to
101. Id. at 603.
102. Id. at 605 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980)).
103. Id.
104. "If the law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, 'no consideration
of the second or third criterilonl lof Lemon] is necessary'." Id. at 585 (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
105. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
106. Indeed, the Court has held that anti-religious bias in a law's enactment may
indicate that it violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993) (stating that a law is
invalid if its "object or purpose ... is the suppression of religion or religious con-
duct").
107. As Justice Scalia observed:
[Plolitical activism by the religiously motivated is part of our heritage.
Notwithstanding the majority's implication to the contrary . . .we do not
presume that the sole purpose of a law is to advance religion merely
because it was supported strongly by organized religions or by adherents
of particular faiths. . . .To do so would deprive religious men and wom-
en of their right to participate in the political process. Today's religious
activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act, but yesterday's result-
864 [Vol. 36:837
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the principle that legislation is invalid only when "there [is] no
question [but] that the statute or activity was motivated wholly
by religious considerations""'8 might provide some relief; how-
ever, one wonders how the Court could be any more certain of
the lack of any secular motivation on the part of any legislative
actor in the passage of the Louisiana Act, than it could be in the
passage of any other legislation. The purity of separation of
religious and secular motivations within individuals is simply an
actual and analytical impossibility.0 9
The attempted separation of religious uses, functions, and
ed in the abolition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine
victims.
We have implied that voluntary governmental accommodation of reli-
gion is not only permissible, but desirable .... Thus, few would contend
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which both forbids reli-
gious discrimination by private-sector employers ... and requires them
reasonably to accommodate the religious practices of their employees, . . .
violates the Establishment Clause, even though its "purpose" is, of course,
to advance religion . . . . While we have warned that at some point,
accommodation may devolve into "an unlawful fostering of religion," . . .
we have not suggested precisely (or even roughly) where that point might
be.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 615, 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 319-20 (1980) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to restrictions on abor-
tion funding); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-53 (1961) (rejecting Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to Sunday closing laws).
108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (emphasis added); see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 614
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. As Justice Scalia observed, a particular legislator might be motivated by a
desire to 'improve education," to "provide jobs for his district," to "make amends
with a faction of his party," to "repay[] a favor he owed the majority leader," to
appease "a flood of constituent mail," or all of these. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 637
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition,
where ought we to look for the individual legislator's purpose? We can-
not . . . assume that every member present . . . agreed with the motiva-
tion expressed in a particular legislator's pre-enactment floor or commit-
tee statement .... Can we assume ... that they all agreed with the
motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee reports . . . ?
Should we consider postenactment floor statements? . . . Should we con-
sider media reports on the realities of legislative bargaining? All of these
sources . . . are eminently manipulable.
Id. at 637-38. Moreover, "[hiaving achieved .. . an assessment of what individual
legislators intended, . . . how many of them must have the invalidating intent[?]" Id.
at 638.
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symbols from secular ones has also led to problematic results.
The Court's attempts to separate religious from secular uses or
functions of textbooks and instructional materials in sectarian
elementary and secondary schools resulted in the analytically
tenuous conclusions that movie projectors, tape recorders, and
record players could be diverted to religious use"0 but "secu-
lar" books could not,'1 ' and that sectarian schools were the pro-
hibited "direct" recipients of field trip transportation but the per-
missible "indirect" recipients of "attenuated" financial benefits
from the provision of sign-language interpreters, basic bus trans-
portation, and student textbooks."2 Efforts to separate the
"secular educational function from the sectarian""' resulted in
conclusions that governmental provision of "diagnostic services"
or sign-language interpreters was permissible, because they had
"no educational content""' and were "not closely associated
with the educational mission of the ... school," ' 5 while the
provision of "auxiliary services" (such as counseling, testing, and
speech and hearing therapy) was not."6 If religious and secu-
lar functions or uses could not be separated-or if such separa-
tion could not be guaranteed without state "surveillance"-then
there was excessive entanglement in violation of the Establish-
merit Clause."7
Efforts to separate religious from secular have been just as
pronounced in a series of cases dealing with public funding of
sectarian colleges and universities-this time, in the service of
upholding the statutes in question. In Tilton v. Richardson"'
and Roemer v. Board of Public Works,"9 the Court upheld
110. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977).
111. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
112. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467-69 (1993);
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55; Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-62; Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947).
113. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250.
114. Id. at 244.
115. Id.
116. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-44; Meek, 421 U.S. at 367-73.
117. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 372; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-20 (1971);
cf. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764 (1976) (finding no entangle-
ment because audits would be "quick" and "nonjudgmental").
118. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
119. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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state subsidies and federal construction grants, respectively, to
religiously-affiliated colleges and universities on the ground that
their "predominant higher education mission [was] to provide
their students with a secular education," 20  and "the
encouragement of spiritual development [was] only 'one second-
ary objective' of each college ... ,121 The buildings at issue in
Tilton were libraries, a language laboratory, and science and
fine arts buildings;'22 there was "no evidence," the Court wrote,
"that religion seep[ed] into the use of any of these facilities."'23
Even if "religion-free" college instruction and fine rts perfor-
mances in a sectarian institution can be envisioned, the consis-
tency of the federal Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) with the
Court's separationist model defies explanation. In Bowen v.
Kendrick,'24 the Court upheld the AFLA, which provided
grants to sectarian organizations (among others) for the provi-
sion of counseling services to adolescents in matters of sexual
relations and pregnancy."' There was, the majority wrote,
"nothing on the face of the AFLA [which] indicate[d] that a sig-
nificant proportion of the federal funds [would] be disbursed to
'pervasively sectarian' institutions."'26  Apparently, in the
majority's mind, "sectarian" institutions were "capable of car-
rying out their functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular
manner,"'27 while "pervasively sectarian" institutions'28 were
not. The "facially neutral projects authorized by the AFJA"'29
were not "'specifically religious activities', ". 3 and "[were] not
converted into such activities by the fact that they [were] carried
out by organizations with religious affiliations." 3'
The idea that family planning or pregnancy counseling servic-
120. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
121. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755.,
122. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681.
123. Id.
124. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
125. Id. at 593.
126. Id. at 610.
127. Id. at 612.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 613.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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es, provided by members of religious orders, can-even in theo-
ry-be "purely secular" in nature is truly a difficult one. Indeed,
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowen, wrote that "asking reli-
gious organizations to teach and counsel youngsters on matters
of deep religious significance, yet expect[ing] them to refrain
from making reference to religion, is both foolhardy and uncon-
stitutional."'32 However, rather than questioning a doctrinal
model which requires such separation, Justice Blackmun argued
that the separationist model (although unrealistic when applied
to the AFLA) can be validly applied to other activities:
There is a very real and important difference between run-
ning a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant
teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions facing them.
The risk of advancing religion at public expense, and of creat-
ing an appearance that the government is endorsing the
medium and the message, is much greater when the religious
organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the ex-
press intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than
where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shel-
ter.1
33
In the one case, "religion is at the core of the subsidized activity,
and it affects the manner in which the 'service' is dis-
pensed."'34 In the other case, "religion plays little or no role; it
merely explains why the individual or organization has chosen
to get involved in the publicly funded program." 35
Separation of the religious from the secular has proven to be
equally difficult in cases involving governmental use of religious
symbols. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,136 the facts were
simple. During the Christmas season, a creche was placed on
the grand staircase of the Allegheny County courthouse, and a
menorah, Christmas tree, and sign entitled "Salute to Liberty"
were placed outside of the City-County Building. 37 Although
the facts were simple, the opinion of the Court was not. Its opin-
132. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 641.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
137. Id. at 582 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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ion is a testament to the extraordinary difficulties involved in its
religious/secular separationist approach.
The Court did not decide this case against a clean slate; it had
already decided, in arguably similar cases, that the display of a
copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of a public school
classroom violated the Establishment Clause 8 and that the
inclusion of a creche in a municipal display in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, did not.'39
Against this background, the Court concluded that the creche
display was unconstitutional but the menorah display was
not.4 ° The creche display was the use of a religious symbol by
government because it communicated an "indisputably religious"
message.' The creche itself, and the words "Glory to God in
the Highest!" that accompanied it, rendered the display reli-
gious--"indeed sectarian."'42 The creche in the Pawtucket dis-
play was distinguished on the ground that it was surrounded by
other, nonreligious objects.' Here, the Court stated, there was
"nothing in the context of the display [that] detract[ed] from the
creche's religious message.... [Tihe creche [stood] alone....""'
The Court's attempts to distinguish legislative prayer, the na-
tional motto ("In God We Trust"), and religious references in the
Pledge of Allegiance ("one nation under God")145 from the
creche display are tenuous at best. The former do not "communi-
cate an endorsement of religious belief"4" because they are his-
torical, "nonsectarian references to religion by ... govern-
ment;"'47 "history cannot legitimate practices [such as the
138. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
139. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
140. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602 (opinion of the Court); id. at 620-21
(opinion of Blackmun, J.).
141. Id. at 598 (opinion of the Court).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 596-97 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
144. Id. at 598.
145. Other national governmental religious practices include the employment of a
congressional chaplain, a special prayer room in the Capitol for use by members of
Congress, and the congressional directive that the President set aside an annual
National Day of Prayer. See id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 602-03.
147. Id. at 603.
1995] 869
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
creche display] that demonstrate the government's allegiance to
a particular sect or creed."" 8 However, the Court's reduction of
First Amendment protection to "nonsectarian" choices among
theistic beliefs contradicted its own decisions as to the scope and
nature of the Religion Clauses.'49
Indeed, the internal incoherence of the sectarian/nonsectarian
distinction was acknowledged by the Court in Lee v.
Weisman,5 ' decided in 1992. In that case, the issue was the
permissibility of a "nonsectarian" prayer (which reflected general
Judeo-Christian precepts) at a public high school graduation
ceremony.'51 Its proponents argued that its "nonsectarian" na-
ture saved it from invalidity under the Establishment
Clause.'52 The Court acknowledged that "[tihere may be some
support, as an empirical observation," for the idea "that there
has emerged in this country a civic religion, one which is toler-
ated when sectarian exercises are not."'5 3 However, "the idea of
a civic religion" must be measured "against the central meaning
of the Religion Clauses . . . , which is that all creeds must be
tolerated and none favored. The suggestion that government
may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding
the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes
us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted."
5 4
148. Id.
149. The Court noted:
Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean (and we have held it
to mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion . . . ), it
certainly means at the very least that government may not demonstrate
a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a preference for
Christianity over other religions). "The clearest command of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another."
Id. at 605 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)); see also Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985).
150. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
151. Id. at 2652.
152. Id. at 2656.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2657. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter addressed the issue
directly, stating that governmental "preference for Theistic over non-Theistic religion"
squarely violates the principle of governmental neutrality "'between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion" under the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 2671, 2668 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
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Even more troubling in these cases is the Court's central,
operating premise: that a clearly religious object with a clearly
religious message can be transformed into one with a secular
message when placed in a "secular" context.'55 Justice Stevens'
example of this change in County of Allegheny only deepens the
question.'56 Public use of a religious object or symbol is prohib-
ited, he wrote, "only when its message, evaluated in the context
in which it is presented, is nonsecular."'57 "[A] carving of Mo-
ses holding the Ten Commandments, if that is the only adorn-
ment on a courtroom wall, conveys an equivocal message, per-
haps of respect for Judaism, for religion in general, or for
law."5' The addition of carvings depicting Confucius or Mo-
hammed does not help, since it "may honor religion, or partic-
ular religions, to an extent that the First Amendment does not
tolerate any more than it does 'the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall.""59 Addition of secular fig-
ures "such as Caesar Augustus, William Blackstone, Napoleon
Bonaparte, and John Marshall alongside these three religious
leaders, however, signals respect not for great proselytizers but
for great lawgivers."'' 0 How it is not equally probable that this
display signals respect for some great religious leaders and some
great secular leaders is not explained. 6'
The problems involved in attempting to separate religious and
secular messages and contexts of clearly religious objects and
symbols are illustrated further by Justice Blackmun's treatment
of the menorah display. He wrote that the menorah display was
permissible because "[tihe necessary result of placing a menorah
next to a Christmas tree is to create an 'overall holiday setting'
104 (1968)).
155. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
156. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 651-52 (1989) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part)).
160. Id. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. As Justice Stevens noted, "[a]ll these leaders . . . appear in friezes on the
walls of our courtroom." Id. at 653 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
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that represents both Christmas and Chanukah-two holidays,
not one."'6 2 The question therefore became "whether the com-
bined display... ha[d] the effect of endorsing both Christian
and Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognize[d] that both
Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday
season...."'63 He wrote that "the latter seems far more plausi-
ble ... "164 Under the circumstances, "it is not 'sufficiently
likely' that residents of Pittsburgh... perceive[d] the combined
display of the tree, the sign, and the menorah as an
'endorsement' or 'disapproval... of their individual religious
choices." 65
Why "[a] reasonable observer would.., appreciate that the
combined display [was] an effort to acknowledge... cultural
diversity.., and to convey tolerance of different choices in mat-
ters of religious belief or nonbelief"6 rather than a "double en-
dorsement,"'67 endorsing "two religions to the exclusion of all
others,"'68 is not explained. As Justices Brennan and Kennedy
note, the creche, menorah, and Christmas tree are all religious
symbols of religious holidays; the question is not how to separate
their religious and secular aspects, but whether the Establish-
ment Clause forbids their governmental use.'6 9
The final challenge to the Court's separationist model is posed
by fundamentalist Christian groups who challenge government
establishment of secular values on the ground that they are not
"secular" at all: rather, they are the establishment of the "reli-
gion of Secular Humanism."'70 In view of the Court's prior de-
162. Id. at 614 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
163. Id. at 616 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 620 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 390 (1985)).
166. Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
167. Id. at 616 n.64 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
168. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 638-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
665-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
170. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (com-
plainants, believers in "scientific creationism," challenged two exhibitions containing
references to evolution at the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History on the
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cisions extending "religion" to include nontheistic belief sys-
tems,17' as defined by the individual adherent,172 these cases
are the ultimate, logical extension of its own decisions.
The fundamental problem in the Court's approach has been
recognized by the Court itself: that the religious and the secular,
as a theoretical and practical matter, are hopelessly inter-
twined.'73 An analytical approach that is premised on the sepa-
ration of the religious from the secular contradicts the fact that
"[tlhe history of man is inseparable from the history of reli-
gion" ' and that religious practices, references, and beliefs are
"deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this coun-
try. ,1
75
No matter how unworkable this separation may seem, we are
told that it has a deep, historic root. It is mandated by our histo-
ry. The relationship between the religious and the secu-
lar-between religion and government-must be "a wall of sepa-
ration" for the protection of both. It is to an examination of the
truth of these assertions that we now turn.
ground that they supported the religion of secular humanism in violation of the
First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (complainants contended that a
prescribed set of reading textbooks in the public schools contained acceptance of
evolution, secular humanism, futuristic supernaturalism, and pacifism in violation of
the Free Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Smith v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 975 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987)
(complainants argued that "a man-centered belief-system, . . . [known] by the appel-
lation 'secular humanism,' [was] promoted in the public schools to the detriment of
[the complainant's] children's first amendment right of free exercise, all in violation
of the [E]stablishment [Cilause").
171. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984) ("No significant seg-
ment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or
absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government"; indeed,
"[tihere is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life ... .
174. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
175. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
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III. THE HISTORICAL RECORD: RELIGION IN SOCIETY AND
GOVERNMENT
A. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court, through the invocation of
writings by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, has attempt-
ed to identify and enforce an alleged historical separation be-
tween the religious and the secular in public affairs.'76 The
Court's operating assumptions appear to be that Madison and
Jefferson assumed the separability of the religious and the secu-
lar, in individual and collective life, and believed that this sepa-
ration was essential to protect fundamental religious liber-
ties. "'
176. The piece of historical evidence most frequently cited by the Court for this
approach is Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he stat-
ed:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely be-
tween man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church
and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation
in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction
the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his
natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his
social duties.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S.
Nelson, a Committee of the Danbury, Connecticut, Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, CONTAINING His AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
NOTES ON VIRGINIA, PARLIAMENTARY MANUAL, OFFICIAL PAPERS, MESSAGES AND AD-
DRESS, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, Now COLLECTED AND PUB-
LISHED IN THEIR ENTIRETY FOR THE FIRST TIME 281, 281-82 (Albert E. Bergh ed.,
1907) [hereinafter THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON].
The "wall of separation" allegedly derived from Jefferson's letter first appeared
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). As recently noted by Justice
Blackmun, "[tihe Court in Reynolds accepted Thomas Jefferson's letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association 'almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect' of the First Amendment." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2662 n.1
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164); see also Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
177. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 16); Everson, 330
U.S. at 13-16.
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This Section will examine the views of reformist spokesmen of
the Founding Era on issues involving the relationship between
religion and government. This review will include the views of
Jefferson and Madison, both of whom figured prominently in
church-state debates on national and state levels. It will also
include the views of John Adams, Fisher Ames, Alexander Ham-
ilton, John Jay, Rufus King, Thomas Paine, James Wilson, John
Leland, Isaac Backus, Jonathan Mayhew, and other political and
religious leaders. All had, at various times, important, recorded
roles in developing political events. Some were delegates to the
Federal Constitutional Convention; some were delegates to the
state ratifying conventions; others simply spoke out on these
issues. All considered church-state questions and left a record
(although partial, in some cases) of their views.
The reformist spokesmen of this era were of diverse religious
faiths and backgrounds. Madison, who had Anglican roots, was
educated at Princeton (a New Side Presbyterian stronghold) and
was heavily influenced by John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian
minister and president of Prirceton who personally directed
Madison's graduate studies. '78 Madison's religious views are
largely unknown; biographers variously claim that he sympa-
thized with Deistic, liberal, or Unitarian positions.'79 Benjamin
Franklin was a Deist, as was Thomas Paine."'0  George
Washington was a conventional Anglican by observance, but had
Deistic sympathies as well.'8' Fisher Ames was a staunch Con-
178. Princeton was a center for dissenting Presbyterians who opposed ecclesiastical
and political authority. The goal of Princeton University, as articulated by
Witherspoon, was "'to cherish the spirit of liberty, and free enquiry; and not only to
permit, but even to encourage their right of private judgment .... '" MILLER, supra
note 9, at 89.
179. See id. at 91; ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICII, A NATION DEDICAT-
ED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THIE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF TIE RELIGION CLAUSES
25 (1990).
180. MILLER, supra note 9, at 110, 236-40. Franklin listed the "essentials of every
religion" as "the existence of the Deity, that he made the world and governed it by
his providence, that the most acceptable service of God was the doing good to man,
that our souls are immortal, and that all crime will be punished and virtue reward-
ed either here or hereafter." These, he wrote, were "found in all the religions we
had in our country .... " BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, quoted in id. at
240.
181. MILLER, supra note 9, at 236.
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gregationalist,'82 and Rufus King an Episcopalian." 3 John
Adams began as a Congregationalist but followed his local
church when it became Unitarian in later years. '84 Jefferson is
often called a Deist, although his religious views were highly
individualistic and complex."8 5 Isaac Backus began as a Con-
gregationalist and later became a Separate Baptist and a leader
of the Baptists in New England.' 6 John Leland was a Baptist
leader and preacher in Virginia.8 7 Jonathan Mayhew, a Con-
gregationalist preacher, was called "'a Whig of the first
Magnitude,"''" and his sermon, delivered on January 30, 1749,
"'the morning gun of' the American Revolution." 89
As a prominent historian of religious thought has written, in
the events of this era, "[i]deas mattered. In fact, . . . [they] mat-
tered supremely."'9 "' Ideas about the relationship of the individ-
ual to society, to government, and (if he or she so believed) to
transcendent beings or transcendent principles, were undergoing
rapid transformation.'9 ' As in any complex matrix of human
beings and human situations, the conclusions drawn from these
circumstances were often in radical opposition.' 2 To Isaac
182. WINFRED E.A. BERNIIARD, FISuER AMES: FEDEiRALIST AND STATESMAN 1758-
1808, at 330 (1965).
183. ROBERT ERNST, RUFUS KING, AMERICAN FEDERALIST 15 (1968).
184. MILLER, supra note 9, at 237.
185. See, e.g., Ai)AMS & EMMERICII, supra note 179, at 24 (arguing that Jefferson
held a "[Dleistic world view . . . tempered by . . . theism"). A descendant described
Jefferson as
a conservative lUlnitarian .... He did not believe in the miracles, nor
the divinity of Christ, nor the doctrine of the atonement, but he was a
firm believer in Divine Providence, in the efficacy of prayer, in a future
state of rewards and punishments, and in the meeting of friends in an-
other world.
Thomas J. Collidge, Jefferson in His Family, in 15 TIIE WRITINGS OF TIIOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 176, at iv; see also CHARLES B. SANFORD, TIiE RELIGIOUS LIFE
OF TIIOMAS JEFFERSON 5, passim (1984).
186. MILLER, supra note 9, at 211-12. Backus published 37 tracts in his lifetime,
most of them on the subject of religious liberty. Id.
187. Id. at 120.
188. HUMP'IIREY, supra note 8, at 50 (quoting JOIIN W. TIIORNTON, TIlE PULPIT OF
TIlE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at xix (1860)).
189. Id. at 51 (quoting TIIORNTON, supra note 188, at 43).
190. MILLER, supra note 9, at 139.
191. See id. at 139-43.
192. Id.
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Backus, truth meant the "'revealed doctrines of grace;m193 for
Jefferson or Madison, this concept was far more complex. 19
The desire to protect the moral fabric of society led to calls for
religious tests for public office in some quarters and to calls for
their abolition in others. Some groups, such as New England
Congregationalists and Virginia Anglicans, endorsed tax support
of religious institutions and other forms of establishment; oth-
ers, such as Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and many Presbyte-
rians, claimed a right to radical separation of church and
state. '
Beneath these differences lay what has been called "the ideo-
logical ground music"' -the foundational and emerging ideas
that shaped the development and legacy of this era. These differ-
ences (as profound as they were) did not prevent a deeper con-
gruence in the thought of these men about religious issues. This
study attempts a broad identification of those underlying beliefs
about religion and society, and religion and government, as they
existed across a broad range of political and religious opinion.
All of these men struggled to reconcile the impulse of tradi-
tional religious doctrines with the Enlightenment. They strug-
gled to reconcile emerging beliefs in the validity of individual
human inquiry with competing beliefs that human reason alone
is a fundamentally deficient source for moral or community
values. Different religious groups reconciled these questions in
different ways; views of the relative roles for human reason and
the influence of the transcendent (if, indeed, they were seen as
independent instrumentalities) were clearly different for differ-
ent individuals. However, all shared a persistent conviction that
there must be shared values in civil society and in government
for the survival of either. The protection of the free inquiry nec-
essary for the apprehension of these values was their over-
whelming preoccupation.
The views of the "articulate reformers" of this era obviously
are not the views of all persons on the questions that are the
193. Id. at 214 (quoting WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, ISAAc BACKUS AND THE AMERI-
CAN PIETIST TRADITION (1967)).
194. Id. at 214.
195. See id. at 127.
196. Id. at 142.
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focus of this study. Some religious groups clearly were more
represented in the ranks of the articulate spokesmen than oth-
ers; groups who shunned the public arena, such as Quakers and
Schwenkfelders, or those who were largely deprived of political
power or social status, such as Jews and Roman Catholics, had
few, if any, spokesmen whose views were recorded. The views of
many segments of society, such as women, slaves, the working
poor, the middle class-basically, all who were not part of the
white, male, affluent, well-educated elite-were rarely recorded
and are largely, if not entirely, lost. This study chronicles the
ideas that were dominant in the circles of those who held politi-
cal and economic power, and that were articulated by those who
are now seen as the authoritative spokesmen of that era. These
men were, through training, accident of birth, or otherwise,
those whose legacy was recorded and who have (for better or
worse) articulated our ideological heritage. For those reasons, it
is their views that I examine here.
Several comments should be made, at the outset, about the
methodology employed and the boundaries of this study. There
is always an inherent danger in building an understanding of
ideas through the piecing together of small portions of the
thought of many individuals; not every word uttered by every
individual was surely intended to be that person's ultimate
statement on the subject, let alone the ultimate statement of the
age.197 However, consistent themes appear repeatedly in the
works of particular individuals and in the writings of this peri-
od; it is the sketching of those broad themes that will be at-
tempted here.
An objection could also be made that the approach of this
study isolates ideas from their more extensive historical and
197. Henry May discussed the pervasive tendency in intellectual history
to talk about the movement of ideas in too general and sweeping a man-
ner. . . . If, in any extended treatment of the Enlightenment, one says
that Newtonian ideas spread, or scepticism increased, or religion declined,
one must say when, where, and among whom. Obviously, there are great
differences between Protestant and Catholic Europe, in America among
North and South, East and West, between city and country everywhere,
among classes and occupations.
MAY, supra note 13, at 132.
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biographical settings and deprives them of needed context. To
some extent, this objection can be answered by the silent knowl-
edge that it invites us down an endless path. As Henry May has
written, attempts to make the recounting more complete might
render the picture "richer and more complex but can never re-
produce reality. In the long run,... the [intellectual] historian
is most like an artist, and history is irreducibly a kind of litera-
ture.,,98
Perhaps a more fundamental response to this objection is that
the importance and usefulness of these ideas lies elsewhere. The
fact that the ideas of this generation cannot be portrayed with
certainty does not necessarily render them any less valuable in
our consideration of the same issues today. The ideas that
emerge can be useful catalysts for our own thinking, even if
their historicity, in the strictest sense, cannot be known. My
intention is not the making of an originalist argument. Even if
we could determine-with the requisite certitude-that a partic-
ular view of the relationship between religion and society, or re-
ligion and government, predominated in the Founding Era, that
would not mean that we must use this view in constitutional
interpretation or that it is, in fact, the only viable resolution of
these issues. Rather, this study is an attempt to present ideas
that prevailed in a certain period of our past; and to see whether
those ideas might not, in the end, have something important to
tell us as we consider the continuing issues of our own time.
B. The Background Against Which These Questions Arose:
Intolerance, Persecution, and State Support for Religious
Establishments
Although many colonists arrived on North American shores to
pursue religious freedom, rarely did they extend that concept to
others. The colonists came to these shores, for the most part,
with impressions of church-state relationships that mirrored
those in Europe.199 Because church and state in Europe were
198. Id. at x.
199. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVO-
LUTION 247 (1967); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 71-72 (1967); SAN-
FORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 4 (1902).
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often highly integrated institutions,"' colonial arrangements
usually reflected this philosophy as well. The fact that many
colonists had suffered under such regimes did not deter them;
"in their view, that suffering was a consequence, not of a vicious
principle, but of a wicked application of a principle which was
very right and necessary."20
The result of this approach was religious oppression or perse-
cution in virtually all of the American colonies." 2 The Anglican
establishment in Virginia was described by Jefferson in many of
his writings. The Anglican establishment began with coloniza-
tion in 1607. "The first settlers of this colony were Englishmen,
loyal subjects to their king and church... .2"3 Upon settle-
ment of the colony, it was divided into parishes, "in each of
which was established a minister of the Anglican church, en-
dowed with a fixed salary, in tobacco, a glebe house and land
with the other necessary appendages."" 4 To meet the expenses
of this arrangement, "all the inhabitants of the parishes were
200. In the words of Sanford Cobb:
That questions as to the relation between things religious and things
political have occupied large space in the history of Europe, is evident to
the most casual reader. It will be difficult, indeed, to find any other
question so important, so insistent for solution, so widely affecting soci-
ety, and so efficient in guiding historic development. Thus, in very em-
phatic words, Ranke declares, "The whole life and character of Western
Christendom consists of the constant action and counteraction of church
and state." From the beginning of the Christian state, it was assumed
that, among its first duties and missions was to care for the interests of
the church or the submission to its demands ....
COBB, supra note 199, at 19.
201. Id. at 67. The transplantation of European ideas of church-state relations to
the New World is described in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947):
These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to
thrive in- the soil of the new America. The very charters granted by the
English Crown to the individuals and companies designated to make the
laws which would control the destinies of the colonials authorized these
individuals and companies to erect religious establishments ....
Id.
202. See COBB, supra note 199, at 68, 69-71; THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO TIlE PASSAGE OF TIlE FIRST AMENDMENT passim
(1986); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: TIlE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
TIlE CONSTITUTION 42-45 (1985); PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 71-90, 108.
203. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in 1 TIlE WRITINGS OF TIIOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 1, 56.
204. Id. at 56-57.
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assessed, whether or not they were members of the established
church."2 5
During-the seventeenth century, the Virginia Assembly passed
a series of acts to enforce religious conformity and to secure the
position of the established church.206 Acts passed in 1659,
1662, and 1693 made it a criminal act for parents to refuse to
baptize children; prohibited the unlawful assembly of Quakers;
made it a criminal act for the master of any vessel to bring a
Quaker into the state; and subjected Quakers who did arrive to
banishment with the penalty of death for the third return.0 7
By an Act of the Assembly of 1705, a person brought up in the
Christian religion who denied the being of a God or the Trinity,
denied the Christian religion to be the true religion, denied the
scriptures to be of divine authority, or asserted that there are
more gods than one was punished as follows: for the first of-
fense, by incapacity ,to hold any office of employment, ecclesias-
tic, civil, or military' and for the second offense, by disability to
sue, to take any gift or legacy, to be a guardian, executor, or ad-
205. Id. at 57.
206. For instance, in 1612 Governor Thomas Dale decreed that "[tlo speak impi-
ously of the Trinity or of one of the Divine Persons, or against the known articles of
the Christian faith," was punishable by death. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 77. The
same penalty was decreed for 'blaspheming God's holy Name." Id. at 78. If an indi-
vidual should "curse or banne,' the penalty for the first offense was to be usevere;"
for the second, "a bodkin should be thrust through the tongue;" for further offenses,
the penalty was death. Id. If an individual should say or do anything "to the deri-
sion or despight of God's holy word" or "in disrespect to any Minister," the offender
should be "openly whipt 3 times, and to ask public forgiveness in the assembly of
the congregation, 3 several Sabbath daies." Id. For nonattendance at religious servic-
es, the penalties were as follows: for the first offense, the "stoppage of allowance;"
for the second, whipping; for the third, service in the galleys for six months. Id. For
Sabbath breaking, the penalties were: for the first offense, stoppage of allowance; for
the second, whipping; for the third, death. Id. In addition, every person in the colo-
ny was required to repair to the minister for examination in the faith. If found to
be "unsound," he was to be instructed. If he refused to go, he would be whipped
"every day until he makes acknowledgement." Id.
On appeal to England, these "Laws Divine, Moral and Martial" were abrogated.
Id. However, fines for nonattendance at church services remained; the payment of
tithes was compulsory; all Anglican ministers had to "conform themselves in all
things according to canons of the Church of England;" Puritans and Quakers were
banned; and Catholics were ineligible to hold public office. Id.
207. TIIOMAs JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in
TIlE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 23, 208 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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ministrator of any estate, and by three years' imprisonment
without bail.2 °8 In the counties of Orange, Spotsylvania, and
Culpepper, Baptist preachers were persecuted, beaten, and im-
prisoned.0 9 In 1774, Madison wrote in a letter to William
Bradford:
That diabolical hell conceived principle of persecution rages
among some . . . . There are at this [time] in the adjacent
County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close Goal
for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main
are very orthodox .... I have squabbled and scolded abused
and ridiculed so long about it,... that I am without common
patience. So I [must beg you] to pity me and pray for Liberty
of Conscience [for us] .210
These laws persisted, despite the fact that two-thirds of the
people of Virginia were religious dissenters by the time of the
Revolution.211
When the first republican legislature met in Virginia in 1776,
there were, in the words of Jefferson, "petitions to abolish this
spiritual tyranny."212 However, that year saw only the repeal of
laws that rendered criminal the maintenance of certain religious
opinions, the failure to attend church, and the exercise of non-
conforming modes of worship. 23 The famous Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights, which was written by George Mason, edited by
Madison, and passed by the Virginia Assembly on June 12,
1776, exempted dissenters from financial support of the estab-
lished church but left other laws intact.2 4
208. Id. at 210.
209. See LEWIS P. LITTLE, IMPRISONED PREACHERS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIR-
GINIA 127-40 (1938).
210. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 27, 1774), in 1 TIlE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 106 (William T. Hutchinson and William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1962).
211. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 23, 209.
212. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 1, 57.
213. Id. at 58.
214. See 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 304-11. This declaration began, "An Act for
exempting the different societies of Dissenters from contributing to the support and
maintenance of the church as by law established, and its ministers, and for other
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The persecution of dissenters in Puritan New England has
been well documented elsewhere." 5 During the colonial era,
Puritan Massachusetts banished Quakers from the state on pain
of death.216 When four Quaker women insisted on returning,
they were burned at the stake.217 Dissent from the established
Congregational church was sedition and a "sin against God."218
In 1673, Uriah Oakes of Harvard College declared that, "I look
upon unbounded Toleration as the first-born of all abomina-
tions."219 Sanford Cobb wrote that "spiritual inquisition and
tyranny operated with more or less strictness and severity in all
of the [New England] colonies, except Rhode Island."22 All but
Rhode Island established the Congregational church.22' At the
time of the Revolution, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire retained religious establishments supported by taxa-
tion, although a taxpayer was permitted (at least in principle) to
choose the religious denomination that was to receive his
tax.222 The greatest religious liberty existed in Rhode Island,
which was considered to be a refuge for dissenters.22 However,
many of the socio-religious norms that existed elsewhere in New
England existed there as well.224 For instance, citizenship and
eligibility to hold public office were restricted by law to Protes-
tants.225 These laws were unevenly enforced, and some Jews
and Catholics were admitted to citizenship by special acts of the
purposes therein mentioned." Virginia Declaration of Rights, in id., at 304. It was
not until 1779 that Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom was finally
passed. See PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 109-10; TIIOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRA-
PHIY, reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 59.
215. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 202, at 4-28 (discussing "deep cooperation" be-
tween clerics and public officials in maintaining religious orthodoxy).
216. Id. at 21-26.
217. Norman Cousins, Introduction to "IN GOD WE TRUST": THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
AND IDEAS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 11 (Norman Cousins ed., 1958) [hereinafter
"IN GOD WE TRUST"]; CURRY, supra note 202, at 21-26.
218. COBB, supra note 199, at 68.
219. 2 JOSEPH B. FELT, ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND; COMPRISING
NOT ONLY RELIGIOUS, BUT ALSO MORAL, AND OTHER RELATIONS 506 (1862).
220. COBB, supra note 199, at 69.
221. Id. at 71.
222. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 141.
223. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 19-21.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id. at 90-91.
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State Assembly."6
New York began with the establishment of the Dutch Re-
formed Church." ' Financial support of this church was com-
pulsory, baptism in this church was required for all children,
and Lutherans, Baptists, and Quakers were subject to persecu-
tion."2 Upon the surrender of "New Amsterdam" to the Eng-
lish in 1664, a system of "multiple establishments" was erect-
ed.229 In his "Instructions" to the colony, the Duke of York de-
creed:
In all the territories of his Royal Highness liberty of con-
science is allowed, provided such liberty is not converted to
licentiousness or the disturbance of others in the exercise of
the protestant religion. Every township is obliged to pay their
minister, according to such agreement as they shall make
with him, and no man shall refuse his proportion; the minis-
ter being elected by the major part of the householders, in-
habitants of the town.20
This decree further mandated that a place of worship should be
erected in every parish; that the church and its minister be
supported by a public tax; and that "every inhabitant shall con-
tribute to all charges both in Church and State."
23
'
In 1683, the Colonial Assembly of New York adopted a "Char-
ter of Liberties" which stated that:
No person professing faith in God by Jesus Christ is to be
molested or called in question for any differences of opinion
in matters of religion, [and] the churches already in New
York do appear to be privileged Churches .... Provided also
that all other Christian Churches, that shall hereafter come
and settle in the province, shall have the same privileg-
es.
232
226. Id. at 85, 90-91; see also MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS 13
(1984).
227. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 79.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 79-80.
232. Id. at 80.
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Further relief for dissenting Christians was provided by a
declaration of the state convention in 1777, which expressly
rescinded all laws that "[m]ight be construed to establish or
maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their
ministers." '233 However, Roman Catholics were excluded from
citizenship by a declaration that all persons naturalized by the
state must abjure all foreign allegiances, "ecclesiastical as well
as civil."234 Jews and other groups merited no mention at all.
Maryland, an originally Roman Catholic colony, is often cited
as an example of relative religious tolerance. However, it incor-
porated many oppressive elements in its laws. The famous Act of
Toleration of 1649 in fact imposed a penalty of death and forfei-
ture of estate on any person who
shall hence forth blaspheme God,... or deny our Savior
Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, or shall deny the Holy
Trinity the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost, or the God-
head of any of the said three persons of the Trinity ... or
shall use or utter any reproachful speeches, words or lan-
guage concerning the Holy Trinity, or any of the three per-
sons therein."'
Utterance of "reproachful words and speeches" about the Virgin
Mary, or the "holy apostles or evangelists," was punishable by
fine, whipping, imprisonment, and banishment.236 Fines or im-
prisonment were prescribed for profaning the Lord's Day.237
Freedom of belief and conscience was reserved for those "pro-
fessing to believe in Jesus Christ."23 Later, when the Church
of England was established in Maryland, public exercise of Ca-
tholicism and the admission of Roman Catholic immigrants were
forbidden.239 The Declaration of Rights of 1776 limited equal
"protection in their religious liberty" to "persons professing the
Christian religion."24 It provided for the laying of "a general
233. COBB, supra note 199, at 502.
234. Id.
235. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 83.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 84.
240. MD. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, Etc., XXXIII, in 3 FRANCIs N.
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and equal tax, for the support of the Christian religion," with
individuals able to choose the church or the poor as the recip-
ient.24
In other middle-Atlantic colonies, conditions were similar. The
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided that each person shall
have "the inestimable privilege of worshipping God according to
the dictates of his own conscience," but public office was limited
to those persons "professing a belief in the faith of any Protes-
tant sect."242 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 restricted
civil rights to persons "who acknowledge the being of a God,"243
and required the following oath for public office: "I do believe in
one God, the creator and governor of the universe, the rewarder
of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowl-
edge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by Divine inspiration."244 The Delaware Constitution, ratified
in 1776, required all state officers to swear a Trinitarian oath
and declare their belief in the divine inspiration of the Scrip-
tures.245
It has been said that in the southern colonies, religious rules
were observed more in the breach than in the practice. Most
Revolutionary-Era laws, however, reflected the intolerance that
existed elsewhere. The South Carolina Constitution of 1778
granted toleration to "[aill persons and religious societies, who
acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of reward
THORPE, TIlE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIc LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, NOW OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1686, 1689 (1909).
241. Id.
242. N.J. CONST. of 1776, XVIII-XIX, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2594, 2597.
243. PA. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, II, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3081,
3082.
244. Id., Plan or Frame of Government for the Commonwealth or State of Penn-
sylvania, § 10, in 5 TIIORPE, supra note 240 at 3084, 3085. The Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1790 extended the right to hold office to all who believed in "God and in
a future state of rewards and punishments." PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4, in 5
THORPE, supra note 240, at 3092, 3100.
245. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22, in 1 THORPE, supra note 240, at 562, 566. This
oath was: "I, [name], do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His
only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do acknowl-
edge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be given by divine inspi-
ration." Id.
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and punishment, and that God is publicly to be wor-
shipped"24 -- a formulation that seemed to include the protec-
tion of Jews and Catholics. However, it further provided that
"[t]he Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is here-
by constituted and declared to be, the established religion of this
State," with "[a]ll denominations of Protestants ... enjoy[ing]
equal religious and civil privileges."247 North Carolina denied
public office to any person, "who shall deny the being of God or
the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority of
either the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious
principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the
State . . *. .24 Georgia, in its Constitution of 1777, declared
that all members of the legislature "[shall] be of the Protestant
religion."249
The existence of these establishments did not remain unchal-
lenged; there was deliberate opposition to them before the Revo-
lution, although it was scattered and ineffective.2 ' Dissenters
often chose to risk imprisonment and loss of property rather
than to submit to what they felt was spiritual tyranny.2t As
the result of opposition, laws requiring religious conformity often
were not enforced,252 and formal or informal systems of choice
246. S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXXVIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3248, 3255-56.
247. Id. at 3256. A religious society was entitled "to be incorporated and esteemed
as a Church of the established religion," if it adhered to the following tenets:
1. That there is one Eternal God, and a future state of rewards and.
punishments.
2. That God is publicly to be worshipped.
3. That the Christian Religion is the true religion.
4. That the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are of
divine inspiration, and are the rule of faith and practice.
5. That it is lawful and the duty of every man being thereunto
called by those who govern, to bear witness to the truth.
Id.
248. N.C. CONST. of 1776, The Constitution, or Form of Government, Etc., XXXII,
in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2787, 2793.
249. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI, in 2 THORPE, supra note 240, at 777, 779.
250. See, e.g., 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 358-446; BORDEN, supra note 226, pas-
sim.
251. See BAILYN, supra note 199, at 247-49. At the outbreak of the Revolution, 18
dissenters who refused to make payments to the established church were in one
Massachusetts jail. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 92.
252. In Massachusetts, for instance, prosecutions for religious offenses numbered
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or exemption from religious taxation were also common.13 Dis-
senting groups increasingly questioned the right of any religious
group to claim for itself the exclusive right to government sup-
port.25
4
Resistance to religious establishments was accelerated by the
Great Awakening, a religious revival movement which began in
the 1730s and spread throughout the American colonies.255
Itinerant preachers traveled throughout the land, creating reli-
gious fervor in the populace and provoking challenges to estab-
lished religious beliefs and organizations.2 5 "New Light" evan-
gelical enthusiasts were produced in all major religious denomi-
nations. '7 Presbyterianism was split into the Synod of Phila-
delphia, dominated by "Old Side" opponents of the Awakening,
and the synod of New York, whose members were "New
Side."" In Connecticut, the Congregational Church fractured
into "Old Lights," "New Lights," and "Separate" groups. '59 In
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and throughout New England, Bap-
tist groups grew in response to the revival.2 " Although most
widespread in the Northeast, the Great Awakening also had
substantial impact on religious thought and diversity in Virginia
about 24 per year until the mid-1780s. After that, prosecutions for missing church
on Sunday ceased, and only the offense of working or travelling on Sunday was
prosecuted. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMEICANIZATION OF TilE COMMON LAW: TIlE IM-
I'ACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACIIUsE'rIFs SOcIETY, 1760-1830, at 110 (1975). In
Virginia, laws requiring nonconformist organizations to register with the government
were often ignored, and some dissenting Protestants and Roman Catholics held pub-
lic office. See BAIIYN, supra note 199, at 248-49.
253. See id. at 248-49; COBIB, supra note 199, at 483-509.
254. See BAILYN, supra note 199, at 249-50. Resistance to established churches and
to English political power were often intermingled. See id. at 252-67. One Revolu-
tionary Era pamphlet declared "Civil and Ecclesiastical Slavery" to equal "the Pur-
chase of Christ." JONATHAN PARSONS, MASSACIRE DAY SERMON (Newburyport, 1774),
quoted in id. at 247.
255. See CUIiRY, supra note 202, at 95-96.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See ALAN HEIMEIRT, RELIGION AND TILE AMERICAN MINI): FRIOM rilEi GREA'T
AWAKENING TO TIIE REVOLUTION 2-3 (1966); G. ADIoIPii KoCmI, REI'UI31,ICAN RELIGION:
TIlE AMERICAN REVOIUTION AND TIlE CULT OF REASON 9-11 (1933).
259. HEIMERT, supra note 258, at 2-3.
260. Id.
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and the Carolinas.26'
The Great Awakening heightened sectarian differences and
opposition to established religions and their state-supported
structures.262 Bitter rifts developed even among those in the
Protestant evangelical ranks.263 Discontent with religious es-
tablishments was fueled by the growth of religious (particularly
Protestant) diversity. Increasing numbers of dissenters meant
increasing clamor for religious liberty. As Bernard Bailyn has
written, the movement for disestablishment "was borne by the
radical sectarians: New Light Presbyterians, Separate Baptists,
and Strict Congregationalists; with the result that the most
advanced pre-Revolutionary arguments for disestablish-
ment-arguments that would eventually bear fruit in all the
governments of the new nation-were unstable compounds of
narrow denominationalism and broad libertarianism.""
The existence of choice plans, or the availability of registry as
a dissenting denomination, did not save these establishment
schemes in the eyes of dissenters.265 Dissenters "resented hav-
261. See id.
262. See BAILYN, supra note 199, at 248-49; BLOCH, supra note 18, at 13-15, 82
(discussing the Great Awakening and its linkage of the concepts of political liberty
and "true religion"). "As the great wave of religious enthusiasm [of the Great Awak-
ening] subsided in the 1750's it left in its wake a sensitivity to those very moral
issues that formed the religious dimension of radical whig ideology." Id. at 15.
263. See HEIMERT, supra note 258, at 122.
264. BAILYN, supra note 199, at 257. Bailyn describes the arguments made by dis-
senters in Virginia as independence approached:
[D]issenters . . . urged the granting of "equal privilege--in religion as in
civil affairs-to all . . . . "[Tihat without delay all church establishments
might be pulled down, and every tax upon conscience and private
judgment abolished." . . . Still others condemned establishments as "in-
consistent with the spirit of taxation which supposes those on whom
impositions are laid to be benefited thereby." . . . [Presbyterians] stated
their absolute opposition to permitting any group to enjoy "exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges . . . to the common reproach and inju-
ry of every other denomination." The only just, reasonable, and effective
solution was to abolish "all partial and invidious distinctions" at once and
for all time.
Id. at 260-61 (quoting 2 GEORGE BRYDON, VIRGINIA'S MOTHER CHURCH (1974) and
Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia, Anno Domini, 1776 (1828)) (footnote
omitted).
265. The actual end of "establishments with choice" plans in Virginia, and the
death knell for them elsewhere, came with the defeat of the "Bill Establishing a
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ing to receive freedoms as favors from those with the right to
choose the beneficiaries" or to say "what was 'regular' enough to
be tolerated.""26 Isaac Backus wrote that Massachusetts 'has
declared the Baptists to be irregular, therefore the secular power
still force them to support the worship which they conscientious-
ly dissent from."'267 Backus concluded that 'many who are fill-
ing the nation with the cry of LIBERTY and against oppressors
are at the same time violating that dearest of all rights, LIBER-
TY of CONSCIENCE."'268 Apparently, skeptics had some basis
for their views. When Baptists refused to pay taxes to support
the established Congregational church in one Massachusetts
town, their property was confiscated on the ground that their
sect was "fluctuating and unstable" and "a sink for some of the
filth of Christianity in this part of the county." There was no
protection, in the eyes of local authorities, for sects who "cannot,
in any tolerable sense, answer the valuable ends of religion to
the community."269
The struggle against religious persecution and state establish-
ments of favored religious groups had clearly begun by the time
of the Revolution. The questions that remain to be examined are
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" in 1786. This bill required all per-
sons to make an annual contribution for the support of the Christian religion; for
some Christian church, denomination, or communion of Christians; or for some form
of Christian worship. The bill, in its final form, allowed the nonreligious taxpayer to
elect that his tax be used for the encouragement of "seminaries of learning" within
the counties where those sums were collected. See PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 109-
10. It was in opposition to this bill that Madison's famous Memorial and Remon-
strance was written. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
COMPRISING His PUBLIC PAPERS AND His PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NU-
MEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED 183
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter TIlE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON]; see also
MEMORIAL BY TIlE HANOVER PRESBYTERY (1785), quoted in PFEFFER, supra note 199,
at 110-11 ("Religion is altogether personal, and the right of exercising it unalienable;
and it is not, cannot and ought not to be resigned to the will of the society at
large; and much less to the Legislature which derives its authority wholly from the
consent of the People . . ").
266. BAILYN, supra note 199, at 262.
267. Id. at 263.
268. Id.
269. 4 TIHE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
MASSACIIUSE'ITS BAY 1036, 1040, 1038 (1869), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 199, at
265.
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what deeper intellectual and religious values motivated these
struggles, and what their implications for different conceptions
of "free exercise" and the "separation" of church and state might
be.
C. The Core Freedom: The Primacy of Freedom of Consbience
Of all of the "fundamental rights" heralded during the Found-
ing Era, calls for freedom of conscience were the most insistent
and the most intense. Despite the history of religious persecu-
tion in the colonies, persons from all geographic regions and
religious affiliations called for protection of the "unalienable
rights" of conscience. "If ... all men are to be considered as
entering into Society on equal conditions," then "[a]bove all are
they to be considered as retaining an 'equal title to the free
exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."'270
A memorial drafted by a committee of the First Continental
Congress stated: "The free exercise of private judgment, and the
unalienable rights of conscience, are of too high a rank and dig-
nity to be submitted to the decrees of councils, or the imperfect
laws of fallible legislators."27' "[Tihe kingdom of Christ is not of
this world, and religion is a concern between God and the soul
with which no human authority can intermeddle;.., we claim
and expect the liberty of worshipping God according to our con-
sciences ... ,2" George Washington wrote to the Baptists that
"every man, conducting himself as a good citizen, and being
accountable to God alone for his religious opinions, ought to be
protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of
his own conscience."273
270. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183, 186. In an essay written in 1792, Madison stated that "[clonscience is the most
sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise
of that, being a natural and inalienable right." JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY, reprinted
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 101, 102.
271. SAMUEL DAVIS, ET AL., MEMORIAL, quoted in ALVAH HOVEY, A MEMOIR OF THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF TIE REV. ISAAC BAcKUS 204-05 (1858).
272. Id. at 210.
273. George Washington, Address to the General Committee, Representing the Unit-
ed Baptist Churches in Virginia (May, 1789), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON; BEING HIS CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER PAPERS,
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In their rebellion in New England, strict Congregationalists
asserted that liberty of conscience is an "unalienable right of
every rational creature." '74 State constitutions called for the
protection of liberty of conscience'17 as did state ratifying con-
ventions for the Federal Constitution.276 Calls for freedom of
conscience were made by evangelical and traditional religious
OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, SELECTED AND PUBLISHED FROM TIlE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS;
WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS 155 (Jared Sparks ed.,
1848) [hereinafter THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON]. Washington noted that
"if I could now conceive that the general government might ever be so administered
as to render the liberty of conscience insecure,... no one would be more zealous
than myself to establish effectual barriers against the horrors of Ithis] spiritual tyr-
anny .. . ." Id.
274. See BAILYN, supra note 199, at 249.
275. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. of 1776, XVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2594,
2597 (declaring that every person has "the inestimable privilege of worshipping Al-
mighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience"); PA.
CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or
State of Pennsylvania, II, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3081, 3082 ("IAill men
have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences and understanding . . ").
276. See, e.g., Statement of Rev. Payson, Debates in the Convention of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 30,
1788), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON TIlE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 120 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [collection as a whole herein-
after ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (" . . . God alone is the God of the conscience, and...
attempts to erect human tribunals for the consciences of men are impious encroach-
ments upon the prerogatives of God."); Statement of Mr. Tredwell, Debates in the
Convention of the State of New York on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(July 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 401 ("[Hiere is no bill of rights, no
proper restriction of power; our lives, our property, and our consciences, are left
wholly at the mercy of the legislature . . . ."). These concerns led to proposed
amendments to the Constitution which focused on the preservation of conscience.
See, e.g., Supplement to the Journal of the Federal Convention (Ratification by the
State of Virginia) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 327, 327 ("[Almong other essen-
tial rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be cancelled, abridged,
restrained, or modified, by any authority of the United States."); Supplement to the
Journal of the Federal Convention (Ratification by the State of New York), in 2
ELLIOVS DEBATES, supra, at 328, 328 ("ITlhe people have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the
dictates of conscience .... "); Supplement to the Journal of the Federal Convention
(Ratification by the State of Rhode Island), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 334,
334 ("IRleligion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis-
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction . . . ; and therefore all
men have a natural, equal, and unalienable right to the exercise of religion accord-
ing to the dictates of conscience . . ").
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groups, Old Lights and New Lights, Strict Congregationalists
and Anglicans, Jews, Quakers, and Roman Catholics. It has
been written that at the time of the drafting of the Constitution,
the idea of freedom of conscience knew no opposition.277
The meaning of "freedom of conscience" differed for different
groups. Older, main-line Protestant religious groups defined it in
terms of individual freedom of thought; evangelicals believed
that it also included such things as the right to hear the minis-
ter of one's choice.27 The fundamental concept, however, incor-
porated certain ideas that crossed religious lines. For virtually
all groups, conscience was seen as a distinctly rational process;
it involved the exercise of human reason, judgment, and under-
standing. Because of its involvement with human rational pro-
cesses, conscience involved elements of free will, choice, and
(ultimately) human responsibility. Liberty of conscience in mat-
ters of religion left the individual alone, and accountable; it
"consist[ed] in the absolute and unrestrained exercise of...
religious opinions and duties ... without the control or interven-
tion of any human power or authority whatsoever. " "' The re-
sponsibility imposed by conscience was often stated in distinctly
religious terms. Jefferson wrote that in matters of conscience,
"[w]e are answerable... to our God."28 John Adams wrote
that "[tihe most abandoned scoundrel that ever existed, never
Yet Wholly extinguished his Conscience, and while Conscience
remains there is some Religion. "2 The rootedness of con-
science in religious ideas is apparent in early characterizations
of the First Amendment's guarantees. In a private letter, Fisher
277. See BERNS, supra note 7, at 2-10.
278. See HEIMERT, supra note 258, at 206-09.
279. St. George Tucker, quoted in THEODORE A. SCHROEDER, CONSTITUTIONAL FREE
SPEECH DEFINED AND DEFENDED 122-23 (1919).
280. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in
TIHE PORTABLE TIIOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 210. Elsewhere, Jefferson
wrote that " . . . I have ever thought religion a concern purely between our God
and our consciences, for which we were accountable to Him . . . ." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Harrison Smith (Aug. 6, 1816), in 15 TIlE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 59, 60.
281. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 19, 1817), in TIlE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETERS: TIlE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 509 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1988) [collection as a
whole hereinafter TIlE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS].
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Ames described the religious guarantees of the First Amend-
ment as protecting the "rights of conscience."282 James Madi-
son, when later arguing that the Alien and Sedition Acts violat-
ed First Amendment guarantees, referred to those guarantees as
"the liberty of conscience and of the press."28 3
The reasons for the perceived paramount importance of free-
dom of conscience were several. First, freedom of conscience was
believed to be important to religion: not only for the practical
protection of minority religious sects, but also for the protection
of the very process of religious belief and conviction. The princi-
ple of voluntariness, or the need for personal enlightenment and
the consultation of conscience in the discovery of religious truth,
was shared by old line and evangelical religious groups." Jon-
athan Mayhew told the members of hs congregation that they
must make their determinations about the existence of God after
"we have impartially examined the matter, and see the evidence
on one side or the other."285 Mayhew argued that Christianity
had three basic principles: "THAT there is a natural difference
between truth and falsehood, right and wrong"; "THAT men are
282. Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (June 12, 1789), in 1
WORKS OF FISHER AMES, WITH A SELECTION FROM HIS SPEECHES AND CORRESPON-
DENCE 53, 54 (Seth Ames ed., 1864) [collection as a whole hereinafter WORKS OF
FISHER AMES] (" . . . Mr. Madison has inserted, in his amendments, the increase of
representatives, each State having two at least. The rights of conscience, of bearing
arms, of changing the government, are declared to be inherent in the people. Free-
dom of the press, too."). A similar understanding is reflected in a letter by Richard
Henry Lee of Virginia, which criticized the proposed Federal Constitution as having
"no restraint, in the form of a bill of rights, to secure . . . that residuum of human
rights which is not intended to be given up to society, and which, indeed, is not
necessary to be given for any social purpose. The rights of conscience, the freedom
of the press, and the trial by jury, are at mercy." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to
Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 503,
503.
283. James Madison, Report on the Resolutions (Feb. 7, 1799), in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 341, 400. He similarly referred to the Vir-
ginia Bill of Religious Freedom as "a permanent barrier against future attempts on
the rights of conscience .... " Letter from James Madison to George Mason (July
14, 1826), quoted in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 299 n.1 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1953) [collection as a whole hereinafter THE COMPLETE MADISON].
284. See HEIMERT, supra note 258, at 2-12, 397.
285. Jonathan Mayhew, The Right and Duty of private Judgment asserted, in JONA-
TIIAN MAYIIEW, SEVEN SERMONS UPON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS ... PREACIIED AT
A LECTURE IN TIE WEST MEETING-HOUSE IN BOSTON, 1748, at 42, 44 (1750).
894
1995] SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 895
naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of
these differences"; and "THAT men are under [an] obligation to
exert these faculties; and to judge for themselves in things of a
religious concern. ""' He argued that all should endeavor to
discover the true religion, "let it be what it will."2 ' In a memo-
rial presented to the Continental Congress in 1774, an associa-
tion of Baptists argued that "[tihe care of souls cannot belong to
the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward
force; but pure and saving religion consists in the inward per-
suasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to
God. 288
The understanding of human reason in a religious context
varied. Some seemed to grant reason a divine or revelatory sta-
tus; 189 others viewed it as a purely human instrumentality to
be used in the discovery of religious truth.290  Jonathan
286. Jonathan Mayhew, Difference betwixt Truth and Falsehood, Right and Wrong,
in MAYHEW, supra note 285; at 5.
287. Jonathan Mayhew, Objections Considered, in MAYIEW, supra note 285, at 72;
see also CURRY, supra note 202, at 100-01.
288. MEMORIAL PRESENTED BY THE BAPTISTS TO THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS IN
1774, reprinted in PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 102.
289. The fusion of human reason and divine revelation is evident, for instance, in
the following statement by Adams: "The human Understanding is a revelation from
its Maker which can never be disputed or doubted. There can be no Scepticism,
Pyrrhonism or Incredulity or Infidelity here. No Prophecies, no Miracles are neces-
sary to prove this celestial communication." Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jef-
ferson (Sept. 14, 1813), in TIlE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 372,
373.
290. The use of a fallible, human instrumentality to discover religious truth pre-
sented an inherent paradox. Although human reason was susceptible to error' (as
evidenced by "false" religions and other misapprehensions of truth), it was still be-
lieved that only through the process of reason could errors be corrected. Jefferson,
for instance, wrote that "[r]eason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents
against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion, by bringing
every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation." He went on to
acknowledge, however, that "Imlillions of innocent men, women, and children ...
have been burnt, tortured, fined, imprisoned . . . " in a futile effort to enforce Chris-
tian uniformity. "1If there be but one right [religion], . . . we should wish to see
the . . . wandering sects gathered into the fold of truth. But . . . we cannot effect
this by force. Reason and persuasion are the only practicable instruments." THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON TIlE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in TIHE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFERSON, supra note 207, at 23, 211-12; see also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Edward Everett (1823), quoted in 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 396 ("[If
new Ireligiousi sects arise with absurd opinions or over-heated imaginations, the
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Mayhew expressed both concepts. He wrote that "[ilt is by our
reason that we are exalted above the beasts of the field.... It is
principally on account of our reason, that we are said to have
been created in the image of God."291 However,
it necessarily follows from the supposition of our rational
faculties being limited, that there is room for our being in-
structed by revelation.... It is the proper office of reason to
determine whether what is proposed to us under the notion of
revelation from God, be attended with suitable attestations
and credentials, or not. So that even in this case, we may of
ourselves judge what is right.292
Under either vision, the importance of rational inquiry (or the
exercise of conscience) to religious belief, and the consequent
need for its protection, were assumed.293 Indeed, freedom of
conscience was of such importance that "[i]f this freedom be
abused, it is an offense against God, not against man: To God,
therefore, ... must an account of it be rendered.""29
Some who have addressed the role of religion in American
proper remedies lie in time, forbearance, and example . . . ."); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Edward Dowse (Apr. 19, 1803), in 10 TIlE WRITINGS OF TIIOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 176, at 376, 378 ("[W]e are bound . ..to make common cause, even
with error itself, to maintain the common right of freedom of conscience."); TiIOMAS
PAINE, TIlE AGE OF REASON, quoted in 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 321 (" . . . I
have always strenuously supported the right of every man to his opinion . . . .The
most formidable weapon against errors of every kind is reason.").
291. Jonathan Mayhew, Men, endowed with Faculties proper for discerning the Dif-
ference betwixt truth and Falsehood, etc., in MAYIIEW, supra note 285, at 39.
292. Id. at 35-36.
293. The protection of religion through protection of freedom of conscience is per-
haps most eloquently set out in the two great documents of the Virginia disestab-
lishment struggle, Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, BILL FOR ESTA3LISIIING RELI-
GIoUs FREEDOM (1777) (original draft), in TiiE PORTABLE TiIOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 207, at 251; JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AN!) REMONSTRANCE AGAINST REIU-
GIOIS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 TIlE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 265, at 183.
294. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL ANI) REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 TIlE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
186; see also Statement of Rev. Payson, Debates in the Convention of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 20,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 120 ("JAttempts to erect human
tribunals for the consciences of men are impious encroachments upon the preroga-
tives of God.").
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Revolutionary ideology have posed religion and religious ideas as
oppositional to the broader, rationalistic ideas of the Enlighten-
ment."' An examination of the writings of this period, howev-
er, leads to a different conclusion: that rising confidence in the
powers of human reason and associated empiricism simply was
fused with emerging strains of religious thought. Although there
was certainly resistance by some who feared the introduction of
any rationalistic elements into revealed religion,"' any clear
division of religious groups into rationalist or pietist is virtually
impossible.297 Across the religious spectrum, reason and "more
primordial" ways of knowing religious truth became deeply in-
tertwined."' Rational inquiry was not seen as incompatible
with religious inspiration or the quest for religious truth; indeed,
the former was seen as necessary for the latter.299 A Massachu-
295. Forrest McDonald cites the rise in popularity of the natural rights theories of
John Locke as part of the ideological movement away from an assumed merger of
church and state and religious impediments to intellectual freedom. He notes that
the natural rights theories of Locke were repeatedly cited without reference to their
religious source-such source being inimical (in his view) to rising rationalistic and
individualistic movements. MCDONALD, supra note 202, at 7, 57-70.
Henry F. May similarly asserts that the alliance of the Enlightenment and
evangelical Protestantism was illusory because "the doctrine of salvation by unmerit-
ed grace that was defined by many as the consistent center of Protestantism
was . . . the very opposite of enlightened morality." In his view, "Protestantism and
the Enlightenment were allies only when they faced common enemies." MAY, supra
note 13, at 117-18. As. May acknowledges, however, doctrines of salvation were only
a small part of the comprehensive world view offered by evangelical Protestantism;
many other tenets of these religious groups were perfectly compatible with Enlight-
enment ideas. Id.
296. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 202, at 99; KOCH, supra note 258, at 239-84 (dis-
cussing resistance of some established religious groups to eighteenth-century rational-
istic trends).
297. See, e.g., BLOCH, supra note 18, at 103-04 (discussing the convergence of dis-
senting religious thought and radical Whig ideology); ADRIENNE KOCH, POWER, MOR-
ALS, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT 14 (1961) (noting that for evangelists, Newton and Locke provided
ideas that fortified doctrines of predestination and original sin).
298. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN
AMERICA 60-63 (1985); see also KOCH, supra note 258, at 215 (discussing eighteenth-
century Unitarian view that revelation worked together with reason in discovering
the will of God).
299. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 28
(1989) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS] (observing that the core belief of the right to free-
dom of conscience "was that persons are independent originators of reasonable claims
on one another as ethical beings, and that the demands of ethics and of an ethical
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setts clergyman pronounced that "[t]he learned Languages,
Rhetoric, Logic, History, Philosophy, etc., are excellent Hand-
maids to Divinity.""3 ' They "who are Enemies to Learning are
so far, whether they know it or not, Enemies to Religion... .""'
For Richard Price, Joseph Priestly, Benjamin Rush, and others,
"[t]he unfolding of scientific truth seemed ... perfectly conso-
nant with biblical revelation."" 2 Throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, "the guardians and interpreters of
belief in God ... had to come to terms with a radically changing
social and intellectual environment."3  The result was not an
abandonment of religious beliefs, but an adaptation of religion to
the new intellectual style." 4 Along with the secular Enlighten-
God could only be both known and practically effective . . . when persons' right to
conscience was appropriately respected"); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 8 (1969) (noting that scriptural truth was believed
to be supported by experience and reason; few American ministers saw any need to
deny the Enlightenment for the sake of religion).
300. JAMES FINLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE GOSPEL MINISTRY 46 (1763).
301. ANDREW CROSWELL, A TESTIMONY AGAINST THE PROFANENESS OF SOME OF THE
PUBLIC DISPUTES, ON TIlE LAST COMMENCEMENT DAY; WITH LETTERS TO THE REV'D
PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE, ON THE OCCASION: HIS LETTER OF DEFENCE, AND
REMARKS UPON IT 16 (1760).
302. BLOCH, supra note 18, at 103-04; see also RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
299, at 24-25 (arguing that the American Founders saw enlightenment in law, histo-
ry, religion, and philosophy as one process).
303. TURNER, supra note 298, at 22.
304. Id. at 22-23. Such changes included increased lay involvement in religious
devotions and greater emphasis on individual acceptance of religious creeds. Id.; see
also MAY, supra note 13, at 113, 120 (noting Enlightenment ideas that "it had re-
cently become possible, through the proper use of the human faculties, to understand
the Universe better than it had ever been understood before, and to make practical
use of this understanding," were not necessarily inconsistent with beliefs that the
universe "remained finally mysterious, understandable only through divine illumina-
tion .... "); CONRAD WRIGHT, THE BEGINNINGS OF UNITARIANISM IN AMERICA (1954)
(discussing the rise of religious groups who advocated rationalist and faith-based reli-
gious beliefs).
Carl Becker challenges the assumption that the thirteenth century was an "age
of faith" and the eighteenth century an "age of reason." Although reason was used
to discredit Christian dogma, eighteenth-century philosophers in fact (if not in form)
retained many of the religious foundations and preconceptions of their forbearers:
They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude
toward the Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been
created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated
machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as
an abiding place for mankind .... They renounced the authority of
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ment, there was a "Christian Enlightenment" as well."0 5 As
Ruth Bloch has written, for many Protestant groups, reason and
revelation were the "twin pillars of true religion.
'3 0 6
Prominent secular figures articulated similar ideas. The Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by George Mason and
amended by Madison, declared that "[rleligion, or the duty
which we owe to our Creator," can "be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence;" as a result, "all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience."" 7 Freedom of conscience-freedom in
the use of human reason-was necessary if religious truth and
the will of God were to be discovered. "Reason," Ethan Allen
wrote, "must be the standard, by which we determine the re-
spective claims of [religious] revelation .... "" John Adams
referred to the "Liberty of conscience" as "the right of free inqui-
ry and private judgment."0 ' Jefferson argued that religion in-
church and Bible, but exhibited a naive faith in the authority of nature
and reason .... They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it
seems, since they retained their faith in the immortality of the soul....
They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectibili-
ty of the human race.
CARL BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PIIILOSOPIIERS 30-
31 (1932).
305. See MILLER, supra note 9, at 90 (discussing John Witherspoon, a dissenting
clergyman whose views combined Calvinism and Scottish Enlightenment ideas).
306. BLOCH, supra note 18, at 194.
307. Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 16 (1776), in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMIENTARY HISTORY 236 (1971). The original language, pro-
posed by George Mason, read: "That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Cre-
ator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and convic-
tion, not by force or violence; and, therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest
toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience .... "
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: TIIE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF
TIlE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1978). James Madison proposed deletion of the reference
to "toleration" and this version was finally adopted. Id.
308. ETHAN ALLEN, REASON THE ONLY ORACLE OF MAN 475 (1784).
309. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 23, 1825), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 607, 607-08. Adams repeatedly stressed the
element of rational choice in the selection of religious beliefs and opinions. In his
diary, he wrote that men should examine "with unbiased judgments every system of
religion" and choose "one system, on their own authority, for themselves." John Ad-
ams, diary entry of Mar. 7, 1756, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRA-
TIONS 8 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850) [hereinafter THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS]. To
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volved "the assent of the mind to an intelligible proposition."")'
"We should.., follow the oracle of conscience, and say nothing
about what no man can understand, nor therefore believe... .
"[Olur reason at last must ultimately decide, as it is the only or-
acle which God has given us to determine between what really
comes from Him and the phantasms of a disordered or deluded
imagination.""' Jefferson wrote, "We should... moralise for
ourselves, follow the oracle of conscience ....
The desire to separate religion and reason, and to paint them
in starkly oppositional terms, is more a product of modern minds
than of those of the eighteenth century."'4 Religion, as broadly
a colleague he wrote, "IGod] has given me reason, to find out the truth and the real
design of my existence here .... " Letter from John Adams to Richard Cranch (Oct.
18, 1756), in "IN GOD WE TitUST'", supra note 217, at 91, 92.
310. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 22, 1813), in TIlE ADAMS-
JEFI -ISON LE'IrEIS, supra note 281, at 367, 368.
311. Id. In a letter to his nephew, Jefferson wrote, "Question with boldness even
the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the hom-
age of reason, than of blindfolded fear." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr
(Aug. 10, 1787), in Til, LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS oF TIIOMAS JEFFERSON 429,
431 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
312. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Miles King (Sept. 26, 1814), in 14 TIlE WRIT-
INGS OF TiIOMAS JEFEMRSON, supra note 176, at 196, 197.
313. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 22, 1813), in Tile ADIAMS-
JEFFERSON LE'Is'EtS, supra note 281, at 367, 368; see also SAMUEl. DAVIS, ET AL.,
MEMORIAL, in HOVE;Y, supra note 271, at 204 (defining conscience as "the free exer-
cise of private judgment").
Madison's views of the relationship between the exercise of reason and the
process of religious conviction are described in the report he wrote opposing the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The precedent established by the violation of free-
dom of the press, he argued, may be equally fatal to the free exercise of religion:
By subjecting the truth of opinion to the regulation, fine, and imprison-
ment, to be inflicted by those who are of a different opinion, the free
range of the human mind is injuriously restrained. The sacred obligations
of religion flow from the due exercise of opinion, in the solemn discharge
of which man is accountable to his God alone; yet, under this precedent
the truth of religion itself may be ascertained, and its pretended licen-
tiousness punished by a jury of a different creed . . . . This law, then.
commits the double sacrilege of arresting reason in her progress towards
perfection, and of placing in a state of danger the free exercise of reli-
gious opinions.
JAMES MADISON, ADDiESS OF TIlE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO TIlE PEOILE OF TIlE COM-
MONWEALTII OF VIRGINIA (1799), reprinted in 6 TIiE WIvTINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 265, at 332, 337.
314. The tendency in much twentieth-century writing to define religion as involving
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understood in this era, meant the acknowledgement or search
for the transcendent in natural or human affairs. The human
capacity to reason was seen as a way to understand the natural
order and the laws by which it was governed. Religious groups
differed in their identifications of the point at which they be-
lieved that reason failed and faith began; but virtually all ac-
knowledged the critical role of individual reason in the forma-
tion of religious belief. While French philosophic skepticism and
belief in superstition and revelation (in opposition to reason) necessarily makes con-
trary beliefs-or mixtures of beliefs---secular" or "nonreligious" in nature. See, e.g.,
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHIENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT, at xi (1986) (asking whether the First Amendment was "the product of the
'secular humanists' of their time-rationalists, Unitarians, and Deists, like Benjamin
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson-or [whether] its supporters [were] evangelical Chris-
tians seeking to protect religion from government"). The notion that Deism, for in-
stance, was not religious in nature would have come as quite a surprise to its
founder, who saw it as "an expression of religious concern-of impatience particular-
ly with the divisions and contentions of. . . Christianity." HEIMERT, supra note 258,
at 539. Among the fundamental principles of the Deistic Society of the State of New
York were:
That the universe proclaims the existence of one supreme Deity,
worthy [of] the adoration of intelligent beings.
That a religion mingled with persecution and malice cannot be of
divine origin.
That education and science are essential to the happiness of man.
That civil and religious liberty [are] equally essential to his true
interests.
That there can be no human authority to which man ought to be
amenable for his religious opinions.
ELIHU PALMER, POSTHUMOUS PIECES 10-11, reprinted in 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at
266.
Perhaps ironically, it is those associated with the twentieth century's political
and religious right who have most readily acknowledged the intertwined nature of
religious and American Enlightenment ideas. See, e.g., ROCKNE MCCARTHY, ET AL.,
DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR THE AMERICAN
ScHOOLS 27 (1982). By successfully establishing the religious nature of American En-
lightenment thought, such commentators can (they believe) demonstrate its uncon-
stitutional establishment in the public schools of this country. Whatever the merits
of this conclusion, it is clear that denial of the integrated nature of religious ideas
and the American Enlightenment has facilitated the attempted separation of the
religious and the secular in American law and politics. Whether the result of a con-
scious strategy of Enlightenment thinkers, see id. at 28, 50, a sincere belief in the
absence of religious elements and roots, or sheer coincidence, the pervasive belief in
later times of the incompatibility of religion and reason has facilitated belief in the
separability of the religious and the secular in individual lives, in the broader cul-
tural milieu, and in government.
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other expressions of Enlightenment rationalism weakened some
orthodox and evangelistic religious movements, they strength-
ened others, particularly those that stressed individual con-
science, individual responsibility, and an individual's direct
relationship with God.315 The ascendancy of rational inquiry
led, itself, to calls for freedom of conscience. "[Tihe gradual im-
provement of the human mind that has.., taken place, has
been leading these colonies into that truly righteous and Catho-
lic principle, Universal Toleration and Liberty of Conscience....1,311
Freedom of conscience was believed to hold great importance
for the state, as well. In the Founding Era, "moral law" was seen
as something firmly rooted in religious ideas, truths, impera-
tives, and fears. The laws that were believed to govern human
conduct were stated to be "dictated by God himself'317 or "given
by the Sovereign of the universe to all mankind."315 In the
common view, "if there [were] no God there could be no moral
obligations."31 9  Richard Henry Lee of Virginia wrote that
315. See 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 265-66.
316. SAMUEL WILLIAMS, A DISCOuRSE ON THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY 15 (1775).
317. In an early essay, Alexander Hamilton describes the "law of nature," quoting
Blackstone: "This is what is called the law of nature, 'which, being coeval with man-
kind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any other."
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON 55, 62 (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1904); see also JOHN P. REID, THE
CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 25 (1988) (discuss-
ing the eighteenth-century association between revelation and natural law).
318. Letter from John Jay to John Murray (Apr. 15, 1818), in 4 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 403, 403 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1893). In
The Federalist No. 43, Madison referred to "the transcendent law of nature and of
nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects
at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be
sacrificed." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), reprinted in 11 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 354, 365.
319. Letter from John Jay to John Bristed (Apr. 23, 1811), in 4 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 318, at 358, 359-60. Jay report-
ed this remark as part of his conversation with an English physician, who was a
professed atheist. The physician
did not hesitate to admit that, if there [were] no God, there could be no
moral obligations, but insisted that they were not necessary .... that
society would find a substitute for them in enlightened self-interest. I
soon turned the conversation to another topic, and he, probably perceiv-
ing that his sentiments met with a cold reception, did not afterwards
resume the subject.
Id. at 360; see KERBER, supra note 18, at 210 n.85 (discussing the intimate connec-
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"[rlefiners may weave as fine a web of reason as they please, but
the experience of all times shows Religion to be the guardian of
morals . . .. ,"" James Madison, often identified as a secularist,
maintained in private correspondence that "the belief in a God
All Powerful wise and good, is so essential to the moral order of
the World and to the happiness of man, that arguments which
enforce it cannot be drawn from too many sources nor adapted
with too much solicitude ....
The importance of religiously-based, transcendent principles
to fundamental moral ideas was the theme of a critique of con-
temporary French philosophers written by John Adams in 1816.
Adams, a child of the Enlightenment who prized the fruits of
reason and derided religious superstition, lashed out at what he
believed to be an attempt by French philosophers to separate
religion and moral truth:
And what was their Phylosophy? Atheism; pure unadulter-
ated Atheism.... The Univer[sle was Matter only and eter-
nal; Spirit was a Word Without a meaning; Liberty was a
Word Without a Meaning. There was no Liberty in the Uni-
verse; Liberty was a Word void of Sense. Every thought Word
Passion Sentiment Feeling, all Motion and Action was nec-
essary. All Beings and Attributes were of eternal Necessity.
Conscience, Morality, were all nothing but Fate.322
Conscience was believed to afford human beings access to this
"law of God," or "moral law." 23 Man was endowed by God
tion between religious belief and natural rights expounded by the clergy in this era).
320. Letter from Richard H. Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), in 8 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 210, at 149, 149; see FISHER AMES, PHOCION
No. IV (Apr., 1801), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 162,
164.
321. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Frederick Beasley (Nov. 20, 1825), in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 503, 503-04 (1867).
322. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 2, 1816), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 464, 464-65. Adams' interweaving of reli-
gious and Enlightenment ideas is also evident in another letter:
Phylosophy which is the result of Reason, is the first, the original Reve-
lation of the Creator to his Creature, Man. When this Revelation is clear
and certain, by Intuition or necessary Induction, no subsequent Revela-
tion supported by Prophecies or Miracles can supercede it.
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 25, 1813), in THE ADAMS-JEFFER-
SON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 409, 412.
323. See JAMES WILSON, OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND OBLIGATION, re-
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"with rational faculties, by the help of which to discern and
pursue such things as were consistent with his duty and inter-
est." 4 The complimentary roles of reason and revelation in
the apprehension of moral principles was expressed by Ethan
Allen in his famous pamphlet, Reason the Only Oracle of Man:
[M]orality does not derive its nature from books, but from the
fitness of things. .. . The -knowledge of this as well as all
other sciences, is acquired from reason and experience, and
(as it is progressively obtained) may with propriety be called,
the revelation of God, which he has revealed to us in the
constitution of our rational natures .... 3z5
During the Massachusetts ratifying convention, conscience
was described as "the reason God has given us, employed on our
moral actions, in their most important consequences.""2 6 The
relationship of conscience to free inquiry, universal moral princi-
ples, and individual responsibility was expounded by Adams. In
a private letter, he wrote:
Morals are no qualities of matter; nor, as far as we know, of
printed in SELECTED POLITICAL ESSAYS OF JAMES WILSON 224, 255-56 (Randolph G.
Adams ed., 1930).
324. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 55, 63.
325. ALLEN, supra note 308, at 466.
The roots of these beliefs can be traced to John Locke, among others. Carl
Becker writes of Locke's contribution to this intellectual movement in the following
terms:
Locke, more perhaps than anyone else, made 'it possible for the eigh-
teenth century to believe ... [that] it was possible for men "to corre-
spond with the general harmony of Nature"; that since man, and the
mind of man, were integral parts of the work of God, it was possible for
man, by the use of his mind, to bring his thought and conduct . . . into
a perfect harmony with the Universal Natural Order. In the eighteenth
century . . . these truths were widely accepted as self-evident: that a
valid morality would be a "natural morality," a valid religion would be a
"natural religion," a valid law of politics would be a "natural law." This
was only another way of saying that morality, religion, and politics ought
to conform to God's will as revealed in the essential nature of man.
CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN TIIE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 57 (1922).
326. Statement of Rev. Payson, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 120.
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simple spirit or simple intelligence. Morals are attributes of
spirits only when those spirits are free as well as intelligent
agents, and have consciences or a moral sense, a faculty of
discrimination not only between right and wrong, but be-
tween good and evil, happiness and misery, pleasure and
pain. This freedom of choice and action, united with con-
science, necessarily implies a responsibility to a lawgiver and
to a law, and has a necessary relation to right and wrong, to
happiness and misery."
A faculty or a quality of distinguishing between moral
good and evil, as well as physical happiness and misery, that
is, pleasure and pain, or in other words, a CONSCIENCE...
is essential to morality.3"
The content of the moral principles to be apprehended by con-
science was often described in sweeping terms: a "passion for
liberty and justice, for truth and humanity."329 Although al-
ways stressing liberty of thought, the articulate spokesmen of
this era nonetheless believed that certain fundamental princi-
ples could-indeed must-be apprehended by men. "The practice
of morality being necessary for the well-being of society,...
[God] has taken care to impress its precepts so indelibly on our
hearts that they shall not be effaced by the subtleties of our
brain."33 Throughout this era, as in European Enlightenment
writings before, Americans spoke and wrote of equality, liberty,
integrity, and justice, as assumed values in a known world.331
Jefferson stated that the Declaration of Independence "place[d]
before mankind the common sense of the subject" and rested
327. Letters from John Adams to John Taylor (1814), in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, supra note 309, at 447, 450.
328. Id. at 520.
329. BECKER, supra note 325, at 43.
330. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Sept. 27, 1809), in 12 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 314, 315.
331. See, e.g., MARVIN MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, at xxiii (1973) (claim-
ing that in Madison's view, equality was the foundational concept of republican gov-
ernment); Wilson C. McWilliams, On Equality as the Moral Foundation for Commu-
nity, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Robert H. Horwitz
ed., 1986). To American patriots, "[tihe value of the American Revolution lay . . . in
what it promised to the human race": "advancing the cause of freedom and righ-
teousness across the earth." BLOCH, supra note 18, at 85-86.
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upon "the harmonizing sentiments of the day."332 Individuals
might differ in their ability to apprehend these values, or in
their willingness to set other, purely self-interested goals aside;
but the reason for conflict or deviation was not a question of the
existence of such principles themselves.
Jefferson wrote at length about these questions, and his an-
swers are particularly illuminating of the assumptions of many
of the articulate spokesmen of his age. In a private letter he
wrote that man "was endowed with a sense of right and
wrong ... . This sense is as much a part of his nature, as the
sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of
morality. .. .""' Fundamental moral truths, he wrote, could
be found in "those moral precepts .. in which all religions
agree, (for all forbid us to murder, steal, plunder, or bear false
witness)"; these must be distinguished from "dogmas in which
all religions differ, and which are totally unconnected with mo-
rality."334 Basic moral precepts included, in Jefferson's view,
332. Letter Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THE LIFE AND SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 311, at 719, 719; see also
JAMES H. RUTHERFORD, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-
AL DEMOCRACY 2 (1992).
333. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 311, at 430. Jefferson's be-
liefs were echoed by many others in this era. Jonathan Mayhew wrote, "men are
naturally endowed with faculties proper for distinguishing betwixt truth and error,
right and wrong. And hence it follows, that the doctrine of total ignorance, and
incapacity to judge of moral and religious truths . . . is without foundation."
Mayhew, Men, Endowed with Faculties Proper for Discerning the Difference Betwixt
Truth and Falsehood, etc., in MAYHEW, supra note 285, at 38. See generally RICH-
ARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 299, at 84 (characterizing the "moral sense" in this
era as a post-Lockean construct used to ground inalienable human rights); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 106-10 (1986) [hereinafter TOLER-
ATION] (discussing the concept of "moral sense" in eighteenth-century moral philos-
ophy). Some have traced this concept to figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. See
MOONEY, supra note 6, at 7 (tracing the roots of this concept to Scottish moral phi-
losophers David Hume and Francis Hutcheson).
334. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Sept. 27, 1809), in 12 THE
WRITINGS OF TiiOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 314, 315; see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Leiper (Jan. 21, 1809), in 12 TIlE WRITINGS OF TIIOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 236, 236-37 ("As to myself, my religious reading has
long been confined to the moral branch of religion, which is the same in all reli-
gions .... ").
Thomas Paine expressed a similar confidence in the existence of fundamental
moral similitude among the world's peoples. "All religions are in their iuature kind
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"acting honestly towards all, benevolently to those who fall with-
in our way, respecting sacredly their rights, bodily and mental,
and cherishing especially their freedom of conscience, as we
value our own."'335 Jefferson noted:
[H]e who steadily observes those moral precepts in which all
religions concur, will never be questioned at the gates of
heaven ... . That on entering there, ... the Aristides and
Catos, the Penns and Tillotsons, Presbyterians and Baptists,
will find themselves united in all principles which are in con-
cert with the reason of the supreme mind.33
and benign, and united with principles of morality. They could not have made prose-
lytes at first by professing anything that was vicious, cruel, persecuting, or immor-
al." TiiOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE'S AT-
TACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 67 (Arthur Seldon, ed., 1938). Religions became
corrupt and persecutory when merged with the state: "The Inquisition in Spain does
not proceed from the religion originally professed, but [from the merger] ... be-
tween the Church and the State.... Persecution is not an original feature in any
religion; but it is always the strongly-marked feature of all law-religions, or religions
established by law." Id. at 67-68; see also ALLEN, supra note 308, at 468-69 ("A
conformity to moral rectitude, which is morality in the abstract, is the sum of all
religion, that ever was or can be in the universe; as there can be no religion in that
in which there is no moral obligation; except we make a religion to be void of Rea-
son . ").
335. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Miles King (Sept. 26, 1814), in 14 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 196, 197-98.
336. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Canby (Sept. 18, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 376, 377.
Jefferson acknowledged that this moral instinct or moral sense seemed to be
defective in some: "li]t is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree,
as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 176, at 256, 257. However, "it is false reasoning which converts excep-
tions to the general rule." It is, "like the want or imperfection of the senses of sight
and hearing ... , no proof that it is a general characteristic of the species." When
such deficiency is found, "we endeavor to supply the defect by education, by appeals
to reason and calculation, by presenting to the being so unhappily conformed, other
motives to do good and eschew evil . . . ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas
Law (June 13, 1814), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THIOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 311, at 636, 639.
Jefferson also addressed the question of whether these moral precepts were
culturally or otherwise contextually bound:
Some have argued against the existence of a moral sense by saying that
if nature had given us such a sense, impelling us to virtuous actions,
and warning us against those which are vicious, then nature would have
also designated, by some particular earmarks, the two sets of actions
which are, in themselves, the one virtuous and the other vicious.
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The concept that was used during the Founding Era to de-
scribe the relationship between abstract moral'principles (appre-
hended by conscience) and individual or collective action was
that of "public virtue": the sacrifice of individual interests to the
interests of the societal whole. Public virtue meant "a disinter-
ested attachment to the public good, exclusive and independent
of all private and selfish interest."3 7 Public virtue, and the
moral principles of which it was composed, were believed to
create the positive cohesion necessary for the maintenance of
basic social institutions.3" Although contrary opinions exist-
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 14, 1816), in TIIE ADAMS-JEF-
FERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 490, 492. Instead, "we find, in fact, that the
same actions are deemed virtuous in one country and vicious in another." Id. The
answer, he wrote, lies in the concept of utility. "Men living in different countries,
under different circumstances, different habits and regimens, may have different
utilities; the same act, therefore, may be useful, and consequently virtuous in one
country which is injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced." Id.
"[Justice] is instinct, and innate . .. ; for virtue does not consist in the act we do,
but in the end it is to effect. If it is to effect the happiness of him to whom it is
directed, it is virtuous. ... Id.
337. CARTER BRAXTON, A NATIVE OF TIS COLONY, VA. GAZETTE, June 8, 1776, re-
printed in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING TIE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805,
at 328, 334 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
This was the most common understanding of the concept of virtue. Any concept
with such widespread currency was, of course, used in different ways with different
meanings. As Ruth Bloch has written:
"IV]irtue" in American political discourse contained many different shades
of meaning throughout the revolutionary period, drawing at once upon
secular republican theory and Protestant ideas about righteousness ...
The personal virtues of industry and frugality [were] deemed essential to
a good citizen . . . .The belief that the individual should sacrifice for the
common good was also integral to ideas .. .of . . . community.
BLOCII, supra note 18, at 109 (footnote omitted).
Lance Banning has argued that public virtue in the civic republican tradition
consisted not in the abnegation of self-interest, but in the "vigorous and vigilant
defense of one's own liberties and interests" within the context of submission to the
will of the community, as expressed through republican government. Lance Banning,
Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking, in CON-
CEPTUAL CHANGE AND TIHE CONSTITUTION 199-200 (Terrence Ball & John G.A. Pocock
eds., 1988). I am not sure that this difference is material. The essence of the matter
is whether individual interests must yield, as an ultimate matter, to the needs of
the community. This is true under either formulation.
338. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 28, 1811), in 9
TIlE WORKS OF JOIN ADAMS, supra note 309, at 635, 636 ("I agree with you in
sentiment, that religion and virtue are the only foundations, not only of republican-
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ed,339 references to public virtue as part of the necessary foun-
dation for republican government are found throughout the writ-
ings of this period. New England Federalists such as John Ad-
ams, Fisher Ames, and Rufus King wrote compellingly of the
need for a virtuous citizenry. 4 ° Those from other geographical
and political points of view expressed similar beliefs. 4' During
ism and of all free government, but of social felicity . . . and in all the combinations
of human society.").
339. See JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 534 (1975) (quoting William
Webster: "'v]irtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be, till
men's natures are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of
government").
340. See, e.g., FISHER AMES, LAOCOON. No. II (Apr., 1799), reprinted in 2 WORKS
OF FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 118, 126 ("[Olur government has been, and is
supported only by the appeal to virtue, zeal, and patriotism of the body of the citi-
zens."); JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS, reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra
note 309, at 3, 31 ("[Lliberty can no more exist without virtue and independence
than the body can live and move without a soul".). As Rufus King wrote:
I myself have been an advocate for a Government free as air; my
opinions have been established upon the belief that my countrymen were
virtuous, enlightened, and governed by a sense of Right and Wrong ...
But if in opposition to these Sentiments the great Body of the people are
without Virtue, and not governed by any internal Restraints of Con-
science, there is but too much room to fear that the Framers of our
constitutions and laws have proceeded on principles that do not exist ....
Letter from Rufus King to Theodore Sedgwick (Oct. 22, 1786), quoted in ERNST,
supra note 183, at 86; see also KERBER, supra note 18, at 201, 208-12 (discussing
the linkage of morality, public virtue, and governmental stability in the Federalist
mind).
At times, this emphasis on virtue took sectarian and xenophobic turns. Ames
wrote that "[tihe first settlers of the British Northern colonies were Englishmen ...
They were serious, devout Christians, of pure, exemplary morals .... Instead of
building a Babel of wild Irish, Germans, and outlaws of all nations . . .. they ex-
cluded not only foreigners, but immoral persons, from political power ... ." FISHER
AMES, PHOCION. NO. IV (1801), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note
282, at 162, 162-63. After the Federalist defeat in 1800, Ames despaired at the
demise of this moral purity. Federalism, he wrote, was founded "on the supposed
existence of sufficient political virtue, and on the permanency and authority of the
public morals." FISHER AMES, THE DANGERS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (1805), reprinted
in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 344, 379. "We are sliding down
into the mire of a democracy, which pollutes the morals of the citizens before it
swallows up their liberties." FISHER AMES, For the Anthology, MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY
AND BOSTON REVIEW, (1805), quoted in BERNHARD, supra note 182, at 337.
341. Linda Kerber noted that "Americans of both parties were fond of the notion
that virtue of the citizen and the stability of the republic were linked." KERBER,
supra note 18, at 201.
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the Virginia ratification debate, John Marshall stated his agree-
ment with Patrick Henry that there are "certain fundamental
principles, from which a free people ought never to depart."
These included "the favorite maxims of democracy": "[a] strict
observance of justice and public faith, and a steady adherence to
virtue.3 42 In commenting on his failed Bill for a More General
Diffusion of Knowledge, Jefferson wrote that it "would have
raised the mass of the people to the high ground of moral re-
sponsibility necessary to their own safety, and to orderly govern-
ment."'343 State constitutions echoed similar sentiments.3" In-
deed, an experiment in republican government was believed to
depend more heavily on the existence of public virtue among its
citizens than did other governmental systems.345
The belief in this era that religiously-based "virtue" was nec-
essary for the success of the republican experiment has been the
subject of extensive commentary. 346  Federalists ' 47  and
342. Statement of John Marshall, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 10, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 223.
343. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE ADAMIS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 387, 390.
344. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. V, § II, in 3 THORPE, supra note
240, at 1888, 1907 ("Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally
among the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liber-
ties .... "); PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government for the Common-
wealth or State of Pennsylvania, § 45, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3081, 3091
("Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and the prevention of vice and immorality,
shall be made and constantly kept in force . . ").
345. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 341, 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
346. See, e.g., KERBER, supra note 18, at 208-12; MILLER, supra note 9, at 28-29
(discussing the prevalent belief that religion was a necessary foundation for public
virtue and, consequently, for a free republic); Gerard V. Bradley, Imagining the Past
and Remembering the Future: The Supreme Court's History of the Establishment
Clause, 18 CONN. L. REV. 827, 834 (1986) (observing that religion lay "at the heart
of . . . a virtuous citizenry," providing critical support for the "virtuous habits and
traits . . . essential to self-government").
347. John Adams wrote that "[wle have no government armed with power capable
of contending with human passions unbridled with morality and religion. Our Consti-
tution was made only for a moral and a religious people. It is wholly inadequate to
the government of any other." JOHN ADAMS, REPLY TO THE MASSACIIUSETTS MILITIA,
quoted in JOHN R. HOWE, JR., THE CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS
185 (1966); see also Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Nov. 5, 1775), quot-
ed in 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 512 ("Statesmen may plan and speculate for Lib-
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others348 wrote compellingly of the religio-moral fabric believed
necessary to sustain republican government. This pervasive
belief was expressed in state constitutions 49 and congressional
erty, but it is Religion and Morality alone which can establish the principles upon
which Freedom can securely stand."); Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush
(Aug. 28, 1811), in 9 TilE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 309, at 635, 636 ("I
agree with you in sentiment, that religion and virtue are the only foundations not
only of republicanism and of all free government, but of social felicity under all
governments and in all the combinations of human society.").
Other Federalists agreed. See Fisher Ames, Eulogy on Washington (Feb. 8,
1800), in 2 WORKS OF FIsIER AMIES, supra note 282, at 71, 82 ("Our liberty . . . is
founded on morals and religion, whose authority reigns in the heart .... "); Alexan-
der Hamilton, Washington's Farewell Address (Aug., 1796), in 8 WORKS OF ALEXAN-
DER HAMIlTON, supra note 317, at 187, 205 ("In all those dispositions which promote
political happiness, religion and morality are essential props. In vain does he claim
the praise of patriotism, who labors to subvert . . .. these great pillars of human
happiness, these firmest foundations of the duties of men and citizens.").
348. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Henry to Archibald Blair (Jan. 8, 1799), quoted
in KERBER, supra note 18, at 210 ("The great pillars of all government . .. larel
virtue, morality, and religion."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct.
28, 1813), in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 387, 390 ("Moral
respectability [is] necessary to [the people's own safety, and to orderly govern-
ment . . ").
349. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is representative:
As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of
civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality;
and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by
the institution of the public worship of GOD, and of public instructions
in piety, religion, and morality: Therefore, to promote their happiness,
and to secure the good order and the preservation of their government,
the people of this commonwealth . . . invest their legislature with the
power to authorize and require . . . the several towns, parishes, pre-
cincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable
provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship
of GOD, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teach-
ers of piety, religion, and morality ....
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III, in 3 THORPE, supra note 240, at 1888, 1889-90.
Public virtue was often envisioned in oppressively narrow terms. This opinion is
apparent in a proclamation issued by the Massachusetts Legislature shortly before
independence:
That piety and virtue, which, alone, can secure the freedom of any
people, may be encouraged, and vice and immorality suppressed, ...
[that] the good people of this Colony, . . . avoiding all blasphemies, con-
tempt of the holy Scriptures, and of the Lord's day, and all other crimes
and misdemeanors, all debauchery, profaneness, corruption, venality, all
riotous and tumultuous proceedings, and all immoralities . ...
Proclamation by the Massachusetts Legislature (Jan. 19, 1776), reprinted in 4 AMIER-
ICAN ARCHIVES 833-35 (Peter Force ed., 1843).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:837
act ,:51 and it became the rallying cry in the 1780s for those
who believed that the stability of the republic was threatened by
the decline of religiously-based moral principles and resulting
corruption.I Only conscience, rooted in transcendent moral or
religious values and imposing a sense of responsibility upon
freely reasoning men, could provide the restraint on human
conduct necessary for the survival of government by the peo-
ple 52
Several commentators have questioned the role that the
Framers ascribed to public virtue, in view of other evidence that
they saw human nature as fundamentally depraved. It has been
350. See Rufus King, Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (art. III), quoted in 1 TIlE LIFE
AND CORIRESPONIENCIE OF RUFUs KING, COMPRISING His LE'IrErs, PRIVATE AND OFFI-
CIAL, His PuIILIC DOCUMENTS AND His SPEECIES 287 (Charles R. King ed., 1894)
Ihereinafter TilE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KINGI (observing that
"Irleligion, morality and knowledge" are "necessary to good government").
351. See BLOCII, supra note 18, at 109; NELSON, supra note 252, at 104; WOOl),
supra note 299, at 417; see also KERI3ER, supra note 18, at 206 (describing the press
and the pulpit as preferred ways to reinforce a sense of public virtue in the popu-
lace during the 1780s).
For examples of this sentiment in period writing, see JOSEPH! HUNTINGTON, A
DISCOURSE, ADAPTED TO TIHE PRESENT DAY (1781); SAMUEL MAGAW, A SERMON DE-
LIVERED IN ST. PAUL'S CHURCH ON TIlE 4TI OF JULY, 1786 (1786).
352. The reason for the compelling force of conscience or religiously-based moral
precepts was often expressed as the fear of divine retribution which they inspired.
Jefferson wrote that the "only firm basis" for "the liberties of a nation" is the "con-
viction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God," and
"Itihat they are not to be violated but with his wrath." TIIOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON TIE STATE OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in TIIE PORTABLE TiiOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 207, at 23, 215.
The belief in the need for a divine system of rewards and punishments found
particular expression in the religious requirements for public office and religious
oaths required in courts of law. Rufus King expressed a common sentiment of the
time:
Our laws constantly refer to this revelation, and by the oath which
they prescribe, we appeal to the Supreme Being, so to deal with us here-
after, as we observe the obligation of our oaths.
The Pagan world were, and are, without the mighty influence of this
principle . .. their morals were destitute of its powerful sanction ....
Rufus King, Speech at the New York State Constitutional Convention (1821), quoted
in ERNST, supra note 183, at 381. These requirements usually took decidedly, and
oppressively, sectarian forms. See infra notes 407-18 and accompanying text.
The role of freedom of conscience in the development of ideas of individual
responsibility and republican government is explored in RICihARDS, FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 299, at 29-31.
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argued that in the 1780s, the concept of virtue as an instrumen-
tal value in American political thought was abandoned and
interest-group politics took its place. Gordon Wood, for instance,
argued that a conclusion was reached that "[tihe American peo-
ple apparently did not possess and were unwilling to acquire the
moral and social character necessary to sustain republican gov-
ernments."353 "Believing ... that virtue had 'in a great degree
taken its departure from our land' and was not to be easily re-
stored, the Federalists hoped to create an entirely new and origi-
nal sort of republican government-a republic which did not
require a virtuous people for its sustenance.
There is certainly abundant evidence that few of the leaders
of the Founding Era failed to recognize that individuals often act
out of self-interest and sacrifice to that self-interest other consid-
erations of the public good.355 Recognition of the role of self-in-
terest in human affairs did not, however, compel a conclusion
that broader concepts of private and public good have no power.
For instance, although Hamilton recognized that human beings
often act out of self-interest,5 6 he also recognized that they
353. WOOD, supra note 299, at 415 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 610-12.
354. Id. at 475. Others have questioned this thesis. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note
339, at 525-27 (arguing that "the theses and antitheses of virtue and corruption
continued to be of great importance in shaping American thought"); MCDONALD,
supra note 202, at 189-91 (arguing that '[iut is a grave mistake . . . to assume . . .
that the Framers . . . cynically abandoned the whole notion of virtue . . . and opted
to substitute crass self-interest in its stead").
355. Ames was particularly cynical about human nature, stating bluntly, '[olur
mistake is in supposing men better than they are. They are bad, and will act their
bad character out." Letter from Fisher Ames to Richard Peters (Dec. 14, 1806), in 1
WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 377, 378. His view appeared to stem in
part from the defeat of the Federalist party in the election of 1800. Reflecting upon
his party's subsequent disintegration, Ames wrote:
Federalism was . .. manifestly founded on a mistake, on the sup-
posed existence of sufficient political virtue, and on the permanency and
authority of the public morals.
[Those] now in power committed no such mistake. They acted on the
knowledge of what men actually are, not what they ought to be ...
They knew that the vicious, on whom society makes war, would join
them in their attack upon government. They inflamed the ignorant; they
flattered the vain; they offered novelty to the restless; and promised
plunder to the base.
FISHER AMES, THE DANGERS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY, reprinted in 2 WORKS OF FISHER
AMES, supra note 282, at 344, 379.
356. Hamilton wrote,
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sometimes do not;35 and that both good and bad impulses
must be taken into account in establishing a republican govern-
ment. In the Federalist No. 76, he wrote:
The supposition of universal venality in human nature is
little less an error in political reasoning than the supposition
of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power
implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among
mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confi-
dence. And experience justifies the theory.35
Moreover, the idea that some recognition of the common good
was a precondition for republican government was assumed.
Governmental structures-no matter how well crafted--could
never, alone, contain the effects of concerted human depravity.
This truth was acknowledged by Madison during the Virginia
ratifying convention:
... I go on this great republican principle, that the people
will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and
wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there is not, we are
in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, no form of
government, can render us secure. To suppose that any form
of government will secure liberty or happiness without any
virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.359
[Hiow little reason there is to expect that the persons intrusted with the
administration of the affairs of the particular members of the confederacy
will at all times be ready with perfect good humor and an unbiased re-
gard to the public weal to execute the resolutions or decrees of the gen-
eral authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of man.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 105, 111 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton discussed the method for selecting federal judges: "[Aind making the
proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number [of quali-
fied individuals] must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with
the requisite knowledge." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464, 471 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
357. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 55, 73 (The "political maxim,
that 'every man must be supposed to be a knave' is "'false in fact.'").
358. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 454, 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
359. Statement of James Madison, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 20, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 536-37.
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In a newspaper article written in 1792, Madison suggested that
"[t]he best distribution is that which would most favor health,
virtue, intelligence, and competency in the greatest number of
citizens. It is needless to add to these objects, liberty and safety.
The first is presupposed by them. The last must result from
them.
360
Ideas about the relationship between individual virtue and
republican self-government underwent substantial change and
development in this period. The American republic was "born in
turbulence";3 6' eighteenth-century America was a society "in
which violence was endemic."362 "[TIhat their nation had been
created by rebellion and secession was never far from the
[Framers'] mind [s] .363 The establishment and maintenance of
a stable, governmental system under conditions of human pas-
sions, factions, and material inequality364  required a
360. James Madison, Republican Distribution of Citizens, THE NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar.
5, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAIES MADISON, supra note 265, at 96, 96.
In The Federalist No. 55, Madison wrote:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in
human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a
higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been
drawn by the -political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of
the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient
virtue among men for self-government ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 341, 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3,61. KERBER, supra note 18, at 181.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. "Passions," "enthusiasms," and "selfish interests" were the human character-
istics viewed as potentially detrimental to the maintenance of governmental order;
their expression was in the form of "factions" bent upon self-interested aims at the
expense of the whole. See Statement of Alexander Hamilton, as recorded in the
Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787, Taken by Hon. Rob-
ert Yates (June 22, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 439 ("Take
mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions . . . . Our
prevailing passions are ambition and interest . . . ."). Fisher Ames provided memora-
ble descriptions of these dangers. See Fisher Ames, Speech in the Convention of
Massachusetts, on Biennial Elections (Jan., 1788), in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES,
supra note 282, at 3, 7 ("Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which
popular governments are destroyed .... [The people] nourish factions in their bos-
oms . . . . A democracy is a volcano, which conceals the fiery materials of its own
destruction."); FISHER AMES, LAOCOON No. 11 (1799), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF
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multivaried approach. Madison and others recognized, with
particular genius, that competing interests could serve as a
source of governmental stability, and that one could control
these interests through institutional design.36 The fact that
such governmental structures were devised does not mean, how-
ever, that the drafters and ratifiers of those documents
abandoned their belief in the value of transcendent moral norms
to social and collective life. In The Federalist No. 51, Madison
wrote that "W ustice is the end of government. It is the end of
civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it
FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 118, 126 ("A faction, whose union is perfect, whose
spirit is desperate, addressing something persuasive to every prejudice, putting some-
thing combustible to every passion, granting some indulgence to every vice, prom-
ising those who dread the law to set them above it, to the mean whispering suspi-
cion, to the ambitious offering power, to the rapacious, plunder, to the violent, re-
venge, to the envious, the abasement of all that is venerable ... Behold this is
our condition, these our terrors.").
365. Recognition of the need for institutional control through governmental struc-
ture and design is found throughout the writings of those most involved in the
drafting of the Constitution. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77, 81 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). If the majority has
such coexistent passion or interest, [it] must be rendered, by [its] number
and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we
well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as
an adequate control.
Id. Ames argues:
It is in vain, it is indeed childish to say, that an enlightened people will
understand their own affairs, and thus the acts of a faction will be baf-
fled. No people on earth are or can be so enlightened as to the details of
political affairs.
Shall we be told, that if the nation is not animated with the public spir-
it, the individuals are at least fitted to be good citizens by the purity of
their morals? But what are morals without restraints?
FISHER AMES, THE DANGERS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY, reprinted in 2 WORKS OF FISHER
AMES, supra note 282, at 344, 364, 378; see also Fisher Ames, Speech in the Con-
vention of Massachusetts, on Biennial Elections (Jan., 1788), in 2 THE WORKS OF
FISHER AMES, supra note 282, at 3, 7 (remarking that biennial elections are neces-
sary "as a security that the sober, second thought of the people shall be law");
Statement of Alexander Hamilton, as recorded in the Notes of the Secret Debates of
the Federal Convention of 1787, Taken by Hon. Robert Yates (June 18, 1787), in 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 421-22 (discussing the need for lengthy terms
in the national legislature to "check the imprudence of democracy").
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be obtained ... ."366 Belief in the existence of transcendent
moral norms, and their necessary (although imperfect) recogni-
tion in social and governmental institutions, did not mean that
these individuals simplistically believed that all individuals were
virtuous or that virtue would, without more, overcome conflict-
ing, self-seeking interests. Virtue was believed to be a real and
vital force, even if (at times) it did not prevail; indeed, the strug-
gle between good and evil was an integral part of the religious
roots of the concept of virtue itself.
The coexistence of belief in the importance of freedom of con-
science with the existence of governmental religious establish-
ments presented an obvious paradox. The reconciliation of prac-
tically universal calls for freedom of conscience with religious
intolerance and persecution was achieved by different groups in
different ways. Some maintained that conscience could not lie
and, therefore, the expression of beliefs which were religiously
"erroneous" could not be a "true" exercise of conscience.6 7 Lib-
erty of conscience for most New England Congregationalist cler-
gy, for instance, was .simply "liberty of what they regarded as
conscience.""36 Others simply assumed that the liberty of con-
science of which they spoke presupposed the existence of a
Protestant Christian state and the exclusion of religious compet-
itors.369 Elisha Williams, Congregationalist minister and Presi-
dent of Yale University, wrote that although Lockean
contractarian principles entitle each member of society to a
natural and inalienable right to liberty of conscience, this does
not include Catholics, who were enemies of a "Protestant
State."3 7 Still others attempted to distinguish "civil" or "legal"
366. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320, 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
367. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 22.
368. Id. at 88. For example, religious freedom, as understood by the old line clergy,
simply did not extend to the activities of evangelicals. See HEIMERT, supra note 258,
at 205-06.
369. See id. at 78-79.
370. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS
(1744), quoted in CURRY, supra note 202, at 97-98; see also BENJAMIN GALE, A RE-
PLY TO A PAMPHLET ENTITLED THE ANSWER OF THE FRIEND IN THE WEST, ETC., WITH
A PREFATORY ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF HIS MAJESTY'S ENGLISH COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT (1755) (stating that freedom of conscience did not include those "whose
religious Principles are not compatible with a Protestant Country, or destructive to
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establishments, which imposed creeds, doctrinal standards,
modes of worship, and other violations of conscience371 from
"non-violative" establishments of other kinds. 2
The "momentum of the century," however, clearly lay with the
dissenters.37 The hypocrisy of calls for freedom of conscience
by those who (in the view of others) worked for its suppression
became increasingly difficult to deny. The splintering of Protes-
tantism into old line and evangelical sects accelerated dissent
within the established ranks of those with political and economic
power. Isaac Backus charged that the established Congregation-
al Church in Massachusetts "has declared the Baptists to be
irregular, therefore the secular power still force them to support
the worship which they conscientiously dissent from."374
"[M]any who are filling the nation with the cry of LIBERTY and
against oppressors are at the same time themselves violating
that dearest of all rights, LIBERTY of CONSCIENCE."375 Ten-
sion between the principle of freedom of conscience and its deni-
al found expression in the battlegrounds of two independent, but
related, ideas: free exercise of religion and freedom from the
establishment of religion by government.
the Community," such as Roman Catholics, Deists, and atheists).
371. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 117-33.
372. See id. at 117-33, 140-41, 178. Proponents in Massachusetts decreed that "lib-
erty is the fundamental principle of our establishment." AMOS ADAMS, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AS AN INVALUABLE BLESSING . . . (1768), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 199,
at 262. Dissenters were free to seek exemption from taxation for the dominant
church. BAILYN, supra note 199, at 262. There was "liberty of conscience, the rights
of private judgment and [an acknowledgement of] the absurdity of advancing the
kingdom of Christ by penal laws." AMOS ADAMS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AN INVALUABLE
BLESSING . . . (1768), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 199, at 262 (alteration in origi-
nal).
373. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 99.
374. ISAAC BACKUS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AGAINST
SOME LATER OPPRESSIVE PROCEEDINGS ... (1770), quoted in BAILYN, supra note
199, at 263.
375. Id.; see also JONATHAN MAYHEW, A SERMON PREACHD IN THE AUDIENCE OF
HIS EXCELLENCY WILLIAM SHIRLEY, ESQ., (1754), reprinted in THE WALL AND THE
GARDEN 288, 304 (A.W. Plumstead ed., 1968) (in Massachusetts, [ilt may be worth
considering whether we have not some laws in force hardly reconcilable with that
religious liberty which we profess").
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D. Protection of Freedom of Conscience: The Meaning of "Free
Exercise" of Religion
Free exercise of religion, as understood in the Founding Era,
was grounded in the imperatives and protection of conscience.
Religion was the expression of the beliefs dictated by conscience;
restrictions on religious exercise were restraints on the freedom
of conscience itself. Alexander Hamilton, in his polemic against
the Quebec Bill, inflamed anti-British sentiment by framing the
bill as an attack on the rights of a "Protestant Englishman" to
"the free exercise of his religion" "in the manner his conscience
dictates.""6 In his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, Madison wrote that "the equal right of
every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the
dictates of conscience" is held "by the same tenure" as "other
rights."377 The close association (if not identity) between free
exercise of religion and freedom of conscience was expressed in
early state constitutions,378 in state ratification statements for
the Federal Constitution, 79 and in the early drafts of the
376. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REMARKS ON THE QUEBEC BILL (1775), reprinted in 1
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 181, 193.
377. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183, 190.
378. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. of 1776, XVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2594,
2597 (protecting right to worship "Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dic-
tates of [one's] own conscience"); N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, Etc.,
XIX, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2787, 2788 (" [A1ll men have a natural and
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences"); PA. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, II, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3081,
3082 ('All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God ac-
cording to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding."); VA. CONST. of
1776, Bill of Rights, § 16, in 7 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3812, 3814 (providing
equal entitlement 'to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of con-
science").
379. Virginia, for instance, proposed that the Federal Constitution be amended to
provide that "among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the
press, cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the
United States." Supplement to the Journal of the Federal Convention (Ratification by
the State of Virginia), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 327, 327. New
York proposed "tihat the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right freely
and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the dictates of conscience." Sup-
plement to the Journal of the Federal Convention (Ratification by the State of New
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First Amendment.38
Although the concept of religious liberty obviously differed in
those colonies where religious establishments existed and in
those where they did not, an examination of the speeches, writ-
ings, and other records of this era reveals nearly universal
agreement among reformers that free religious exercise included
freedom to pursue religious expression and worship as dictated
York), in ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 327, 328. An earlier draft of the
New York resolution, written by Hamilton, stated "that among other essential rights,
the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled or abridged by any
authority of the United States." Alexander Hamilton, Draft of Proposed Ratification
of the Constitution of the United States, with Specified Amendments, in 2 WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 95, 96; cf Ratifying Statement of New
Hampshire, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276 at 325, 326 ("Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience.").
380. On June 8, 1789, Madison offered the following language to the House of Rep-
resentatives: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief
or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). During the ensuing debate, it was observed
that Madison
apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.
Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but
they had been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to
entertain an opinion that under the clause of the Constitution, which
gave power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry
into execution the Constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled
them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of con-
science, and establish a national religion ....
Id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789). Later that day, Madison's proposal was amended by the
House to read: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the
rights of conscience." Id. at 732. The final version was adopted by the House on
August 20, 1789. This language, proposed by Fisher Ames, read: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to in-
fringe the rights of conscience." Id. at 766.
On September 9, 1789, the Senate adopted a different version, and sent this to
the House. This version read: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of
faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion . . . ." JOUR-
NAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 77 (1820). On September 24, 1789, a
House-Senate Conference Committee produced the final language: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . ." Id. at 86. This was accepted by the House on September 24, 1789,
and by the Senate a day later. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra, at 913; JOURNAL OF THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, supra, at 88.
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by conscience and as one pleased. The ability to erect houses of
worship, and to design them in the manner desired, were widely
regarded as elements of religious exercise, even if denied to
some. Adams regretfully wrote in a private letter, "I am an ene-
my to every appearance of restraint in a matter so delicate and
sacred as the liberty of conscience; but the laws [in Massachu-
setts] do not permit Roman Catholics to have steeples to their
churches, and these laws could not be altered."3 ' Compulsory
attendance at religious services in which one did not believe was
also seen as a violation of the right to free religious exercise.
The Delaware Constitution of 1792, although setting forth the
"duty of all men frequently to assemble together for the public
worship of the Author of the universe" for the promotion of "pi-
ety and morality," nevertheless acknowledged that "no man shall
or ought to be compelled to attend any religious worship."3 82
Jefferson's A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom similarly
guaranteed that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or sup-
port any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever."" 3
His conviction that religious exercise included "religious institu-
tions, their doctrines, discipline, [and] exercises" later led him to
refuse to issue Presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations
directing the nation to observe a day of "fasting and prayer."8 4
The protection of religious expression was rooted in the belief
that if government could restrict (or compel) religious expres-
sion, it could invade the right of the individual to determine, for
himself, the religious opinions that he would hold. In A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, Jefferson wrote that govern-
mental restraints on religious expression were the result of the
"impious presumption of legislators and rulers, . . . who, being
themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed do-
minion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions
and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible."385 Jef-
381. Letter from John Adams to Robert R. Livingston (Oct. 8, 1782), in 7 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 309, at 646, 648.
382. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 1, in 1 THORPE, supra note 240, at 568, 568.
383. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777),
reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 251, 253.
384. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 428, 428-30.
385. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777),
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ferson stated:
[Tihe opinions of men are not the object of civil government,
nor under its jurisdiction; that to suffer the civil magistrate
to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain
the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of
their ill tendency is a dangerous falacy, which at once de-
stroys all religious liberty, because he being.., judge of that
tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and
approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they
shall square with or differ from his own ... 386
The danger presented was clear: If the state could restrict or
compel religious expression, it could restrict or compel the pro-
cess of belief itself.
38 7
Whether "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion,"
understood in this way, protected those who rejected all recog-
nized religious faiths was a subject of intense debate. One con-
gressman stated that he "hoped ... the amendment [to the Fed-
eral Constitution] would be made in such a way as to secure the
rights of conscience, and a free exercise of religion, but not to
patronize those who professed no religion at all." "3M Madison, in
a private letter to Jefferson, expressed the fear that an attempt
to enact a Federal Bill of Rights "could be a disservice" because
there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of
some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the
requisite latitude., I am sure that the rights of conscience in
particular, if submitted to public definition would be nar-
rowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an as-
sumed power. One of the objections in New England was that
the Constitution by prohibiting religious tests, opened a door
for Jews Turks [and] infidels.389
reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 251, 251-52.
386. Id. at 252.
387. See James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265,
at 332, 337 (discussing the vital connection between the formation of religious belief
and freedom in its expression).
388. Statement of Rep. Huntington, 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 380, at 730-31
(Aug. 15, 1789).
389. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in THE COAT-
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Jefferson described similar fears during the passage of Virginia's
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom. He later wrote that the
Act's broad scope
met with opposition; but, with some mutilations in the pre-
amble, it was finally passed; and a singular proposition
proved that its protection of opinion was meant to be univer-
sal. Where the preamble declares, that coercion is a depar-
ture from the plan of the holy author of our religion, an
amendment was proposed, by inserting the word "Jesus
Christ," so that it should read, "a departure from the plan of
Jesus Christ, the holy author of opr religion;" the insertion
was rejected by a great majority, in proof that they meant to
comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and
the Gentile, the Christian and the Mohametan, the Hindoo,
and Infidel of every denomination."9'
Even those who argued that religious expression must be
given a broad gauge, recognized that it could not be absolute. In
an organized society, religious expression, like all other individu-
al acts, must be constrained by the fundamental needs of social
order. This outer limit was generally expressed in terms of
"peace," "safety," and the reciprocal rights of others. In
Madison's view, religious exercise must be protected unless "the
preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are
manifestly endangered."391 In a private letter, Madison wrote,
"I observe with particular pleasure the view that you have taken
of the immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction, in every case
where it does not trespass on private rights or the public
peace." 92 Jefferson wrote, "it is time enough for the rightful
purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when
[religious] principles break out into overt acts against peace and
good order." '393 The "legitimate powers of government extend to
PLETE MADISON, supra note 283, at 253, 253.
390. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 1, 67.
391. James Madison, Amendments to the Declaration of Rights, 1 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 210, at 174, 175.
392. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 3 LET-
TERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 273, 274.
393. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777),
19951
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:837
such acts only as are injurious to others."394 The Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780 expressed similar sentiments. Under
its terms, "no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained...
for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience ... provided he doth not
disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious
worship."9 ' Some defined these restraints in broader terms,
adding infringements on "laws of morality,"39 "licentious-
ness,"3 97 or general social "well being ''39  as among the valid
grounds for the restriction of religious exercise. Oliver Ellsworth
opined that the "'civil power has a right, in some cases to inter-
fere in matters of religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish
gross immoralities and impieties . . . ." Examples, to his
mind, included "profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed
atheism. '' °
The dangers of such broad calculations clearly disturbed re-
formers. Madison attacked the idea that "licentiousness" can be
an exception to otherwise constitutionally-protected liberties:
The distinction between liberty and licentiousness is still a
repetition of the Protean doctrine of implication, which is
ever ready to work its ends by varying its shape. By its help,
reprinted in TIlE PORTAiiLE TiIOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 251, 252-53.
394. TIOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON TIE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in
TIlE PORTABLE Th1OMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 21, 210.
395. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. II, in 3 TjIORPE, supra note 240, at 1888,
1889; see also GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, in 2 TifORPE, supra note 240, at 777,
784 ("All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it
be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State . . ").
396. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, Etc., XXIII, in 3
TifORPE, supra note 240, at 1686, 1689 ("[N]o person ought by any law to be molest-
ed . . . on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious
practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order,
peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality . . ").
397. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, XXXVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at
2623, 2637 ("Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of this State.").
398. John Jay advocated denial of religious liberty to those who "'hold and
teach ...principles incompatible and repugnant to the peace, safety, and well being
of civil society.'" CURRY, supra note 202, at 162 (quoting John Jay).
399. Id. at 218 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth).
400. Id.
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the judge as to what is licentious may escape through any
constitutional restriction. Under it men of a particular re-
ligious opinion might be excluded from office, because such
exclusion would not amount to an establishment of religion,
and because it might be said that their opinions are licen-
tious. And under it Congress might denominate a religion to
be heretical and licentious, and proceed to its suppres-
sion."'
In response to the argument "that Religion left entirely to itself
may run into extravagances injurious both to Religion and to so-
cial order,"4"2 Madison argued that governmental interference
would be as likely to increase as to decrease that tendency.4"3
"The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a
corrupting coalition or alliance between them, will be best
guarded [against] by an entire abstinence of the [Government]
from interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of
preserving public order, [and] protecting each sect [against]
trespasses on its legal rights by others."4 °4 There must be
trust, in a free society, that reason will prevail.4 5 "Great ex-
citements are less apt to be permanent than to vibrate to the
opposite extreme."0 6
The dual needs to protect freedom of belief and to preserve so-
cial order collided when test oaths were used for public office-a
common colonial practice prior to the Revolution.4"7 The argu-
401. James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
332, 335-36.
402. Letter from James Madison to the Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 487.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 485-87. Jefferson also believed that the best antidote to religious excess
is freedom of thought. In his draft of the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom, he wrote:
[T]hat truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the
proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from
the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weap-
ons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is
permitted freely to contradict them.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777), reprinted
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 251, 253.
407. See PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 252-56 (describing the universality of religious
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ment in favor of such tests was simple: unless individuals feared
God, and believed in a divine system of rewards and punish-
ments, there would be no guarantee that they would feel subject
to any moral constraints.4 8 Opponents responded that test
oaths were, in themselves, no guarantee of moral fiber or integ-
rity and that they opened the door to a far more pernicious con-
sequence: the erection of human tribunals to determine religious
preference and religious truth. When an objection was raised in
the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention to the prohibition of
religious tests for national public office contained in the pro-
posed Federal Constitution,4"9 members of the religious com-
munity responded. Isaac Backus argued that "the imposing of
religious tests hath been the greatest engine of tyranny in the
world. And I rejoice to see so many gentlemen, who are now
giving in their rights of conscience in this great and important
matter."41  Two somewhat more obscure clerics, Reverend
Payson and Reverend Shute, also forcefully expressed their
views. Reverend Payson argued that
the seat of religion in man being the heart or conscience, i.e.,
tests for public office throughout the colonies at the time of their declaration of
independence from England); 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 274 (same). Under English
common law, no person could testify as a witness or affiant in a judicial proceeding
unless he first asserted a belief in a Supreme Being and in a divine scheme of re-
wards and punishments. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 256. The American colonies
continued this disqualification of professed disbelievers. Id. at 257. In the original
version of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, for instance, no witness could testify
who 'did not believe that there is a God who rewards truth and avenges falsehood."
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, quoted in PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 257.
408. See, e.g., Statement of Rev. Shute, Debates in the Convention of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788),
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 118-19. Luther Martin of Maryland wrote
that, regarding officeholders, "it would be at least decent to hold out some distinction
between the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity or paganism." 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 75 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
409. See Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 30, 1787), in 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 277 ("INlo religious test shall ever be required
as a qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of the United
States . . . ."). For a discussion of the history of this Clause, see 1 STOKES, supra
note 17, at 523-27.
410. Statement of Rev. Backus, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Feb. 4, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 148.
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the reason God has given us, employed on our moral ac-
tions ... God alone is the God of the conscience, and, conse-
quently, attempts to erect human tribunals for the conscienc-
es of men are impious encroachments upon the prerogatives
of God. Upon these principles, had there been a religious test
as a qualification for office, it would... have been a great
blemish upon the instrument."
Reverend Shute argued that:
In this great and extensive empire, there is, and will be, a
great variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants.
Upon the plan of a religious test, the question ... must be,
Who shall be excluded from national trusts? Whatever an-
swer bigotry may suggest, the dictates of candor and equity, I
conceive, will be, None.
... I believe ... that there are worthy characters among
men of every denomination-among the Quakers, the Bap-
tists, the Church of England, the Papists; and even among
those who have no other guide, in the way to virtue and
heaven, than the dictates of natural religion.412
Opposition came from those who held secular office, as well.
Oliver Wolcott argued that religious test oaths are unnecessary
because "God... is the avenger of perjury."4 13 In an open let-
ter to his constituents, Oliver Ellsworth wrote that the constitu-
tional prohibition on test oaths was intended to "exclude perse-
cution, and to secure to you the important right of religious
liberty."4 14 Although limiting his discussion to distinctions
411. Statement of Rev. Payson, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 120.
412. Statement of Rev. Shute, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 118-19.
413. Statement of Oliver Wolcott, Fragments of the Debates in the Convention of
the State of Connecticut on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 9, 1788),
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 202.
414. See OLIVER ELLSWORTH, THE LANDHOLDER, VII, (1787), reprinted in ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE 1787-1788, at 167, 168 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892) [collection as a whole
hereinafter ESSAYS]; see also id at 169 ("A test in favour of any one denomination
of Christians would be to the last degree absurd in the United States. If it were in
favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalians, baptists, or quakers,
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among Christians,415 he argued that
[iun our country every man has a right to worship God in that
way which is most agreeable to his conscience. If he be a good
and peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or incapaci-
ties on account of his religious sentiments ....
If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least excep-
tionable would be one, requiring all persons appointed to
office to declare ... their belief in the being of a God, and in
the divine authority of the scriptures .... [I]t may be said,
that one who believes these great truths, will not be so likely
to violate his obligations to his country . . . . But I answer:
His making a declaration of such a belief is no security at all.
For suppose him to be an unprincipled man.., how easy is
it for him to dissemble! how easy is it for him to make a
public declaration of his belief in the creed which the law
prescribes .... In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual:
they are no security at all; because men of loose principles
will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude
any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will
rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of
their consciences.416
Ellsworth acknowledged that the civil power has a right to inter-
fere in matters of religion when "gross immoralities and impi-
eties '  are involved. He noted, however, "[1legislatures have
no right to set up an inquisition, and examine into the private
opinions of men. Test-laws are useless and ineffectual, unjust
and tyrannical; therefore the Convention have done wisely in
excluding this engine of persecution .... "
The principle of the equality of religious sects, which lay be-
it would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the American citizens for any
publick office . . ").
415. Id. at 169.
416. Id. at 168-70.
417. Id. at 171.
418. Id. Ellsworth gave as examples of the proper sphere of the civil power those
laws that prohibited and punished "drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and
professed atheism." Id. The apparent inconsistency of such laws with the principles
of freedom of belief and equality of religious sects (which underlay his opposition to
test oaths) did not appear to concern him.
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hind principles of free exercise, also animated opposition to the
framing of these rights in the language of "toleration." The free-
dom to believe and the freedom to express that belief were root-
ed in the concept of the equality of all; these principles did not
allow the favored status of some and the "toleration" of others.
In strident terms, Thomas Paine condemned toleration as "not
the opposite of Intolerance, but ... the counterfeit of it. Both are
despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding
Liberty of Conscience, and the other of granting it."4"9 Isaac
Backus attacked toleration as part of the legislature's power to
"compel acceptance of its own definition of proper religious prac-
tice."42° The insistence that free religious exercise be framed in
terms of equality, not toleration, was stated most eloquently in
Madison's great Memorial and Remonstrance:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all
men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal
conditions .... Above all are they to be considered as retain-
ing an "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to
the dictates of conscience" Whilst we assert for ourselves a
freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion
which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an
equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to
the evidence which has convinced us.42'
Belief that freedom of conscience required religious equality
motivated the rejection of "toleration" and support for free reli-
gious exercise within the broadest constraints that maintenance
of civil order would allow.
Freedom of conscience and equality also provided the deepest
foundations for the second great principle: freedom from the
establishment of religion by government.
419. PAINE, supra note 334, at 65.
420. ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773),
quoted in BAILYN, supra note 199, at 266.
421. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
AIENTS, reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 183,
186.
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E. The Meaning of the Second Great Principle: Freedom from
Establishment of Religion by Government
The nature of colonial religious establishments and the state
establishments that succeeded them is described at length
above.422 In the New England, middle-Atlantic, and southern
areas, religious establishments varied but were admixtures of
the same basic characteristics: taxpayer assistance to religious
institutions, state enforcement of favored religious observance
and conformity, religious tests for public office or general civil
capacity, and other preferential treatment on the basis of reli-
gious affiliation or belief.423 Although attempts to enforce or
prohibit particular religious practices declined by the time of the
Revolution, and systems designating single religious institutions
as recipients of state financial assistance were largely replaced
by systems implementing taxpayer choice, deeply institutional-
ized schemes of governmental religious preference existed
throughout the colonies at the dawn of the Founding Era.424
There has been much debate over whether the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution was intended to prohibit all federal fi-
nancial aid to religious institutions."5 Whatever the particular
intentions of the framers of this document, it is clear that an
"establishment," in the general understanding of the time, en-
compassed any tax monies given directly to a religious institu-
tion, whether designated by the state or by the taxpayer's
choice. By the time of the Revolution, schemes of taxpayer choice
had succeeded single payee plans in New England and else-
422. See supra part III.B.
423. See supra notes 199-269 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 199-269 and accompanying text.
425. Several commentators have argued that the Establishment Clause intended to
permit nonpreferential aid to religious institutions. See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 7, at
31; ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982); MALBIN, supra note 307, at 14; Edward S. Corwin, The
Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 20 (1949).
Others have argued that the prohibited "establishment" included financial support of
any kind. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 202, at 215; LEVY, supra note 314, at 84;
William W. Van Alstyne, What is "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L. REV.
909, 912 (1987). The debate has recently been extended to state laws and consti-
tutions as well. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 159-60 (discussing language in the
Delaware and New Jersey Constitutions).
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where,42 and these programs clearly were understood to be
"establishments" as well.
Fisher Ames, in describing the virtues of New England ar-
rangements, wrote that they required "the establishment of a
learned clergy, and [the] obliging [of] every small district to
support a minister."427 Responding to a criticism of the laws of
Massachusetts, which "compelled men to pay to the building of
[their] churches and support of ministers,... [and] to go to
some known religious assembly on first days," Adams stated
that "the laws of Massachusetts were the most mild and equita-
ble establishment of religion that was known in the world, if
indeed they could be called an establishment . .,42' James
Madison, discussing the meaning of "religious Establishments,"
framed the question in a private letter as "whether a support
of... the [Christian] religion... ought... [in] so far at least as
pecuniary means are involved, to be provided for by the
Gov[ernment] rather than be left to the voluntary provisions of
those who profess it."429 He opposed the Virginia "Bill estab-
lishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," which
allowed taxpayers to choose religious denominations or "semi-
naries of learning" for the receipt of tax monies, as a scheme
creating a religious "establishment."43 °
426. From 1727 onward, establishment schemes in Massachusetts and Connecticut
exempted Baptists and Quakers from paying ministerial taxes, and Anglicans were
permitted to designate their taxes for their own priests' support. CURRY, supra note
202, at 89. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided, for instance, that taxes
would be collected for the support of "public Protestant teachers of piety, religion,
and morality." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III, in 3 THORPE, supra note 240, at
1888, 1890. Taxpayers could designate recipients for their levies; if there was no
designation, the tax would be paid toward 'the support of the teacher or teachers of
the parish or precinct in which the said moneys are raised." Id. See generally LEVY,
supra note 314, at 1-62 (discussing multiple establishments in the American colonies
and states).
427. FISHER AMES, PHOCION. NO. IV (Apr., 1801), in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES,
supra note 282, at 162, 163.
428. John Adams, diary entry of Oct. 14, 1774, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 309, at 398-99.
429. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 485.
430. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS AS-
SESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 TIlE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183; see also Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1777) (origi-
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The meaning of a religious "establishment" in the parlance of
the time is discussed at length in a rather remarkable polemic
written by Hamilton in response to the Quebec Bill, passed by
the English Parliament in 1774.431 After discussing the Bill's
failures in various areas of civil government, Hamilton proceed-
ed "next to examine it with relation to religion, and to endeavor
to show that the Church of Rome has now the sanction of a legal
establishment in the province of Quebec."4 32 Quoting a "certain
writer," Hamilton wrote that "' [a]n established religion ... is a
religion which the civil authority engages not only to protect but
to support.' 433 This Bill, Hamilton wrote, "[t]his act makes ef-
fectual provision not only for the protection but for the perma-
nent support of Popery. . .. "' He continued:
The [Catholic] clergy "may hold, receive, and enjoy their
accustomed dues and rights." They may if they please. It is at
their option ... ; and, consequently, there must be a corre-
spondent obligation upon their parishioners to comply with
that will, and to pay those dues when required....
.. [I]f a church [has property in tithes],... it is plain the
laws must have made provision for its support, or, in other
words, must have established it.
The characteristic difference between a tolerated and es-
tablished religion consists in this: With respect to the support
of the former, the law is passive and improvident, leaving it
to those who profess it to make as much, or as little, provi-
sion as they shall judge expedient; and to vary and alter that
provision, as their circumstances may require.... But with
nal draft), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 251 (arguing
that taxpayer-designated assessment schemes violated true freedom of choice and
religious liberty); CURRY, supra note 202, at 146-47 (discussing usage in Virginia).
Curry has argued that although anti-establishment rhetoric often was framed in
terms of denominational preference, this distinction was more a matter of language
than substance. Id. at 197-98. The distinction between preferential and non-preferen-
tial aid, made by modern scholars, was not made by those of the Founding Era. Id.
at 211.
431. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REMARKS ON THE QUEBEC BILL, reprinted in 1
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 181.
432. Id. at 187.
433. Id.
434. Id.
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respect to the support of the latter, the law is active and
provident. Certain precise dues (tithes, etc.) are legally an-
nexed to the clerical office, independent on the liberal contri-
butions of the people .... While tithes were the free, though
customary, gift of the people, as was the case before the pass-
ing of the [Aict in question, the Roman Church was only in a
state of toleration; but when the law came to take cognizance
of them, and, by determining their permanent existence,
destroyed the free agency of the people, it then resumed the
nature of an establishment ....
Although religious "establishments" were thought broadly to
include religious tests for office and other religious preferences
established by law,436 the simultaneous prohibition of religious
establishments and the existence of religious tests and other
religious privileges appeared to go unchallenged. In the Dela-
ware Constitution of 1776, for instance, a required oath of office
professing belief "in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His
435. Id. at 188-91.
436. See, e.g., Supplement to The Journal of the Federal Convention (Ratification
by the State of New York), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 276, at 327, 328
(stating that "no religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law
in preference to others"); Supplement to The Journal of the Federal Convention
(Ratification by the State of Rhode Island), in 1 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 276,
at 334 (same); Statement of Oliver Wolcott, Fragments of the Debates in the Con-
vention of the State of Connecticut on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan.
9, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note .276, at 202 (discussing religious tests
for public office: " . . . I do not believe that the United States would ever be dis-
posed to establish one religious sect and lay all others under legal disabilities."). See
generally James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265,
at 332 (implying that religious tests for office constitute "an establishment of reli-
gion").
A broad understanding of religious establishments was also reflected in those
laws that favored church-state integration. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXXVIII,
in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3248, 3255-56 (stating that "[tihe Christian Protes-
tant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the
established religion of this State" and promulgating five articles of faith that a reli-
gious group must profess before it could achieve recognition); Connecticut Act for
Securing the Rights of Conscience (1784), quoted in COBB, supra note 199, at 501
("[N]o persons professing the Christian religion, who soberly dissented from the wor-
ship and ministry established by law, . .. should incur a penalty by not attending
the established worship"; dissenters could use "the same powers for maintaining
their respective societies" (including receipt of tax receipts) "as belonged to societies
established by law.").
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only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore"
coexisted with a provision that "[t]here shall be no establish-
ment of any one religious sect in this State in preference to
another."437 In another twist, the South Carolina Constitution
of 1778 declared the "Christian Protestant religion" to be "the
established religion of this State" and included the elaborate
prescription of articles of faith which must be accepted before a
religious group could reach this "incorporated and esteemed"
status.4" The same constitution, however, made it illegal to
compel a citizen "to pay towards the maintenance and support of
a religious worship that he does not freely join in, or has not
voluntarily engaged to support." '439 Many who rejected govern-
mental financial aid to religion still supported test oaths, restric-
tion of public office holding to Christians or to Protestants, and
the enforcement of blasphemy laws.440 The most likely explana-
tion for such contradictions lies not in a differing understanding
of what an "establishment" was, but in the common (unques-
tioned) assumption that these were Protestant Christian states,
where the only issue concerned the legal preference or "estab-
lishment" of particular Protestant groups.
The reasons for the growth and persistence of religious estab-
lishments were complex and undoubtedly ranged from the at-
tempted consolidation of spiritual and political power to deep
concerns about the nature of religious duty and its role in orga-
nized society. Of particularly lasting concern, both to those who
advocated the maintenance of religious establishments and to
those who advocated their abolition, were the common beliefs
that religious establishments were necessary for the survival of
both religion and the state. Both beliefs were brought to these
shores from Europe, and both were heavily entrenched in all
437. DEL. CONST. of 1776, arts. 22, 29, in I THORPE, supra note 240, at 562, 566-
67. These provisions were deleted in the Delaware Constitution of 1792, which stat-
ed that no "preference [shall] be given by law to any religious societies, denomina-
tions, or modes of worship." DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 1, reprinted in 1 THORPE,
supra note 240, at 568, 568.
438. S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXXVIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3248, 3255-56.
439. Id. at 3257. These provisions were not retained by the Constitution of 1790.
See S.C. CONST. of 1790, in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3258.
440. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 170-71.
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regions and in all social and religious classes-even among those
who often dissented from the particular establishments
chosen."'
Although the belief that government establishment was neces-
sary for the promotion (and even the survival) of religion was
clearly not universal, it is found throughout the writings of this
era. Fisher Ames wrote that the "establishment of a learned
clergy" was necessary "for the support of good morals and true
religion."442 The Constitution of Massachusetts provided for the
"support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety,
religion, and morality" as necessary for the promotion of religion
and "the institution of the public worship of God, and of public
instructions in piety, religion, and morality."443 A perceived
"decline in religiosity" in Virginia in the 1780s led to the intro-
duction of two bills to aid religion, one for the incorporation of
the Protestant Episcopal Church and one to levy a "General
Assessment" to be used to support teachers of the Christian reli-
gion." ' The supporters of the latter argued that they "ha[d]
with much concern observed a general Declension of Religion for
a number of Years past" and that the bill was necessary "to aid
[and] patronize Religion."445 Leo Pfeffer has written that
441. For example, Presbyterians in Virginia originally voiced support for the Virgin-
ia "General Assessment" bill, apparently because they (along with other Christian
sects) would have been its beneficiaries. See MILLER, supra note 9, at 29-31. They
later changed their position, fearing that the bill would, in the last analysis, lead to
a resurgence in the power of the established Episcopal church. Id. at 40-41.
442. FISHER AMES, PHOCION. NO. IV, reprinted in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra
note 282, at 162, 163.
443. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III, in 3 THORPE, supra note 240, at 1888,
1889-90.
444. MCDONALD, supra note 202, at 44. Patrick Henry, who spoke out critically
against the established Episcopal Church on numerous occasions, nevertheless draft-
ed and supported the Virginia "General Assessment" bill. MILLER, supra note 9, at
25-27. This bill assessed a property tax used to pay clergy and maintain church
buildings. The taxpayer could designate the Christian denomination to receive his
money. If no choice was made, the money was used to support the building of
schools in the taxpayer's county. If the taxpayer's denomination had no clergy, the
money would go into the general fund "'to promote [the taxpayer's] particular mode
of worship.'" Id. at 26.
445. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Va.) (Oct., 1784), quoted in 1 STOKES,
supra note 17, at 388-89. The supporters of this bill argued:
[Tihat should [religion] ... decline with nearly the same rapidity in
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in Virginia,
[this was the crucial issue: was the support of religion the
concern of the state, or was it a matter to "be left to volun-
tary contribution"? The lines were clear; to one group, liberty
meant disestablishment and separation and voluntariness,
because man's relation to his Maker was not within the juris-
diction of civil government; to the other, establishment meant
"order and internal tranquility, true piety and virtue...
peace and happiness," and was therefore quite properly a
state responsibility.446
Future, your Petitioners apprehend Consequences dangerous, if not fatal
to the Strength and Stability of Civil Government. *** Were all Sense of
Religion rooted out of the Minds of Men, scarce any thing would be left
on which human Laws would take hold. *** Your Petitioners therefore
think that those who legislate, not only have a Right, founded upon the
principle of public utility, but as they wish to promote the Virtue and
Happiness of their Constituents & the good People of the State in gener-
al; as they wish well to the Strength and Stability of Government, they
ought to aid & patronize Religion . . . .As every Man in the State par-
takes of the Blessings of Peace and Order, which results no less from
religion than the operation of the laws, so every Man should be obliged
to contribute as well to the Support of Religion, as that of Civil Govern-
ment nor has he any Reason to complain of this, as an Encroachment
upon his religious Liberty, if he is permitted to worship God according to
the Dictates of his Conscience.
Id. (star alterations in original); cf MILLER, supra note 9, at 28 (noting that in the
view of the bill's supporters, a republican governmental foundation required public
virtue, public virtue required morality, and morality required state-supported reli-
gious institutions).
446. PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 108 (footnote omitted). The existence of choice for
dissenters rendered establishment plans acceptable to some who might otherwise
have opposed them. George Washington wrote to George Mason:
Altho. no man's sentiments are more opposed to any kind of restraint
upon religious principles than mine are, yet I must confess, that I am
not amongst the number of those who are so much alarmed at the
thoughts of making people pay towards the support of that which they
profess, if of the denomination of Christians; or declare themselves Jews,
Mohamitans or otherwise, and thereby obtain proper relief.
Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), quoted in Paul F.
Boller, Jr., George Washington on Religious Liberty, 17 WM. & MARY Q. 486, 490
(1960); see also JOHN TUCKER, REMARKS ON A DISCOURSE OF THE REV. JONATHAN
PARSONS, OF NEWBURYPORT, DELIVERED ON THE 5TH OF MARCH LAST, AND ENTITLED,
FREEDOM FROM CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL SLAVERY, THE PURCHASE OF CHRIST 5, 10-
12 (1774) (arguing that there can be no valid objection to a demand that one sup-
port one's own minister); CURRY, supra note 202, at 203 (discussing the view that no
violation of conscience was presented by a taxation plan which forced no one to
936
SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
Support for religious establishments was often framed in terms
of religious duty. Attempting to justify his refusal to condemn
the Massachusetts establishment before a self-assembled tribu-
nal of Quakers, John Adams cited the fact that the "consciences
[of the people of Massachusetts] dictated to them that it was
their duty to support those laws."4 7
Because religion was believed to be necessary for morality,
and morality was necessary for the survival of society and its
governmental institutions, supporters made attempts to justify
the existence of state religious establishments on this ground as
well. Without the "precious security" of financial support for
religious institutions, Fisher Ames wrote, "the attempt will be
vain to adopt the laws and institutions of our ancestors.""8
Rufus King argued that Christianity was entitled to special
state support and protection because its belief that the deeds of
this world would be rewarded or punished was a necessary foun-
dation for the force of moral law. 449 Numerous state constitu-
tions set forth special financial support or prerogatives for par-
ticular religious groups, citing the "duty" of citizens to worship
God or the necessity of religion and religious institutions for the
preservation of social order and government.450 In an odd twist
to this belief, Patrick Henry attacked the Anglican clergy's resis-
tance to the Virginia Two Penny Act of 1759 on the ground that
the clergy had failed to fulfill the mission that established
churches must meet: the "enforce[ment] [of] obedience to civil
sanctions."45 ' "[W]hen... clergy cease to answer these ends,
the community have no further need of their ministry, and may
support a religion other than his own).
447. John Adams, diary entry of Oct. 14, 1774, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 309, at 399.
448. FISHER AMES, PHOCION. NO. IV, in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 282,
at 162, 163.
449. See ERNST, supra note 183, at 381.
450. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, Etc., XXXIII, in 3
THORPE, supra note 240, at 1686, 1689; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III, in 3
THORPE, supra note 240, at 1888, 1889; S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXXVIII, in 6 THORPE,
supra note 240, at 3248, 3256.
451. 1 WILLIAM W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES
41 (1891).
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justly strip them of their appointments ....""'
The general desire for protection of free religious exercise,
together with a belief in the fundamental role of religion in
society and government, led to complex, conflicting, and ambigu-
ous views of religious institutions. The positive role of religious
institutions in fostering the moral restraints necessary for the
maintenance of social bonds and republican government was
widely believed and widely acknowledged.453 Those who advo-
cated state aid for religious purposes were particularly articulate
in expressing the importance of religious institutions. In a pri-
vate letter, John Jay wrote:
Although the mere expediency of public measures may not be
a proper subject for the pulpit,... it is the right and the
duty of our pastors to press the observance of all moral and
religious duties, and to animadvert on every course of con-
duct which may be repugnant to them.4"
In a later address, Jay rejoiced that:
A zeal unknown to many preceding ages has recently pervad-
ed almost every Christian country, and occasioned the estab-
lishment of institutions well calculated to diffuse the
knowledge and impress the precepts of the Gospel both at
home and abroad....
We have reason to rejoice that such institutions have been
so greatly multiplied and cherished in the United States .... 4-1
Benjamin Rush stated that "the only foundation for a useful
education in a republic is to be laid in Religion. Without this
there can be no virtue, and without virtue there can be no liber-
ty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican govern-
ments." 45" The power of religious education came both from the
452. Id.
453. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 9, at 47-48 (discussing the church's role in the
"social order"); Robert N. Bellah, Religion and the Legitimation of the American Re-
public, in BELLAH & HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 3, 16-17 (discussing prevailing be-
liefs in the ability of religious institutions to inculcate republican values).
454. Letter from John Jay to Rev. Jedidiah Morse (Jan. 1, 1813), in 4 THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 318, at 365, 365-66.
455. John Jay, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Bible Society (May
13, 1824), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note
318, at 493, 497.
456. Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Rush on Republican Education, 1798 in 1 AMERICAN
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power of its message and from its extraordinarily wide audience.
Adams wrote in his diary that:
One great advantage of the Christian religion is that it
brings the great principle of the law of nature and na-
tions-Love your neighbor as yourself, and do to others as
you would that others should do to you-to the knowledge,
belief, and veneration of the whole people.... No other insti-
tution for education, no kind of political discipline, could
diffuse this kind of necessary information, so universally
among all ranks and descriptions of citizens. The duties and
rights of the man and the citizen are thus taught from early
infancy to every creature.45 '
The potential power of religious institutions was not, however,
an unmitigated blessing. It created fear as well as promise. Be-
lief in the necessity of religiously-based values for social and
governmental cohesion, and belief in the importance of religious
institutions in the propagation of those values, did not lead to
the conclusion that religious institutions should be involved in
governmental affairs. With the exception of early theocracies in
the New England colonies,45 ' the relationship between institu-
tional church and state was viewed as a one-way
street-government was free to aid religious institutions, but
religious institutions were precluded from involvement in the
affairs of government. Even New England Federalists, who gave
actual or tacit approval to existing schemes of state support for
religious institutions, distrusted the involvement of those insti-
tutions in governmental affairs. Although the inculcation of
moral values was seen as a vital and legitimate function of reli-
gious institutions, the involvement of these institutions in the
structures of political power was not. On this point, Adams was
HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 170, 170 (Richard Hofstadter & Wil-
son Smith eds., 1961) (excerpted from BENJAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL (1806)).
457. John Adams, diary entry of Aug. 14, 1796, in "IN GOD WE TRUST," supra note
217, at 99-100.
458. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 4-6, 82-83 (discussing the Puritans who settled
Massachusetts and Connecticut and their hopes to build communities with govern-
mental and religious institutions united in the "true Christian religion").
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particularly adamant. In a letter to Jefferson, he wrote:
The question before the human race is, Whether the God of
nature shall govern the World by his own laws, or Whether
Priests and Kings shall rule it by fictitious Miracles? Or, in
other Words, whether Authority is originally in the People?
or whether it has descended for 1800 years in a succession of
Popes and Bishops, or brought down from Heaven by the holy
Ghost in the form of a Dove, in a Phyal of holy Oil?. 9
In discussing a proposed parliamentary tax, Adams stated that
[iut spread an universal alarm ... . It excited a general and
just apprehension, that bishops, and dioceses, and churches,
and priests, and tithes, were to be imposed on us by Parlia-
ment .... [Ihf Parliament could tax us, they could establish
the Church of England, with all its creeds, articles, tests,
ceremonies, and tithes, and prohibit all other churches, as
conventicles and schism shops."
Throughout his later writings, Jay similarly and incessantly
argued against the involvement of church authorities in civil
affairs.46'
Those religious groups, such as Roman Catholics and Episco-
palians, who had established ecclesiastical structures and histo-
ries of involvement in government, were the particular objects of
denunciation and alarm. Opposition to state support of religious
institutions was often linked to overt anti-clericalism.462 Adams
wrote, "I do not like the late Resurrection of the Jesuits.... Our
459. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 20, 1815), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 445, 445. In his diary, Adams wrote: "Where
do we find a precept in the Gospel requiring Ecclesiastical Synods? Convocations?
Councils? Decrees? Creeds? Confessions? Oaths? Subscriptions? and whole cart-loads
of other trumpery that we find religion encumbered with in these days?" John Ad-
ams, diary entry of Feb. 18, 1756, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note
309, at 5-6.
460. Letter from John Adams to H. Niles (Feb. 13, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 309, at 282, 288.
461. See "IN GOD WE TRUST," supra note 217, at 360.
462. Jonathan Mayhew, in a famous pamphlet published in 1763, warned that if
the Church of England were established in New England, religious oaths would
follow "and all of us [would] be taxed for the support of bishops and their under-
lings." JONATHAN MAYHEW, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARTER AND CONDUCT OF THE
SOCIETY (1763), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 199, at 256.
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System... of Religious Liberty must afford them an Assylum.
But if they do not put the Purity of our Elections to a severe
Tryal, it will be a Wonder."463 Rufus King, himself an Episco-
palian, nevertheless opposed the establishment of the Church's
hierarchy in America. "I never liked the Hierarchy of the
Church," he wrote, and "if the clergy combine, they will have
their influence on Government."464 Although a traditional reli-
gionist in many ways, Jay also wrote of the dangers of the cleri-
cal structures of the Episcopal Church:
There never was a time when those doctrines promoted peace
on earth or good-will among men. Originating under the
auspices and in the days of darkness and despotism, they
patronized darkness and despotism down to the Reformation.
Ever encroaching on the rights of governments and people,
they have constantly found it convenient to incorporate, as
far as possible, the claims of the clergy with the principles
and practice of religion ....
To you it cannot be necessary to observe, that high Church
doctrines are not accommodated to the state of society, nor to
the tolerant principles, nor to the ardent love of liberty which
prevail in our country.4"
Even those state constitutions that were replete with all forms
of religious establishments took strong steps to bar the involve-
ment of the institutional church in government. The South Caro-
lina Constitution barred all clergymen from the offices of gover-
nor and lieutenant governor, from membership on the privy
council, and from service in the legislature until two years after
leaving the ministry.466 The Georgia Constitution prohibited a
463. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (May 6, 1816), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 472, 474. Jefferson, in a letter to Adams,
wrote of one of his previous letters: "The last is on the subject of religion, and by
it's publication will gratify the priesthood with new occasion of repeating their Con-
demnations against me. They wish it to be believed that Jhe can have no religion
who advocates it's freedom." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (June 15,
1813), in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 331, 331.
464. Letter from Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry (May 8, 1785), quoted in ERNST,
supra note 183, at 56-57.
465. Letter from John Jay to the Corporation of Trinity Church, in 4 THE CORRE-
SPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra note 318, at 505, 513-14.
466. S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXI, in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3248, 3253.
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"clergyman of any denomination" from serving in the state legis-
lature, 467 as did the constitutions of Delaware, New York,
North Carolina, and Maryland.46
Although these provisions often purported to be efforts to
"encourage religion and religious teaching"469 or to ensure that
religious teachers would "not... be diverted from the great
duties of their function, 47 ° the fact that such periods of disabil-
ity often extended beyond the period of the actual holding of
religious office indicates that they were motivated, at least in
part, by a far greater concern-the danger of institutional merg-
er of church and state.
Reformers attacked all three assumptions of those who fa-
vored religious establishments: that establishments were neces-
sary for religion, that establishments were necessary for republi-
can government, and that state aid could be given to religious
institutions while maintaining their preclusion from the affairs
of government. James Madison launched a most concerted at-
tack upon the theoretical underpinnings of establishment theo-
ries. In his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments, he argued that state funding for teachers of
Christianity must be opposed "[blecause the establishment pro-
posed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian
Religion," "[b]ecause experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical
467. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXII, in 2 THORPE, supra note 240, at 777, 785.
468. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 29, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 240, at 562,
567-68 ("[No clergyman or preacher of the gospel, of any denomination, shall be
capable of holding any civil office in this State, or of being a member of either of
the branches of the legislature, while they continue in the exercise of the pastoral
function."); MD. CONST. of 1776, The Constitution, or Form of Government, Etc.,
XXXVII, in 3 THORPE, supra note 240, at 1686, 1697 ("[N]o . . . minister, or preach-
er of the gospel, of any denomination . . . shall have a seat in the General Assem-
bly or the Council of this State."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, XXXIX, in 5 THORPE, supra
note 240, at 2623, 2637 ("[N]o minister of the gospel, or. priest of any denomination
whatsoever, shall, at any time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever,
be eligible to, or capable of holding, any civil or military office or place within this
State."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, The Constitution, or Form of Government, Etc., XXXI,
in 5 THORPE, supra note 240, at 2787, 2793 ("No clergyman, or preacher of the
gospel, of any denomination, shall be capable of being a member of either the Sen-
ate, House of Commons, or Council of State, while he continues in the exercise of
the pastoral function.").
469. MCDONALD, supra note 202, at 43 n.42.
470. S.C. CONST. of 1778, XXI, in 6 THORPE, supra note 240, at 3248, 3253.
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establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of
Religion, have had a contrary operation," and "[blecause the
establishment in question is not necessary for the support of
Civil Government."471 Madison attacked the chain of reasoning
of establishment proponents at its root, arguing that state sup-
port was, in fact, antithetical to religious freedom, and under-
mined the role that religious values might play in the mainte-
nance of civil society and government. He wrote:
If ... [an establishment] be urged as necessary for the sup-
port of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting
Religion, and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it
cannot be necessary for the former. If Religion be not within
[the] cognizance of Civil Government, how can its legal estab-
lishment be said to be necessary to civil Government? What
influences in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect
a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many
instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of politi-
cal tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guard-
ians of the liberties of the people.472
In his later years, Madison reflected extensively upon these
questions, and what he felt was empirical proof of the triuth of
his opinions. In private letters, Madison observed that
the prevailing opinion in Europe, England not excepted, has
471. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183, 187, 188. In a speech on the floor of the Virginia House of Delegates, Madison
argued that the "decay of public morals" of which the measure's proponents com-
plained was not due to the absence of
any legal provision for the support of religion, but was the result, in
general, of a long-continued state of war, of bad laws, and of a loose
administration of justice; and that the true and proper remedies would
be found in . . . peace, in laws cherishing virtue, in a more regular ad-
ministration of justice, and in the influence of good example and of vol-
untary religious associations.
1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 344 (quoting a reconstruction of the speech from
Madison's notes (Oct. 1784), in 1 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF MADISON 625 (1866)).
472. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183, 188.
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been that Religion could not be preserved without the sup-
port of [Government] nor [Government] be supported [with-
out] an established religion[-]that there must be at least an
alliance of some sort between them.
It remained for North America to bring the great and in-
teresting subject to a fair, and finally to a decisive test.
In... [the colonies of Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania,] Delaware, [and] the greater part of [New York] there
were no religious Establishments; the support of Religion
being left to the voluntary associations [and] contributions of
individuals ....
... [T]he New England States have.., advanced toward
the prevailing example; and without any evidence of disad-
vantages either to Religion or good Government." 3
The "old error," that of "alliance or coalition between Govern-
ment and Religion," has a "corrupting influence on both the
parties, [and] ... the danger cannot be too carefully guarded
against.""4 The goal must be a "perfect separation between
ecclesiastical and civil matters.""5 Madison conducted that "re-
ligion and Government will both exist in greater purity, the less
473. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 485-86. In another private letter, he wrote:
The settled opinion here is that religion is essentially distinct from civil
government, and exempt from its cognizance, and that a connection be-
tween them is injurious to both .... Prior to the Revolution, the Epis-
copal Church was established by law in this State. On the Declaration of
Independence it was left, with all other sects, to a self-support. And no
doubt exists that there is much more religion among us now than there
ever was before . . . . This proves rather more than that the law is not
necessary to the support of religion.
Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (1823), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 305, 307-08; see also Letter from
James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 121, 125. ("It was the universal opinion of
the century preceding the last, that civil Government could not stand without the
prop of a religious establishment, and that the Christian religion itself would perish
if not supported by a legal provision for its clergy. The experience of Virginia con-
spicuously corroborates the disproof of both opinions.").
474. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822) in 3 LET-
TERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 275.
475. Id.
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they are mixed together."476
Others launched similar attacks. Jefferson argued that Penn-
sylvania and New York "have long subsisted without any estab-
lishment at all. The experiment was new and doubtful when
they made it. It has answered beyond conception. They flourish
infinitely. Religion is well supported; of various kinds, indeed,
but all good enough; all sufficient to preserve peace and or-
der. . . .,47' A committee of delegates to the First Continental
Congress wrote that establishments "may make hypocrites, but
cannot create Christians.... That liberty, virtue, and public
happiness can be supported without them, this flourishing prov-
ince [of Pennsylvania] is a glorious testimony ....
Reformers did not attack the foundational belief of traditional
proponents of establishments-that religion was necessary to
sustain the moral fiber of society and the governmental institu-
tions founded by that society. 479 Rather, they attacked the as-
sumption that state support of religion was constructive, rather
than destructive, of religious faith and flourishing.48 For them,
religious faith was a matter of individual conviction, and govern-
mental efforts to support or enforce religion would only work to-
476. Id.
477. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in THE POR-
TABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 212; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 207, at 251, 252 (observing that state establishment of religion
"tends . . . to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage,
by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honors and emoluments, those who will ex-
ternally profess and conform to it").
478. SAMUEL DAVIS ET AL., MEMORIAL, quoted in HOVEY, supra note 271, at 200.
479. Isaac Backus, the Baptist dissenter who (at least rhetorically) opposed all
forms of governmental aid to religion, is typical in this regard. After condemning the
intrusion of civil government into religious affairs, he nonetheless affirms "[t]hat
Christianity is essentially necessary to the good order of civil society is a certain
truth." 2 ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
TO THE DENOMINATION OF CHRISTIANS CALLED BAPTISTS 294 (David Weston ed.,
1969).
480. Madison framed the question thus: "'[Niot is Religion necessary, but are Reli-
gious Establishments necessary for Religion?'" 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 389; see
also CURRY, supra note 202, at 219-20 (discussing the views of those who opposed
governmental aid to religious institutions); MARK DE W. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
passim (1965) (arguing that the predominant fear of religionists during the Founding
Era was the protection of the religious "garden" from the "wilderness" of the state).
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ward its destruction.45 '
The existence of state aid to religious institutions raised, for
reformers, the distinct and overwhelming danger of the aggrega-
tion of governmental and religious institutional power. This
"establishment of religion by government" was, in their view, the
inevitable historical product of governmental aid to religion and
the consequent involvement of religious and governmental insti-
tutions in each other's affairs. Madison wrote that
[iun the Papal System, Government and Religion are in a
manner consolidated [and] that is found to be the worst of
[Governments].
... [T]he legal establishment of a particular religion...
makes [that religion] a part of the Political and Civil organi-
zation and... few.., will maintain that the system has
been favorable either to Religion or the [Government] .482
As President of the United States, Madison vetoed an attempt
by Congress to incorporate the Episcopal Church in the District
of Columbia. 483 This bill, which prescribed the organization
and governance of the church, was opposed by Madison on
grounds that echo modern entanglement doctrine. The bill, Mad-
ison wrote, violated the Establishment Clause and the "essential
distinction between civil and religious functions." "This particu-
lar church.., would... be a religious establishment by law, a
legal force and sanction being given to certain articles in its
constitution and administration. "14 ' The provisions in the bill
granting the church authority to provide for the support of the
poor was likewise dangerous, because they "would be a prece-
dent for giving to religious societies as such a legal agency in
carrying into effect a public and civil duty."48 Thomas Paine's
481. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 138.
482. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 485.
483. James Madison, Veto Message (Feb. 21, 1811), in THE COMPLETE MADISON, su-
pra note 283, at 307.
484. Id.
485. Id.; see also HOWE, supra note 480, at 44-45 (discussing Madison's opposition
to the incorporation bill). A petition by the Episcopal Church to the Virginia Assem-
bly to allow the Church's incorporation in Virginia was condemned as "an express
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description was succinct: the legal connection of the church with
the state creates "a sort of mule-animal, capable only of destroy-
ing, . . called The Church established by Law."486
In addition, reformers openly challenged the traditional belief
that the state could give aid to religious institutions while si-
multaneously precluding their involvement in the structures of
political power. Reformers viewed the traditionalists' belief that
establishments could be a one-way street-with state aid to
religious institutions, but no reciprocal involvement of religious
institutions in the affairs of government-as a painful and dan-
gerous naivete. They ridiculed the expectation that religious
institutions, whose financial welfare and, perhaps, very exis-
tence depended upon the beneficence of civil government and its
laws, would remain separate and apart from the affairs of gov-
ernment. Madison wrote that the established clergy "are a nu-
merous and powerful body.., and will naturally employ all
their art [and] Interest to depress their rising Adversaries; for
such they must consider dissenters who rob them of the good
will of the people and may in time endanger their livings [and]
security. 487 Where there is support of religious institutions by
government, there will be a
tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a
corrupting coalition or alliance between them best guarded
[against] by an entire abstinence of the [Government] from
interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of
preserving public order, [and] protecting each sect [against]
trespasses on its legal rights by others.48
Fear of church-state merger also proceeded on a more subtle
basis: that the establishment of religion by government threat-
ened the equality of all religious sects in the eyes of the law.
Reformers vehemently believed that "no man or class of men,
attempt to draw the State into an illicit connexion & commerce with them." Letter
from John B. Smith to James Madison (June 21, 1784), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 212, 214 n.1.
486. PAINE, supra note 334, at 67.
487. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Apr. 1, 1774), in 1 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 210, at 111, 112.
488. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 487.
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ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emolu-
ments or privileges, nor be subjected to any penalties or disabili-
ties;""' and that the involvement of government in the making
of distinctions between citizens on this basis violated required
neutrality."' By clear implication, the existence of religious
establishments also attempted to influence religious exercise and
practice in violation of rights of conscience." '
Principles of government neutrality and equality presented a
difficult theoretical question: whether they extended to distinc-
tions between religion and nonreligion, or only to distinctions
among competing religious groups. For some, these principles
clearly protected the atheist as well as those who professed some
kind of religious belief.492 For others, this was clearly not the
489. JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA JOURNAL (1776), reprinted in "IN GOD WE TRUST,"
supra note 217, at 301; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTAILISHING REI-
GIOuS FREEDOM (1777), reprinted in TIlE PORTAI-,E THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
207, at 251, 253 (proposing that religious beliefs of individuals "shall in no wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities"); JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 TIlE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 183, 186 (arguing that an establishment would
violate basic principles of equality).
490. Madison wrote in a private letter:
Among the features peculiar to the political system of the United States
is the perfect equality of rights which it secures to every religious
sect. . . . Equal laws, protecting equal rights, are found . . . the best
guarantee of loyalty and love of country; as well as best calculated to
cherish that mutual respect and good will among citizens of every reli-
gious denomination which are necessary to social harmony, and most
favorable to the advancement of truth. The account you give of the Jews
of your congregation brings them fully within the scope of these observa-
tions.
Letter from James Madison to Dr. de la Motta (Aug., 1820), in 3 LETTERS AND OTII-
ER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 178, 179.
491. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 202, at 202; JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA JOURNAL,
reprinted in "IN GOD WE TRUST," supra note 217, at 301. For this reason, opposition
to tax support of religions institutions was often framed as a free exercise rather
than an establishment issue. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 216-17.
492. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in 1 TIlE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 67 (describing his intention
that the Virginia Bill Establishing Religious Freedom protect "the Jew and the Gen-
tile, the Christian and the Mahometan, the Hindoo, and the infidel of every denomi-
nation"); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 TIlE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 269, 271-72 (criticizing those who
feared an extension of the "rights of conscience" to "Jews Turks & infidels"). Madi-
son implied the extension of religious freedom to nonbelievers in his Memorial and
948
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case.4 93 The debate, however, became one largely of rhetoric,
rather than substance, since the focus for dissenters was govern-
mental acts that privileged some at the expense of others or that
otherwise threatened the sanctity of conscience. By focusing on
the effects of positive acts of government, a broad consensus was
achieved, since any attempted religious establishment inevitably
disadvantaged other religious groups as well as those who pro-
fessed no religion.494
Reformers acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the con-
cept of institutional separation of church and state. Madison
wrote that "I must admit... that it may not be easy, in every
possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, where he wrote that "[w]hilst we assert
for ourselves a freedom to embrace .. . the Religion which we believe to be of di-
vine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us." JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 183, 186; see also Letter from Richard Henry
Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 210, at 149, 149-50 ("I fully agree with the presbyterians, that true freedom
embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo as well as the Christian religion. And
upon this liberal ground I hope our Assembly will conduct themselves."). This liberal
spirit did not, however, dissuade Lee from advocating a general tax assessment for
religion: "[Tihe experience of all times shows Religion to be the guardian of mor-
als-and he must be a very inattentive observer in our Country, who does not see
that avarice is accomplishing the destruction of religion, for want of a legal obliga-
tion to contribute something to its support." Id. at 149.
493. See, e.g., Statement by Rep. Huntington, 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 380,
at 730-31 (Aug. 15, 1789) (He understood that what was to become the First
Amendment should "be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience,
and [the] free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who pro-
fessed no religion at all."); see also CURRY, supra note 202, at 78-79 (arguing that
colonial writers rarely considered the possibility that religious freedom might include
the right not to believe in Christian principles); ef JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION, BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA, re-
printed in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 47 (1823) ("Lastly, Those are not at all
to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which
are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.").
494. This approach was apparent, for instance, in Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments, where he argued that the theory which per-
mits general assessment for Christianity could as easily support the establishment of
a particular sect of Christians, to the exclusion of other sects. Such a bill, he wrote,
"violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law." JAMES MADISON,
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 183, 186.
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of Religion [and] the civil authority with such distinctness as to
avoid collisions [and] doubts on unessential points."495 Even
those who favored the general theory of church-state separation
disagreed about the particulars of its implementation. The
Northwest Ordinance, as originally drafted, reserved one section
of land in each township for religious purposes.496 Such general
support of religion by government was advocated by many mod-
erates.497  Madison, on the other hand, applauded the
ordinance's demise, remarking, "[h]ow a regulation, so unjust in
itself, so foreign to the Authority of [Congress,] so hurtful to the
sale of the public land, and smelling so strongly of an antiquated
Bigotry, could have received the countenance of a [congressional
committee] is truly ta] matter of astonishment."4 98
Particular disagreement erupted on issues of governmental
involvement in recommendations, proclamations, and exercises
that were (at least arguably) religious in nature. Evangelical
Protestant groups and others exhibited extreme concern over
public calls for religious services.4 99 When the Continental Con-
gress opened in September, 1774, Thomas Cushing suggested
that daily sessions begin with prayer.00 Jay objected on the
ground that the members represented too much diversity of
religious opinion and belief to permit prayer selection in a man-
ner fair to all.50 1 Over this objection, and the objections of oth-
ers, the practice was adopted.502
For government to require public religious activities would
495. Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 484, 487.
496. See ERNST, supra note 183, at 56.
497. See id. at 56-57.
498. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 29, 1785), in 8 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 210, at 285, 286. Madison later vetoed a bill
passed by Congress that set aside a parcel of federal land for the use of a Baptist
church. The bill, he wrote, "comprises a principle and precedent for the appropri-
ation of funds of the United States for the use and support of religious societies,
contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that 'Congress shall make
no law respecting a religious establishment.'" James Madison, Veto Message (Feb.
28, 1811), in THE COMPLETE MADISON, supra note 283, at 308.
499. See HEIMERT, supra note 258, at 295.
500. See 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 449.
501. Id.
502. See id. at 448-49.
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clearly have violated church/state separation in the view of re-
formers; on the question of government recommendation, or
government example, the responses were mixed. Writing about
action that the President might take in response to disturbing
events in France, Hamilton suggested that the President "recom-
mend a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer. The occasion
renders it proper, and religious ideas will be useful.""5 3 After
the adoption of the Federal Constitution by the First Congress, a
resolution was offered which requested that the President rec-
ommend to the people of the United States a day of thanksgiv-
ing and prayer.0 4 Objection was raised that "'it is a business
with which Congress has nothing to do; it is a religious mat-
ter, ... proscribed to us."'505 The resolution carried, and Wash-
ington issued the proclamation."'
Jefferson, when President of the United States, refused to
follow suit. He explained:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted
by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institu-
tions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not
only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting
the establishment or free exercise of religion, but from that
also which reserves to the States the powers not delegated to
the United States. Certainly, no power to prescribe any reli-
gious exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline,
has been delegated to the General Government. It must then
rest with the States, as far as it can be in any human
authority.50
7
The argument that such governmental edicts were merely
503. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering (Mar. 17, 1798), in 10
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 317, at 275, 276.
504. 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 486.
505. Id. at 487 (quoting Statement of Thomas Tucker).
506. Id. This proclamation, drafted by Hamilton, recommended "a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer... [to give] hearty thanks to the great Ruler of na-
tions .. . [and] to diffuse and establish habits of sobriety, order, morality and pi-
ety . .. that so men may be happy and God glorified throughout the earth." Alexan-
der Hamilton, Proclamation for a National Thanksgiving, in 8 WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMIILTON, supra note 317, at 120, 121-22.
507. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11
TaE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 428, 428.
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recommendatory, without civil or criminal sanction, failed to
persuade him. "It must be meant, too," he wrote, "that this rec-
ommendation is to carry some authority, . . . perhaps in public
opinion." "' This "change in the nature of the penalty [did not]
make the recommendation less a law of conduct for those to
whom it is directed.""9 When reminded of existing state prac-
tices, which clearly included the issuance of such edicts, Jeffer-
son stated only that "every one must act according to the dic-
tates of his own reason, and mine tells me that.., the Presi-
dent of the United States [has] no authority to direct the reli-
gious exercises of his Constituents."51 °
In his Presidential years, Madison issued Thanksgiving Day
proclamations, bowing to the power of tradition, the cultural
expectations of the people, and the example of predecessors.5" '
He later wrote almost apologetically of his yielding on this issue,
stressing that he was "always careful to make the Proclamations
absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; ... a
day, on which all who thought proper might unite in consecrat-
ing it to religious purposes, according to their own faith and
forms."512 He acknowledged that these proclamations deviated
from his principles of separation of church and state, and "lost
sight of the equality of all religious sects in the eye of the Con-
stitution."'513 He apparently believed that any governmental
foray into the realm of religious exercises, whether mandatory or
hortatory, was impossible to reconcile with separationist and
egalitarian principles; but respect for the expectations of others
rendered resistance, at the time, impossible.
Similar conflicts surrounded the issue of the appointment of
federal chaplains. Congressional chaplains were first established
by Act of Congress on September 22, 1789."' In 1808, Jeffer-
son signed a law providing for the appointment of a chaplain for
508. Id. at 428-29.
509. Id. at 429.
510. Id. at 429-30.
511. See PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 224.
512. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 3 LET-
TERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 273, 275.
513. Id. at 274-75.
514. 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 457.
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each brigade of the Army, and Madison signed an act
reauthorizing the appointment of Congressional chaplains in
1816.515 In his later writing, Madison repudiated this practice:
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Con-
gress consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure
principle of religious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the
negative. The Constitution of the U.S. forbids everything like
an establishment of a national religion. The law appointing
Chaplains establishes a religious worship for the national
representatives, to be performed by Ministers of religion,
elected by a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of
the national taxes. Does not this involve the principle of a
national establishment... ?
The establishment of the chaplainship [in Congress] is a
palpable violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional
principles: The tenets of the chaplains elected [by the majori-
ty] shut the door of worship [against] the members whose
creeds [and] consciences forbid a participation in that of the
majority....
Were the establishment to be tried by its fruits, are not
the daily devotions conducted by these legal Ecclesiastics,
already degenerating into a scanty attendance, and a tire-
some formality?
Better also to disarm... the precedent of Chaplainships
for the army and navy, than erect them into a political au-
thority in matters of religion. The object of this establishment
is seducing; the motive to it is laudable. But is it not safer to
adhere to a right principle, and trust to its consequences,
than confide in the reasoning.., in favor of a wrong one....
If the spirit of armies be devout, the spirit out of the armies
will never be less so ... and if such be not the spirit of ar-
mies, the official services of their Teachers are not likely to
produce it.516
These views were shared by Protestant religious leaders, such as
515. MCCLELLAN, supra note 495, at 141-42.
516. Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534,
558-59 (1946).
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John Leland;517 they apparently were not shared by many oth-
ers of the age."'
Objections to the use of religion by government were grounded
in three powerful ideas: that religion must be, and is, wholly
exempt from the cognizance of government;"' that governmen-
tal involvement in religious activities destroys the requirement
of government neutrality among religious sects;52 and that any
institutional merger of church and state must be avoided."'
Despite these concerns, routine governmental papers were re-
plete with mention of "God," "Nature's God," "Providence," and
other religious references. 22 Religious references on the Great
Seal of the United States were apparently deemed desirable by
conservatives and reformers alike. When proposed designs were
solicited, Franklin suggested an image of Moses lifting up his
wand and dividing the Red Sea, with the motto "Rebellion to
tyrants in obedience to God," and Jefferson proposed the chil-
dren of Israel in the wilderness "led by a cloud by day and a
517. See JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE, reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF
JOHN LELAND 119 (L.F. Greene ed. 1845) ("Under this head, I shall also take notice
of one thing, which appears to me unconstitutional, inconsistent with religious liber-
ty, and unnecessary in itself; I mean the paying of the chaplains of the Civil and
Military departments out of the public treasury .... If legislatures choose to have a
Chaplain, for Heaven's sake, let them pay him by contributions, and not out of the
public chest.").
518. See CURRY, supra note 202, at 219.
519. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808),
in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 428, 429 ("I do not
believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its
exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines . .. Every religious society has a right to
determine [these] for itself . . . , according to their own particular tenets; and this
right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has depos-
ited it."); see also JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELI-
GIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
265, at 183, 185 ("Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society,
he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe .... Religion
is wholly exempt from [the] cognizance [of government].").
520. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at
183, 186.
521. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), in 10
TIlE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 305, 305 (observing that
proclamation of fastings and thanksgivings encourages "alliance between Church and
State").
522. See PFEFFER, supra note 199, at 119.
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pillar of fire by night."5' Reformers tolerated such references,
apparently because they were not believed to implicate core
concerns.
Occasionally, attempts to achieve institutional separation
raised questions of the unfair treatment of the religious. Under
colonial laws and new state charters, clergy often were incapaci-
tated from holding public office on the theory that to allow them
to do so would create a potentially dangerous alliance between
church and state." Jefferson initially supported such exclu-
sions and included a provision prohibiting office holding by
"Ministers of the Gospel" in his draft of a Constitution for Vir-
ginia.5" He later reversed his position, on the ground that no
realistic danger of church-state merger was presented. Although
such prohibitions might have been necessary in prior times, by
the turn of the century the clergy "seem to have relinquished all
pretension to privilege" and should, therefore, possess the same
political rights as other citizens."2 6
The role of religious teaching and studies in public universi-
ties presented similar conflicts. For Madison, the teaching of
Christianity in a "university established by law, and at the com-
mon expense," was a flagrant violation of free exercise and anti-
establishment principles."' For Jefferson, the importance of
523. 1 STOKES, supra note 17, at 467-68. The final version included the "Eye of
Providence." Id.
524. See supra notes 466-70 and accompanying text.
525. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 294, 297 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952); see also HOWE, supra note
480, at 61-62 (comparing the views of Jefferson and Madison). Madison challenged
this practice on the ground that office holding was a civil liberty and its denial to
clergy was the denial of a civil right. He wrote: "Does not the exclusion of Ministers
of the Gospel as such violate a fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a reli-
gious profession with the privation of a civil right? does it [not] violate another
article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of the Civil
power?" James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virgin-
ia" (Oct., 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 265, at 284,
288.
526. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jeremiah Moor (Aug. 14, 1800), in 7 TIlE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 453, 455 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904).
527. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (1823), in 3 LETTERS AND OTH-
ER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 321, at 305, 307-08. Madison's views of
church-state institutional separation were often more extreme than others of this
age. For instance, he opposed a proposal to exempt churches from state taxation on
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religious studies and the need for their equal treatment with
other disciplines led to his proposal of a complex plan for the
University of Virginia. He proposed that the four major religious
denominations be invited to
establish, each for itself, a professorship of their own tenets,
on the confines of the university, so near as that their stu-
dents may attend lectures there, and have the free use of our
library, and every other accommodation we can give them;
preserving, however, their independence of us and of each
other.528
His enthusiasm about the results of the mixing of sects, which
"shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their
prejudices, and make the general religion a religion of peace,
reason, and morality," '529 apparently blinded him to the obvious
problems inherent in the choice of particular religious groups for
this accommodation.
F. Summary and Conclusion
The historical record is far from unambiguous. Political
spokesmen, traditional religionists, and the leaders of emerging
dissident religious groups often had radically different world
views and radically different images of the existing social and
governmental order. Differences pervaded the goals, motivations,
and understandings of language of the participants in the great
dialogue.
Although these differences existed, various strains of congru-
ence among reformers can be found. Religiously-based truths,
however understood, were widely believed to be the foundation
of the ultimate moral principles on which civil society and re-
publican governmental systems depended. Natural law, natural
rights, and similar concepts were the articulations of what was
believed to be man's apprehension of the transcendent truths of
the ground that it was an attempted "encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bodies" into
alliance with government. Fleet, supra note 516, at 555. Few others apparently
shared this view.
528. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in 15 TIiE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 176, at 403, 405.
529. Id.
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the universal natural order. Calls for "liberty," "justice," "truth,"
"equality," and so on had extraordinarily cohesive power, what-
ever differences their makers intended.
Even those who clearly fell within the Enlightenment tradi-
tion assumed the existence of a Provident natural order and the
workings of transcendent or religious beliefs and ideals in pri-
vate and public life. The explosion of scientific discovery and
social scientific thinking in the eighteenth century led not to an
abandonment of religion, but to attempts to harmonize religious
concepts with scientific discoveries and emerging beliefs in a
rational, self-sustaining natural order.530 Jefferson wrote to Ad-
ams that scientific discoveries reinforced "the necessity of a
superintending power to maintain the Universe in it's course
and order."53' James Turner, in a detailed and exhaustive
study of the time, wrote that in this era, "disbelief in God re-
mained scarcely more plausible than disbelief in gravity."53
2
The task that the articulate spokesmen of this era set for them-
selves was not the eradication of the religious from public life,
but the development of ways in which the avowedly religious
nature of the people could be fostered while protecting religious
and governmental institutions from destruction, each by the
other.
The implementation of these ideas as part of a governmental
plan was the subject of great conflict. As ideas of reform gained
530. See TURNER, supra note 298, at 35-72.
531. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Apr. 11, 1823), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, supra note 281, at 591, 592.
532. TURNER, supra note 298, at 44. He wrote:
The Enlightenment spawned much religious doubt and some atheistic
speculation, but even in its radical variants, eighteenth-century culture
could scarcely support unbelief as a really viable option .... The com-
mon inclination among later historians to see rejection of the Christian
God as a halfway house to unbelief in any God misunderstands both
Deism and the Enlightenment. The "natural religion" favored by the more
adventurous Enlightenment thinkers constituted a legitimate if thin-
blooded form of theism, not a road to unbelief. Only much later, in indi-
rect ways and under very different circumstances, did it-could
it-contribute to the eventual emergence of a widespread and enduring
disbelief in God. Unbelief required too great a divorce from reality, as
understood during the Enlightenment, to be either palatable or plausible.
Id. at 46.
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momentum, they crystallized around a core concept: the call for
freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience encompassed ideas
of individual free inquiry and private judgment. It was used to
describe the process by which many believed that religious belief
and conviction were formed. Its protection was vehemently advo-
cated not only as a matter of religious practice and obligation,
but also as a matter of grave governmental concern: it was be-
lieved that a republic could not survive without the ability of
citizens to freely reason and, as the result of that process, to
apprehend the moral consensus necessary to sustain civil society
and republican government.
The protection of freedom of conscience lay at the base of two
great and emerging principles: free exercise of religion and the
destruction of religious establishments by government. Neither
was a simple concept with simple acclaim and obvious applica-
tion. The understandings of these principles, and how they
should be implemented to protect the deeper goals that they
represented, were the subjects of deep disagreements. The prin-
ciples were not neat or exclusive, with clearly-defined bound-
aries into which human activities could be sorted.
Solutions to various problems, however, were motivated by
the same concerns. Free religious exercise was grounded in the
principle of freedom of conscience. The power of this principle is
seen not only in the ubiquity of calls for freedom of conscience
and religious expression, but also in the almost unthinkable
political character of explicit advocacy of state-imposed ortho-
doxy in matters of religious exercise or belief. There was nearly
universal agreement that free religious exercise included free-
dom to pursue religious activities and worship, although the
extension of these rights to disfavored religious groups often was
denied in principle and in practice. Despite such inconsistencies,
a consensus emerged that free religious worship must include
the ability to erect houses of worship of the design desired; the
freedom to attend, or not to attend, religious services; and the
freedom of religious institutions to control their doctrines, disci-
plines, and exercises.
Although the protection of religious exercise was broad, the
needs of civil society and civil order demanded that it not be
absolute. Limitations on religious exercise and expression were
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usually expressed in terms of preservation of the peace and
safety of the state and the protection of the reciprocal rights of
others. Laws that attempted, through indirection, to enforce
particular religious creeds (such as prohibitions against profani-
ty, blasphemy, and atheism, and the use of test oaths for public
office) engendered particular opposition from reformers. Reform-
ers navigated between the shoals of conflicting societal and indi-
vidual needs by offering the following resolution: that the ex-
pression of conscience, or free religious exercise, must be protect-
ed unless equal liberty or the peace and safety essential to the
state was manifestly endangered.
Similarly, indirect attempts by government to enforce or to
promote particular beliefs-through the use of test oaths for
public office, public taxation for religious organizations, and so
on-increasingly were viewed in hostile terms. Such religious
establishments by government were seen as potentially cor-
rupting on various levels: to individuals, who would be forced to
act in ways contrary to the dictates of conscience in order to
obtain public power or benefits; to religious institutions, which
would lose their spiritual and actual autonomy in the scramble
for governmental largesse and political power; and to govern-
ment, which would, through alliance or merger with religious
institutions, lose its ability to respect and protect the needs of
all citizens in accordance with fundamental concepts of equality.
The importance of religious belief to the moral foundations of
society and government, which was asserted by those who sup-
ported religious establishments, was not denied by those who
opposed them. Although religious institutions were seen as nec-
essary expressions of religious freedom, and as valuable contri-
butors to the inculcation of moral values, their merger with
government was believed to hold the potential for intellectual
tyranny and the destruction of the very freedom of conscience
that their existence represented. The question was how to pre-
serve the benevolent function of religious institutions without
fostering an aggregation of governmental and religious institu-
tional power. In early colonial days, many believed that this
balance could be accomplished through state support of religious
institutions in a myriad of ways. By the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, and the confrontation of these issues
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in the context of a national polity, a consensus was clearly
emerging that it could not. Conditions of religious diversity, and
persistent calls for the general sanctity of individual belief, ren-
dered existing mergers of religious institutions with government
increasingly untenable.
The implementation of these principles was uneven and
fraught with inconsistency, even among the influential reformers
of the age. Although schemes that forced individuals to pay
toward the maintenance of others' religious institutions were
widely condemned by the time of the Revolution, schemes that
merely forced individuals to pay toward the maintenance of their
own religious institutions were supported, at least lukewarmly,
by many of the articulate spokesmen of this era. Only as time
progressed, and such establishments were increasingly opposed
on free conscience and free exercise grounds, were inroads
against them made as well. Historical practices, political pres-
sures, and unquestioned belief in the positive role of religion in
society and in government led to many unusual configurations.
Announcements of principles of equality coexisted with religious
test oaths in state constitutions. Reformers, working from the
same principles, both opposed and supported the issuance of
Thanksgiving Day proclamations and the teaching of Christiani-
ty at a publicly-financed university. Although general principles
were clear, their implementation often was not.
Although inconsistencies can certainly be found, the thrust of
the reformers' message was clear. Moreover, the difficulty in
determining the proper implementation of principles of church-
state separation was rooted in a deeper reality: that the reli-
gious impulse and American culture were deeply intertwined.
The prevailing view throughout this era, shared by traditional-
ists and reformers alike, was that religion was an accepted and
necessary part of human expression and communal life. The
question was how to end direct and indirect governmental com-
pulsion in matters of conscience, while maintaining the social
structures and the fabric of shared values believed to be neces-
sary for social cohesion and free government.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO FIRST AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES
A. Introduction
I have argued that during the Founding Era, a consensus
emerged among reformers for the following propositions. It was
believed that religion (in the sense of the search for transcen-
dent, moral principles) was a vital force in the lives of individu-
als and a necessary part of the foundation of free, republican
government. Free inquiry, or freedom of conscience, was neces-
sary for this apprehension of religious or "transcendent" truths
to occur. The protection of conscience was imperative. It was to
be accomplished by explicit protection of the expressions of con-
science (religious free exerpise) and by prohibition of the aggre-
gation of governmental and religious institutional power (the
establishment of religion by government).
The Supreme Court's approach to religious questions has been
altogether different. The Court has attempted to separate the
religious and the secular, in individual and collective life, and
has attempted to use that line of demarcation as the foundation-
al principle for First Amendment religious guarantees. If a
nonseparationist approach (such as what I term the "historical"
approach) were used-one that rejects the separation of the
religious and the secular as the operational principle, and sub-
stitutes, instead, the protection of individual conscience-what
would result? What would be the shape, content, and limitations
of First Amendment guarantees?
In this Section, I will consider the implications of a
nonseparationist, historical approach for First Amendment juris-
prudence. Rejection of the separation of the religious and the
secular, and focus (instead) on the protection of individual con-
science, would have important implications for the breadth,
importance, and presumptions of protected free exercise. Impli-
cations for Establishment Clause jurisprudence would be even
more profound. If focus in these cases were shifted from hostility
to the religious in public life to the enforcement of religious and
governmental institutional separation, the Court's existing ap-
proach to these cases would be fundamentally altered. Many
state actions now sanctioned would fail, and many state actions
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now condemned would be permitted. Finally, there are the im-
plications of the historical approach for what may be the most
intriguing question in First Amendment jurisprudence: the ap-
parent irreconcilability of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. Under the historical approach, is the irreconcilable,
reconciled?
B. Free Religious Exercise
The Supreme Court currently approaches free exercise cases
in the following fashion. First, the religious nature of the claim
is considered. In practice, this investigation generally involves a
separation of the religious from the philosophical, a presump-
tively nonprotected category.533 If the claim involved is a reli-
gious one, the next question is whether the state action has, as
its object, the "burdening" of religion-such an object being in-
valid, in the Court's view, under the Free Exercise Clause. If the
claim is religious, and the state action "neutral," the remaining
tests-belief vs. action, "centrality" of belief, and the "compel-
ling" nature of the governmental interest-are attempts to as-
sign importance, and protection, to the conflicting interests in-
volved.534
The Court's threshold attempt to separate religious from
philosophical beliefs, with protection accorded to the former and
denied to the latter, has proven increasingly problematic as less
traditional, nontheistic beliefs have provided the basis for free
exercise claims. This attempt has also conflicted with the Court's
theoretical (and practical) recognition that both the nature of an
asserted belief and the question of an individual's adherence to
that belief must be left to individual determination. Under the
Court's approach, (unprotected) philosophical beliefs must be
separated from (protected) religious beliefs; but the difficulties of
this task are so great that the Court's analyses have tended to
founder at the outset.
The historical approach would change the threshold question
asked. Under this approach, the issues of the Clause's scope or
533. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. Establishment Clause claims
have involved the same (albeit often unspoken) inquiry.
534. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
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coverage would turn less on the nature of the asserted belief
than on the protection of the process of individual belief forma-
tion. Freedom of conscience-and the deep reasons for its pro-
tection-would provide the outer limits of the Clause. The criti-
cal question would not be whether an inquiry involves "reli-
gious" or "philosophical" issues or answers, but whether it in-
volves the exercise of free human reason, judgment, and under-
standing "about... ultimate matters of belief, of meaning, [and]
of value."5 ' Attempted distinctions between the religious and
the philosophical-a hopeless enterprise, as the Court has all
but conceded-would no longer be the focus of protection.
Regaining conscience as the focus of protection would obvious-
ly not eliminate all definitional issues. The need for some under-
standing of this new test would remain. "Freedom of conscience"
had definite meaning in the Founding Era; it was assumed to
involve individual determination of answers to fundamental
questions of human existence, including the determination of
"religious" or transcendent truths.536 Such ideas are far from
precise; the problem of individual relativity-that one person's
"fundamental questions" or "transcendent truths" may not be
those of another-would remain. However, focus on the process
of conscience, and on the purposes served by its freedom, might
well yield a more articulable understanding of the scope of free
exercise protection than current practice has done.
Use of the historical approach would also ameliorate a deeper
problem. Problems in distinguishing the religious from the secu-
lar are an inherent part of any scheme of First Amendment
interpretation. They are far more critical, however, for a scheme
that depends, for its foundational structure, upon analytical and
spheric religious/secular separation. If an intertwining of reli-
gious and secular is accepted, as a matter of First Amendment
analysis, some indeterminacy in the definition of religion may be
untidy, but manageable. If, on the other hand, the religious and
the secular must be separated rigidly, and separation is depen-
535. MILLER, supra note 9, at 343; cf RIcHARDs, TOLERATION, supra note 333, at
97, 137-44 (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause, and the freedom of conscience
that it protects, should broadly immunize theistic and nontheistic beliefs, powers of
rationality and reasonableness, from state coercion).
536. See supra notes 270-313 and accompanying text.
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dent upon a definition that is somewhat nebulous at best, there
is a festering difficulty at the root of the entire jurisprudential
scheme. The historical understanding does not eliminate all
definitional issues; but it does render their inherent uncertainty
far less pivotal in the basic understanding of First Amendment
protections and prohibitions.
Under the historical approach, the next step in the Court's
analysis-that 'laws that intend to burden religion are, by this
reason alone, invalid-would have no force. This inquiry, like
"subjective" inquiries in establishment cases,537 has no place in
the historical approach. Rather, the question would be whether,
as an actual matter, the law impairs the claimant's freedom of
conscience (exercise of religion). This function, or effect, would
be determinative. The "object" of the law, if it has no such effect,
would be irrelevant.
Existing tests that assign importance (and protection) to con-
flicting claims would also change. The distinction between reli-
gious belief and religiously-motivated action, which has been
repeatedly invoked by the Court in support of its decisions, is
alien to the historical approach. In the Founding Era, religious
beliefs, and their expression in a myriad of ways, were assumed
to be an integral part of individual and communal life. 3 Free-
dom-to object, to dissent, to express religious and conscientious
belief-clearly was accepted and protected. Different degrees of
protection for religious belief and religious action would have
been seen as essentially meaningless, since the idea of belief
without action was not seen as a viable choice. Even those gov-
ernmental acts that seemed to directly concern belief, such as
prescribed creeds, test oaths for public office, and so on, were
seen in terms of coercion of action: acts of worship, testifying as
to one's beliefs, implementing one's religious creeds in private
and public life.
If the historical approach were used, the question of protection
would devolve into what has essentially been the final part of
the Supreme Court's test: whether the state's asserted restric-
tion of religious free exercise or the expression of conscience is
537. See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 376-421 and accompanying text.
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supported by something akin to a compelling governmental in-
terest. 39 In particular terms, the test would be whether the
governmental action in question serves to protect the state from
a manifest danger or to protect the reciprocal rights of others.
Although this test might not seem to be a substantial change as
a rhetorical matter, the weight assigned to competing interests
within this test would be profoundly altered. The concern with
religious/secular separation that I argue to be the animating
principle in the Supreme Court's decisions-the approval of
those claims that accept the Court's conception of separation and
the denial of those that do not-would be completely incompre-
hensible, indeed, illicit, under the historical approach. In the
absence of separationist concerns, findings of "compelling" gov-
ernmental interests in the denial of exemptions from military
service,54° from participation in the Social Security system,541
and from assignment of Social Security numbers,"' might well
reach different outcomes. Similarly, the assumption that protec-
tion of "neutral" laws that do not "coerce" individual action must
trump competing religious interests543 would have no place
under the historical approach.544 All laws that restrict religious
free exercise or the expression of conscience would be subject to
equal scrutiny.
Balances struck in free exercise cases would also be altered by
enhanced recognition of the societal or collective value inherent
in free exercise claims. Although the Court's opinions have been
characterized by stock recitations of the importance of free exer-
cise to the religious claimant involved,545 there is no recogni-
539. See supra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
540. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
541. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
542. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
543. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
544. Cf Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (arguing that the framers of the First Amendment
intended that there be religious exercise exemptions from otherwise neutral laws).
545. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. In the majority opin-
ions issued in two other recent free exercise cases, there are not even stock recita-
tions: no discussion of the importance of free exercise to anyone (including the claim-
ant) appears. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Bowen, 476 U.S.
at 693.
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tion that protection of free exercise serves any socially useful
function or has any importance to the process of government. As
a result, the Court has viewed free exercise claims as individual-
ly-defined, arbitrary interferences with communal desires and
norms. When these arbitrary, individual claims (of no societal
value) are weighed against the claims of government (which, by
definition, reflect the collective will), the result is predictable:
the latter must prevail. This analytical process reached its cul-
mination in the recent collapse of the compelling interest test in
Lyng. 4. and Smith."' Since, in those cases, the only recog-
nized interests of collective importance were those represented
by government, accommodation of free exercise claims might as
well be left "to the political process."54 Indeed, the absence of
any perceived societal value in religious free exercise is reflected
in the Court's articulation of the compelling governmental inter-
est test itself. Although an interest is "compelling" only in the
context of other interests, that context, as articulated by the
Court, has been increasingly limited to the interests of govern-
ment.549
Use of the historical approach would force recognition and
articulation of the societal and governmental interests that un-
derlie free exercise claims. Because freedom of conscience under
the historical approach has both individual and collective value,
societal interests in these claims must be considered in evaluat-
ing the impact of governmental action. Claims for freedom of
conscience (or religious free exercise) cannot be seen simply as
individually-defined and arbitrary annoyances--"luxur[ies]" that
our society "cannot afford;"55 they present core, fundamental
values, on which a free society and free government depend.
546. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
547. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
548. Id. at 890; see also Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452.
549. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (compelling
interest in maintaining a "'sound tax system'" is compared to the governmental in-
terest in an exemption-free Social Security System) (quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)); Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-84 (comparing the governmental
interest in "generally applicable criminal law[s]" to the governmental interests in
Sunday closing laws, the integrity of the tax system, general governmental regulato-
ry programs, and so on).
550. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
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When weighing the competing interests involved in these cases,
the calculation would be much more complex, with societal and
governmental interests involved on both sides of the scale.
The fundamental differences in orientation that this approach
involves are evident when it is compared to the "exceptions" ap-
proach to free exercise. In The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion,"' Michael McConnell
challenges the Lyng and Smith decisions and argues that ar-
ticulate spokesmen of the Founding Era anticipated that reli-
gious exercise exceptions would be granted from otherwise neu-
tral (secular) and generally applicable laws.552 Although I am
sympathetic with the thrust of his efforts, the approach that he
describes is in fact the inverse of what I argue. Under an excep-
tions approach, one begins with neutral laws, and seeks excep-
tions for religious free exercise; under what I argue to have been
the historical understanding, one begins with the assumption of
freedom of conscience (or free religious exercise) and allows state
interference only in those cases that present particular extremi-
ty or danger.
Arguably, the result will often be the same: under either un-
derstanding, the conflict is between religious exercise and com-
munity norms, with similar factors (compelling state interests)
deciding the outcome. There is, however, a critical difference in
the assumptions of each. Under what I argue to be the historical
understanding, analysis begins with the primacy and strength of
freedom of conscience; the state, which claims an exception to
this value, must prove it. Under the "exceptions" approach, anal-
ysis begins with the primacy and legitimacy of state action; the
individual, who claims an exception to this value, must prove it.
Although the Court often frames the "exceptions" approach to
the contrary, this approach assumes the broad, collective power
of "otherwise neutral" state laws, and the absence of any per-
ceived societal value or function in free exercise claims. As a
result, the legitimacy of state action is presumed, with the reli-
gious claimant left to prove otherwise. The march toward Smith
551. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
552. Id. at 1453-55.
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and Lyng was not, in other words, accidental. It inhered in an
approach that identifies state laws with collective values and
collective power and that leaves the free exercise claimant to
argue for an exception, alone.
Admittedly, the use of the historical approach would make the
adjudication of free exercise claims more difficult. The approach
in Lyng and Smith-that the bulk of free exercise claims (being
only of an individually valued nature) simply are outweighed by
the collective will, asserted in any neutral law of general appli-
cation-is certainly a simple one. However, its assumption that
free exercise is a separate, "private" matter, which is protected
only when it does not contravene the routine affairs of govern-
ment, relegates religiosity and the freedom of conscience on
which it is based to a role of extreme peripherality. In the
Founding Era, it was assumed that freedom of conscience and
its expression were the fundamental values from which all else
sprang. In only the most extreme circumstances was suppression
justified.553 From this beginning, we have moved to a point, in
Lyng and Smith, where any neutrally-framed law lies beyond
free exercise challenge. Freedom of conscience and its expression
have, indeed, been left to the grace of the sovereign. Perhaps, in
our complacency, we have forgotten the bitter value of dissent.
C. Freedom from Establishment of Religion by Government
Under the traditional approach of the Supreme Court, estab-
lishment of religion by government is to be avoided by vigorous
application of the tests set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.554 Un-
der Lemon, in order for a law or governmental practice to with-
stand challenge on establishment grounds, it must have a secu-
lar purpose;55 it must have a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion;556 and it must not foster "excessive
government entanglement with religion." ' 7 Recently, the first
two prongs of this test have been reframed in the terms of "en-
553. See supra notes 391-406 and accompanying text.
554. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
555. Id. at 612.
556. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
557. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
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dorsement": the law or practice, to survive scrutiny, must not
"convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred."5 8 Implementation of these tests has in-
volved the attempted separation of the religious and the secular
within the individual, in society, and in government.559
The results of this approach have been operationally problem-
atic and doctrinally incoherent. An analytical approach premised
upon the separation of religious and secular motivations, uses,
purposes, symbols, functions, and so on contradicts the enmesh-
ment of the religious and the secular in all areas of human life.
Indeed, recent challenges by fundamentalist Christian groups,
who claim that the "establishment" of the majority's belief sys-
tems is no less violative of the Clause than the "establishment"
of theirs, are the predictable (if uncomfortable) products of the
Court's own approach.56
If this approach is compared with a nonseparationist, histori-
cal one, the differences are profound. Under the historical ap-
proach, the critical question in all cases is whether the govern-
mental action or practice fosters an aggregation of governmental
and religious institutional power. The existence of the religious
in public life is important only to the extent that it answers this
question. The fact that a particular governmental action is per-
meated by religious or anti-religious sentiments or values, or
that it coincides with particular systems of belief, has no impor-
tance absent a further finding of dangerous church-state integra-
tion.
Historical concern with principles of equality and state neu-
trality would not change this result. These principles, while
558. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
In a very recent Establishment Clause case, the majority made no mention of
the traditional Lemon test. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
Members of the Court differed in their interpretations of this fact. Compare id. at
2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting "disagreement with any suggestion that
today's decision signals a departure from the principles" of Lemon) with id. at 2500
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (contending that
the Court's opinion shows that "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is
well under way").
559. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
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clearly informing the historical approach, were not believed to be
free-standing entities that should be used to eradicate the reli-
gious from public life. 61 Rather, principles of equality and state
neutrality were understood to be a part of a greater objec-
tive-the prevention of institutional alliance of church and state.
Governmental adoption of particular acts of religious worship, or
financial support of religious institutions, threatened this objec-
tive and its included notion of equality; the enactment of laws
from religious motives, or the coincidence of laws with religious
belief systems, without more, did not. The latter was assumed to
be a natural part of social and governmental life.562
How would these broad historical principles affect the Su-
preme Court's tests? Under the historical approach, the first,
csecular purpose" prong of the Lemon test 563-whether indi-
vidual legislators or public officials are motivated by "religious"
or "secular" values, beliefs, or ideals-would be either irrelevant
to an Establishment Clause inquiry or itself a violation of consti-
tutional guarantees. Such attempted religious/secular separa-
tion-believed in the Founding Era to be a complete impossibili-
ty 4-would have no relevance to the question of whether par-
ticular governmental action fosters an aggregation of govern-
mental and religious institutional power. Under the historical
approach, it is assumed that government officials will implement
the "fruits of conscience"; indeed, such implementation is as-
sumed to be a necessary part of public life.565 The Court's cur-
rent approach, which has involved the scouring of legislative re-
cords for evidence of religious bias or motive, would have been
incomprehensible to those of the Founding Era. It would have
been seen as an attempt to deprive those in public life of free-
dom of conscience-itself a constitutional violation.
The second and third Lemon prongs-whether the governmen-
tal action has a primary effect that advances or inhibits reli-
561. See supra part III.B.
562. See id.
563. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
564. Cf supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties posed
by the separationist principles utilized by the Court in Establishment Clause cases).
565. See supra notes 317-75 and accompanying text.
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gion,"' and whether it fosters excessive entanglement with
religion 56 7-could be appropriate inquiries under the historical
approach. However, their significance would change. Clearly, if a
governmental action has a primary effect that advances or inhib-
its religion, or fosters excessive government entanglement with
religion, it might well present an unacceptable danger of the
institutional merger of church and state. The Court would have
to apply such tests, however, in the light of the true danger to
be avoided and the goals to be achieved. The primary effect of
the governmental action, or its potentially excessive entangle-
ment with religion, would have to be evaluated in this light.
In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, a finding that a
particular use, symbol, or practice is religious in nature would
no longer be conclusive evidence of an Establishment Clause
violation. Under the Court's current approach, any affirmative
answer to these questions is determinative and fatal. If a school
instructional aid is used for a religious purpose, or if a symbol
used by government has a "religious message," the Establish-
ment Clause is violated. The existence of an Establishment
Clause violation turns wholly on what is (as an analytical and
practical matter) an often entirely arbitrary attempt to catego-
rize such things as religious or secular5 6 8-an attempt that
founders on the mixed nature of many uses, functions, and sym-
bols.569 Where the practice in question is an historic one, with
clearly religious elements (such as legislative prayer and many
national mottos), the Court's position has created particular
difficulties. Since, under the Court's approach, any finding of the
"religious" nature of such uses, symbols, or practices requires
the finding of an Establishment Clause violation, its only re-
course has been denial of their religious nature"--a complete-
ly improbable conclusion.
566. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
567. Id. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 674 (1970)).
568. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
569. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
570. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468-69
(1993); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968); Allegheny County, 492
U.S. at 615-21 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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Under the historical approach, recognition of the religious use
of a material resource, or governmental use of a religious sym-
bol, might well be involved in determining whether a particular
governmental action fosters the institutional merger of church
and state. There would be no need, however, to arbitrarily deny
the mixed nature of many uses, symbols, or functions, or to deny
that many uses, symbols, and practices, although religious in
nature, present no cognizable danger of church-state integration.
Analysis would not turn upon the mechanical and often impossi-
ble separation of religious from secular messages, or religious
from secular functions, and so on. Rather, it would go to the core
issue: whether the governmental action in question fosters an
aggregation of governmental and religious institutional power.
The finding that a particular governmental action contains reli-
gious elements would not compel a conclusion that it advances
or inhibits religion, fosters entanglement with religion, or is (by
this reason alone) a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The endorsement test would have a similar, limited role under
the historical approach. Whether a governmental action "con-
vey[s] a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred""' would appear to be the substantial
equivalent of the historic concern that government observe a
position of neutrality toward competing religious sects. However,
under the historical approach, the limited role of equal treat-
ment tests (whether framed in terms of endorsement or neutrali-
ty) must be remembered: they are only part of the equation.
Even if a particular governmental use, symbol, or action appears
to "endorse" or favor a particular religious group, that fact will
not, alone, violate anti-establishment principles absent a further
finding of dangerous church-state alliance. Conversely, even if
principles of equality are not violated by a particular govern-
mental action, the prohibition on religious and governmental
institutional integration may well be. For example, massive
governmental funding of all religious institutions may not vio-
late principles of equality but may well present unacceptable
dangers of the aggregation of governmental and religious insti-
571. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
972 [Vol. 36:837
19951 SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 973
tutional power. In all cases, the constitutionality of the govern-
mental action must be evaluated against the fundamental area
of historical concern.572
The question that remains is whether, under the historical
approach, the outcomes of past cases would differ. Although
such speculation is not easy, some differences are clear. Under
the historical approach, public aid for sectarian elementary and
secondary schools would not present an automatic violation of
the Establishment Clause.573 Artificial distinctions between re-
ligious and secular uses of books or instructional aids,574 or pu-
pil and institutional benefit tests,575 would no longer have de-
572. One remaining question is whether the endorsement test, with its implicit in-
clusion of preference for religion over nonreligion among prohibited governmental
acts, sweeps more broadly than historical concerns of governmental neutrality. See
supra notes 492-94 and accompanying text. In the end, this question has little prac-
tical impact, because it is virtually impossible for government to "endorse" religion
without (in the course of defining that term) choosing among competing understand-
ings of the religious. Indeed, if an affirmative governmental act were framed with
sufficient latitude to avoid this problem (such as exemption from military service of
all "religious" objectors, with that left to the definition of the adherent), there would
be no "endorsement" in any meaningful sense at all. The Supreme Court has implic-
itly recognized this, by leaving unchallenged (on equal treatment grounds) those laws
that leave the freedom to choose religious identity to the individuals or groups in-
volved. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Conmm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). It is those laws that
attempt to impose state definition and sanction upon particular religious beliefs that
run afoul of endorsement or neutrality tests.
573. Cf Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991) (arguing that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect citizens' organi-
zational structures as well as individual rights). For an attempt to apply this theory
of "structural" recognition and protection to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
claims, see Mary A. Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 477 (1991).
574. See e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 386-89 (1985); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
575. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468-69
(1993) (direct loans of teaching material and equipment, the provision of state-paid
personnel to provide remedial and accelerated instruction, and guidance counseling
"'aid . . . sectarian school enterprise[s],'" while "[handicapped children, not sectarian
schools, are the primary beneficiaries" of state-paid sign language interpreters pro-
vided to parochial school students) (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
The institutional-child benefit distinction has come under harsh scrutiny in the
Court. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (distinction between
equipment loaned to the pupil or the institution "exalt[s] form over substance"); Ball,
473 U.S. at 395 (rejecting "fiction that a ... program could be saved by masking it
as aid to individual students").
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terminative force. The absurdity of such tests, both in the at-
tempted categorization of such uses and benefits as religious or
secular, and in the refusal of such tests to acknowledge the inte-
grated planning and financing of religious institutions, could
finally be acknowledged. Instead of attempts to separate reli-
gious and secular uses or benefits, a simple and straightforward
question would be asked: does the proposed public aid create an
unacceptable danger of the institutional merger of church and
state? If it does, it is violative of the Establishment Clause; if it
does not, it is not.
Indeed, many decisions by the Supreme Court in this area
arguably reflect the silent usage of this test.576 Although incon-
sistencies remain, assessment of the danger of church-state
merger often presents a more coherent explanation for the
Court's decisions than the stated reasons for its actions. Deci-
sions permitting the provision of sign-language interpreters,
577
loans of secular textbooks,5 78 basic bus fares,5 79 and diagnos-
tic services.. to students in parochial schools are more readily
explainable on the basis that they present no realistic danger of
church-state merger than that they present no "religious" use of
public money. Other examples of public assistance currently
forbidden to sectarian schools-such as the limited provision of
projectors, tape recorders, and record players," 1 the lending of
institutional equipment or materials," 2 or the provision of
counseling and testing services 83 -would appear to present a
no more palpable danger of institutional merger, and should
(under the historical test) be permissible as well.
A question which arises is what the limits of this approach
might be. Would public financial support of sectarian education-
576. In two cases, the Court's decisions have explicitly turned on concerns about
the "fusion" of governmental and religious functions. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481, 2488-90 (1994) (plurality opinion); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116, 126, 127 (1982).
577. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
578. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
579. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
580. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977).
581. See id. at 248-51.
582. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975).
583. See id. at 367-72.
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al institutions ever present the dangers that those in the Found-
ing Era feared? Clearly, if some sectarian institutions receive
public support to the exclusion of others, or if sectarian institu-
tions receive support to the exclusion of nonsectarian ones, the
choice of particular recipients for governmental largesse would
violate historical principles of equality and create a clear danger
of church-state alliance. The provision of aid on an even-handed
basis presents a more difficult question. If all educational insti-
tutions receive equal governmental support, would this implicate
historical concerns?
This question is hardly academic. Educational "choice plans,"
now advocated by many educational reformers and governmen-
tal leaders, are pending in legislatures nationwide. Many feature
the use of public-funding "vouchers" for education in all
schools-including those of a sectarian nature.
The fact of equal treatment, alone, does not answer this issue.
Equality, in the historical view, was only a part of the larger
concern of the institutional alliance of church and state, and the
resulting corruption of each. The concerns of reformers-that
governmental financial support of religious institutions would
promote their involvement in government, their meddling with
laws, their grasping for money, and their attempts to protect
governmentally-bestowed privileges and emoluments-are pre-
sented no less by the public funding of all religious institutions
than by the funding of few. Rather, the answer becomes un-
avoidably, and perhaps uncomfortably, one of degree: while
incidental public support for sectarian institutions (on a basis
equal to public institutions and to each other) probably presents
little danger of institutional alliance of church and state, exten-
sive funding may pose significant danger."'
This change in approach would have widespread effects. Pub-
lic financial support for religious institutions exists throughout
our governmental system: governmental grants for sectarian
charitable activities, public financial assistance to sectarian
universities, and public financing of religious counseling ser-
584. Indeed, in a recent case, the Court articulated a standard that explicitly incor-
porates the amount of aid received as a relevant factor under the Establishment
Clause. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2468 (1993).
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vices, to name a few. Under current law, all of these practices
have received Court approval585-generally under the fiction
that religious activities of sectarian institutions could be sepa-
rated from secular activities, with taxpayer aid "channeled" only
to the latter. Under the historical approach, such fictions would
be abandoned, and all of these forms of governmental involve-
ment with religious institutions would be subject to scrutiny and
would be potentially violative of the Establishment Clause. Dis-
tinctions between aid to sectarian elementary and secondary
schools and aid to other sectarian institutions, often used to
uphold such financing, would have no bearing on the issue.
Indeed, in the ostensible reason for this distinction-that reli-
gious indoctrination occurs in a uniquely effective manner in
settings of elementary and secondary school children 58 -it is
difficult to imagine a greater departure from historical assump-
tions. Those in the Founding Era were not concerned with the
existence of religion in the lives of those who chose those beliefs.
Rather, they were concerned with compelled taxpayer support of
religious institutions, be they charitable, higher educational, or
of whatever nature.
Government involvement in religious recommendations, proc-
lamations, and exercises, also presents a sensitive danger. Here,
the symbolic nature of governmental actions is so powerful, the
difficulty in avoiding choice among religious sects so difficult,
and the dangers of church-state alliance or merger so subtle,
that great vigilance would be required. The Court's traditional
concerns with the vulnerability of the audience, the decline in
religious meaning of particular acts through long, historic us-
age, 51' and the existence of religious or nonreligious contexts
for particular words or symbols,"' would certainly be of rele-
585. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (approving public grants to
sectarian teenage counseling centers); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (approving public aid to religiously-affiliated colleges); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (same); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (approving
public aid to church-run hospital).
586. See, e.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-86 (stating that federal aid to church-related
colleges is permissible for the reason, among others, that college students are 'less
impressionable" than elementary and secondary school students to religious influ-
ences).
587. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
588. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-81 (1984) (discussing the im-
976 [Vol. 36:837
1995] SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 977
vance (although not determinative) under the historical ap-
proach. In each instance, the question would be whether the
particular usage, exercise, symbol, or action not only carries
religious content but also presents, in its particular context, a
danger of church-state alliance. Under this test, the outcomes in
many cases would track the Supreme Court's decisions. The use
of prayers or devotional texts in public schools would violate the
principle of church-state separation,589 as would the display of
clearly religious injunctions on the walls of a public school class-
room.59 Public use of religious symbols that have obtained
broader cultural meaning would present less danger.59'
Other issues would have starkly different outcomes. Sunday
closing laws,59 and other governmental acts that involve par-
ticular sabbatarian choices, would be particularly difficult to
sustain under an honest application of the historical ap-
proach.593 Although such laws survived the efforts of reformers,
they are clearly a vestige of comprehensive state religious estab-
lishments. 94
portance of context in the constitutional evaluation of objects in a Christmas dis-
play).
589. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (reaffirming the Court's
prohibition of state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercises in public schools).
590. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that a statute requiring
posting the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms was unconstitutional).
591. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (discussing
usage of religious symbols in Christmas season displays); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668
(same).
592. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
593. See generally ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA 42-45 (1984) (describ-
ing Sunday closing laws as an attempt by Protestant religious groups to create a
"Christian civilization").
594. For instance, the Reverend John Leland, a dissenting Protestant minister,
wrote:
If Jesus appointed the day to be observed, he did it as the head of the
church, not as the king of nations; or if the apostles enjoined it, they did
it in the capacity of Christian teachers, and not as human legislators. As
the appointment of such days is no part of human legislation, so the
breach of the Sabbath (so called) is no part of civil jurisdiction. I am not
an enemy to holy days . . . but these times should be fixed by the mutu-
al agreement of religious societies . . . and not by civil authority.
JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JOHN
LELAND, supra note 517, at 119.
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State laws excluding clergy from public office would also be
evaluated for what they are: efforts to achieve institutional sepa-
ration of church and state. The Supreme Court struck down
such a Tennessee law, on the ground that it violated the clergy's
civil rights and free religious exercise. There is, the Court wrote,
"no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public
office will be... less faithful to their oaths of civil office than
their unordained counterparts."595 Under the historical ap-
proach, the question would not be whether individuals could
execute religious and secular functions, but whether persons
who hold positions of particular authority in religious institu-
tions should also hold positions of civil power. Should a cardinal
of the Roman Catholic Church, a bishop of the Episcopal
Church, or the head of the Lutheran Church in America serve as
a United States Senator or President as well? Such engrafting of
religious and secular power evoked a bitter taste for many early
Americans, who knew from personal experience of the dangers of
such arrangements. Although opinions on the question were
divided during the Founding Era,59 the probable answer (un-
der the historical approach) is that such dual office holding
should be prohibited.
Consideration of the historical approach also illuminates an-
other issue: why "sectarian" religious uses, functions, and sym-
bols have triggered particular alarm in the Court's adjudication
of Establishment Clause cases. 97 The basis for this alarm has
never been articulated by the Court. Indeed, if (as the Court
assumes) the critical question is the separation of the religious
from the secular, with a blanket prohibition of the former, it is
difficult to justify greater opprobrium for "sectarian" belief than
for "theistic" belief or belief of any other description.59 If, how-
ever, the critical question changes-if it is, instead, whether the
governmental action tends to foster the institutional merger of
church and state-the reason for fear of the sectarian is clear.
Alliance of government with a particular, sectarian religious
595. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
596. See supra notes 524-26 and accompanying text.
597. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
598. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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group obviously carries greater danger than governmental alli-
ance with diffuse "theistic" notions or other broad belief systems.
Lastly, use of the historical approach would answer one of the
most difficult controversies in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence: the question of the establishment of particular values by
government. Somewhat ironically, those on the fundamentalist
Christian right, who oppose the "establishment" of secular hu-
manism in the public schools,599 and those of the civil libertari-
an left, who oppose attempts to inteiject creationism and other
"religiously-based" doctrines into the same settings,"' share
the same assumption: that laws motivated by religious concerns
or rooted in religious beliefs present an apparent violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court condemned
Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act6.' because it found that
"[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint .. .""' In a recent
article in the New York Times, a writer alleges that "[a]round
the country, a highly organized, well-financed movement is try-
ing to return Biblical values-if not the Bible itself-to school-
rooms.""0 3 Similarly, Christian fundamentalists who have chal-
lenged the teaching of "Jeffersonian Enlightenment" or "secular
humanism" in the public schools have argued that such
"antirevelatory" and "antisupernaturalistic" philosophies are "no
less dogmatic than any other faith" and are only "particular
religion[s] vying for dominance among others."0 4 Both groups
argue that they should not be taxed to support schools involved
in teaching "religious" values that they do not support.
605
599. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
600. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
601. Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in Public
School Instruction Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982).
602. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591 (1987).
603. A Campaign To Put Biblical Values in the Public Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
13, 1994, at Bl.
604. MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 314, at 49.
605. A distinction (rarely made) must be made between the teaching of religious
values and the explicit teaching of religious or anti-religious doctrine. Teaching that
"it is wrong to kill" must be distinguished from teaching that "God tells us it is
wrong to kill" or "there is no god to tell us it is wrong to kill." The first involves
the teaching of a particular value (which may coincide with particular systems of
belief); the latter involves the teaching of religious or anti-religious doctrine, an
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Such arguments point out an important truth and a different
conundrum for existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. If, as the
Supreme Court has intimated, the essence of religious belief is
deep value choice," 6 any value choice by government is sectari-
an. No matter what philosophical basis is chosen for the public
school curriculum (or, presumably, for any other law), sectarian
control exists and the Establishment Clause is violated. The
common critique of the fundamentalists' position-that they are
"really fighting for a restoration of the Protestant empire's val-
ues"6 7-although undoubtedly true, fails to address the ques-
tion. If value choice is an Establishment Clause issue, there is
no apparent constitutional justification for privileging any par-
ticular values over others in the nation's public schools or laws,
because the choice of any values violates required governmental
neutrality among competing religious sects."' Indeed, even if
the public school curriculum were somehow seen as "nonreli-
gious" or value-neutral, its "establishment" would violate the
required neutrality between religion and nonreligion that the
Court has held that the Clause commands.0 9
Under the historical approach, these claims fail because their
shared central premise fails: the Establishment Clause does not
prohibit the existence of religious values, beliefs, or ideals in the
enterprise clearly condemned under any interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
606. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
607. Martin Marty, Foreward, to McCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 314, at xiii.
608. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (Establishment Clause
forbids not only state practices that "aid one religion . . .or prefer one religion over
another", but also those that "aid all religions"). As Stephen Arons has written:
Up to this point, the effect of the Court's schooling cases has been
to uphold and entrench the legal fiction that schooling can be value-neu-
tral. By its use of the secular-religious dichotomy the Court has been
able to eliminate an obvious form of belief manipulation-religious obser-
vance-from public schools, but it has thereby implied that the secular
content of schooling does not touch upon the basic beliefs and values of
students ....
Stephen Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV.
EDUC. REv. 76, 97 (1976).
609. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)
(stating that the Establishment Clause applies "no less to governmental acts favoring
religion generally than to acts favoring one religion over others"); Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.").
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workings of government. Those values, beliefs, and ide-
als-whether Jewish, Baptist, secular humanistic, or something
else-are an accepted, integral, and necessary part of social and
governmental institutions. As a consequence, the existence of
religious motivations of lawmakers, or the coincidence of public
school teachings and particular belief systems, presents no viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. Rather, the central concern
and language of the debate is different. It is not the establish-
ment of values that should trigger concern; it is the merger of
institutional church and state. The religious or nonreligious con-
tent of school curricula or other laws is relevant only as part of a
larger issue: that of the danger of merger or alliance between
institutional church and state. When viewed in this light, a law
such as Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act might fail; but if it
does, it will be because of the actuality of the danger of church-
state merger, not because of its simple coincidence with (particu-
lar) religious values.
Historical recognition of the inseparability of the religious and
the secular does not, in short, result in the eradication of all
limitations in the reach of the Establishment Clause. Rather, it
restricts the scope of that Clause to the protection of freedom of
conscience through prohibition of the merger of governmental
and religious institutional power. Linda Kerber has written that
in the Founding Era, it was believed that "[r]eligious obligation
would reinforce moral obligation." 1° It was a paradox "that re-
ligious faith was a necessary ingredient in a social order which
forbade the establishment of religion."61' This paradox exists
only if the "establishment of religion" is seen as the eradication
of religious beliefs, ideals, and values from the processes and
products of government. No paradox arises if these issues are
understood now as they were understood then: that the process
of free, individual inquiry, and the religious or transcendent
beliefs that it yields, are a vital part of the foundations of society
and government; and the merger of governmental and religious
institutional power is prohibited for their protection.
610. KERBER, supra note 18, at 208.
611. Id.
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D. The Historical Approach: Is the Irreconcilable, Reconciled?
It has long been stated that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment present an irreconcilable conflict. The Establish-
ment Clause, in the view of the Supreme Court, comprises two
basic principles: one "of 'absolute equality before the law, of all
religious opinions and sects,"'612 and one of governmental neu-
trality between religion and nonreligion.613 These principles
present a central, theoretical problem because the Court's ap-
proach to the Establishment Clause clearly implies differing
treatment of the religious and the secular, as does the explicit
language of the Free Exercise Clause. The religious and the
secular clearly are distinguished and treated unequally, whether
the goal is the protection of the public realm from religious val-
ues, motivations, symbols, or exercises, or the protection of the
private interests in free exercise from undue public interference.
In short, "neutrality" in establishment seems to contradict the
need to prevent the establishment of religion by government or
to protect (and privilege) religious free exercise.
The apparent irreconcilability of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses presents an intriguing historical question. We,
as the legatees of the Founding Era, might well be burdened
with this irreconcilability, to deal with as best we might. But
what about the reformers, who presumably had choice in the
matter? Surely, they must have been aware of the problem that
they created. If they were, why did they create it? Or (perhaps
more fairly) why is it never discussed, in anything resembling
recognizable terms, in the writings of this era?
We can never know the reasons for silence. What answers
might have been made to an objection, never posed, are impossi-
ble to guess. What we can say, with some confidence, is that the
reformers apparently assumed that concepts of equality and the
special treatment of the religious existed in harmony. Where the
issue was the differing treatment of particular religious sects by
government, the reason is apparent: the drive toward disestab-
lishment was perfectly consonant with the principle of equality.
612. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
613. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04.
982 [Vol. 36:837
SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
Religious, sectarian differences, then more frightening and raw
than at any later time in our history, in fact impelled the drive
toward equal treatment of all.
The apparent privileging of the religious over the nonreli-
gious-by free exercise guarantees and the apparent belief, in
the Founding Era, that they presented no difficulty under the
Establishment Clause-presents a more difficult question. The
ease with which privileged, religious expression coexisted with
concepts of equality could be attributed to a general failure to
consider the question. Challenges to general religious preference
are most often raised by religious skepticism, a phenomenon
little known in that era.
It is far more likely that the answer lay in the view of the
relationship between the religious and the secular that prevailed
at that time. If (as in the modern era) the religious and the
secular are seen as separate spheres, competing for supremacy,
the privileging of one over the other becomes a problem of poten-
tially large dimensions. If (as in the Founding Era) the religious
and the secular are seen as inseparable parts of all aspects of
life, problems of "equality" lose their force. Although bitter dif-
ferences existed as to what the legitimately religious was, virtu-
ally all agreed that the religious deserved protection because of
its assumed role in individual and collective life.
Seeming nonconcern with problems of equality might also be
traced to the core concept that underlay anti-establishment and
free exercise principles: the idea of freedom of individual con-
science. The fundamental, irreducible value for the reformers of
this era was the protection of individual conscience. When gov-
ernment attempted to prescribe the content of belief, or acted in a
way that might lead to attempts to prescribe belief-whether
through governmentally-enforced religious creeds, restrictions on
religious free exercise, or the merger of governmental and reli-
gious institutions-the reformers' core value was threatened.
If free exercise and anti-establishment principles are viewed
in this way-if they are seen as rooted in the preservation of the
freedom of individual belief-problems of equality, or irreconcil-
ability, disappear. Freedom of religion, understood as freedom of
conscience, is a value that all human beings share; it is not the
prerogative of "believers" alone. To the extent that religion is
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particularly protected, principles of equality are not offended
because the right that it protects (freedom of conscience) is
something available and valuable to all. As I have argued in
another context, the concept of a general right must be distin-
guished from particular instantations of that right. 14 Modern
claims that religion is "privileged" assume that only some have
an interest in this right. In fact, freedom of conscience is of uni-
versal value to all individuals and to the societies they cre-
ate.
615
Problems of discrimination against the religious-another
form of inequality-are ameliorated as well. When the focus of
anti-establishment efforts is the protection of freedom of con-
science and, consequently, the enforcement of church-state insti-
tutional separation, the problems inherent in attempts to ex-
clude religious motivations, values, and ideas from the public
sphere are avoided. The discrimination against religious persons
that inevitably results from efforts to separate the religious from
the secular, root and branch, is not present when the role of the
religious in public life is an accepted and expected phenomenon.
It is true, of course, that differing treatment of religious and
secular institutions remains under the historical approach.
Founding Era reformers accepted this result because their un-
derstanding of the concepts of government neutrality and equali-
ty did not extend so far. Dangers to freedom of conscience-the
primary and overriding value-justified the prevention of
church-state merger. Faced with this issue, and its history of
oppression, there was no hesitancy in their choice.
The seeming irreconcilability of Free Exercise and Establish-
614. See Laura S. Underkuffler, The Perfidy of Property, 70 TEX. L. REV. 293, 307-
08 (1991) (book review) (discussing the general concept of property protection and
the protection of existing property distributions); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 168-70 (1986) (discussing the distinction between general rights and
particular rights).
615. Cf. generally RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 333 (arguing that toleration,
or freedom of conscience, is a necessary foundation for governmental systems based
upon contractarian assumptions that all persons are free, rational, and equal); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 205-11 (1971) (positing that persons in the "original
position," who are aware of their fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical
interests, but unaware of the particular content of those interests, would choose
equal liberty of conscience as a binding principle).
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ment Clause principles is, in fact, the product of our narrow
sense of the religious and of its role in public life. In the Found-
ing Era, reformers assumed otherwise. Perhaps, as we face mod-
ern conflicts, we should consider their ideas again.
V. SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
Acknowledgement of the inseparability of the religious and
the secular in individual and collective life may seem like a
radical act. The model of separate religious and secular spheres,
vying for supremacy, each antagonistic to the other, with a "wall
of separation" erected for mutual protection between them, is so
entrenched in our thinking as to be a throw-away phrase of
obvious truth in judicial and scholarly work. The phrase is re-
peated, again and again, as if its very simplicity will make it
true.
We are afraid to see the world as it exists. We are afraid, as
the custodians of liberal democracy, that with religion comes
intolerance, bigotry, and the end of state neutrality. We are
aware of the course of religious persecution, oppression, and
death throughout recorded human history. Afraid of this knowl-
edge, afraid of the relaxation of vigilance, we draw our
lines-again and again-only to be undermined (yet again) by
the contradictions we assume.
The religious voice is strident. It asserts its truth and cites as
its sources ways of knowing inaccessible to others. The reli-
gious-with its claims to special recognition, protection, preroga-
tives, and privileges-seems to confound our deepest instincts of
equality. The dangers of such ideas reverberate uneasily in our
collective conscience.
The idea that issues of religious truth should be excluded from
the public agenda, as divisive and unamenable to compromise, is
undoubtedly a good one.616 The couching of political argument
or public dialogue in explicit terms of religious truth may well
contribute to social and political fragmentation. The attempted
exclusion of explicitly religious arguments is, however, one
616. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Ste-
phen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DE-
MOCRACY, supra note 16, at 19.
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thing; the attempted exclusion of religious values, beliefs, ques-
tions, and so on, is another.
In the American Founding Era, reformers believed that indi-
viduals are empowered to make moral judgments; indeed, they
cannot "alienate" this power, even if they wish to do so. Under
this vision, the residual and inalienable power of individuals to
exercise conscience, to make moral judgments, was not seen as
threatening the polity with disintegration. On the contrary, the
process of moral questioning was assumed to be fundamental
to-indeed, the a priori basis for-free government.
The dangers that come with the loss of this perspective are
profound. To avoid imagined divisiveness, discord, and threats to
the body politic, we risk the loss of individual conscience in
public life. This is true, despite the fact that conscience often
has provided the only contemporary voice against what we now
universally agree to have been atrocities in human history.
The religious reminds us, however uneasily, of the questions
that we, as a culture, often try to deny: the question of the pres-
ence (or absence) of shared values, the question of the presence
(or absence) of enduring meaning in our lives. A recent book
describes in compelling detail the struggle for the evolution of
meaning in the lives of middle-class Americans committed to the
individualism of liberal culture."' A lawyer in Silicon Valley is
quoted as saying that "'life is a big pinball game and you have to
be able to-move and adjust yourself to situations if you're going
to enjoy it. You got to be able to realize that most things are not
absolute. Very little is, other than life and death.""'61 Individu-
als speak "a language of radical individual autonomy, a world of
no connection, other than the most utilitarian, to community or
to the world beyond the self and a few intimate relations."1 9
The authors write:
Separated from family, religion, and calling as sources of
authority, duty, and moral example, the self seeks to work
out its own form of action by autonomously pursuing happi-
ness and satisfying its wants. But what are the wants of the
617. BELLAH, ET AL., supra note 14, at 77.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 81.
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sell? By what measure or faculty does it identify its happi-
ness? In the face of these questions, the predominant ethos of
American individualism seems more than ever determined to
press ahead with the task of letting go of all criteria other
than radical private validation.62
The religious reminds us of value choice. It reminds us of the
search for principles that will provide the foundations for social
and governmental order. It reminds us that liberal democratic
government requires, at the very least, commitment to the rule
of law and some understanding of what the law should be. Why
do we agree that slavery is universally, morally repugnant?
What other forms of human oppression should we refuse to ac-
cept, in our society or in our world? The religious reminds us of
the depth, complexity-and indeed, the very existence-of such
questions.
Ideas of conscience, public virtue, and value choice-so impor-
tant during the Founding Era-may seem quaint to us in this
age of preference maximizing and other wizardries. However,
underneath all of our professed sophistication, we remain hu-
man. The failure of the "science" of secularized, liberal theory to
account for "nonrationa' or religious yearnings has been cited
as a primary reason for the popular decline in the appeal of
liberal political ideology and the rise of the politics of right-wing
evangelism in its stead.62' This failure also has resulted in the
tacit denial of the importance of the mystical, the emotional, and
the symbolic in our lives. The spiritual impulse persists, in part,
because of the certitude of illness, loss, suffering, and death. The
denial of the "religious" in public life has mirrored a denial of
the human yearning for meaning beyond ourselves, for ways of
knowing that transcend those of ordinary human experience. As
the result of this denial, we suffer a cost not only to legal coher-
ence, but to the human spirit as well. With the denial of this
part of life, each is, in the end, "shut up in the solitude of his
620. Id. at 79.
621. See generally MOONEY, supra note 6, at 16; Robert N. Bellah, The Japanese
and American Cases, in BELLAH & HAMOND, supra note 14, at 37; Carter, supra
note 16, at 995.
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own heart."'622
The attempt to relegate the religious to the private realm has
impoverished our ideas about the role of conscience in public
life. Its implicit denial-that government must implement val-
ues, and that values (if they are to be more than arbitrary choic-
es) must rest upon shared concepts of what is just, moral, and
right in our lives-has created deep conflicts in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. It has created deep conflicts in our percep-
tions of both government and ourselves.
622. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 508 (George Lawrence trans.,
1966).
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